Concurrent Security by Lin, Hui Jia
CONCURRENT SECURITY
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulﬁllment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Huijia Rachel Lin
January 2012c  2012 Huijia Lin
ALL RIGHTS RESERVEDCONCURRENT SECURITY
Huijia Rachel Lin, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2012
Traditionally, cryptographic protocols are analyzed in a “stand-alone” setting,
where a single protocol execution takes place in isolation. In the age of the Inter-
net, however, a great number of executions of different protocols co-exist and
are tightly inter-connected. This concurrency severely undermines the founda-
tion of the traditional study of cryptography. Since the early 90’s, it has been an
important theme in cryptography to address security in such concurrent setting.
However, till recently, no satisfactory solutions were proposed for performing
general tasks in a concurrently secure way.
In this thesis, we resolve “concurrent security”—we exhibit a construction of
cryptographic protocols for general tasks that remain secure even in concurrent
settings like the Internet. Different from previous works, our construction does
not rely on any trusted infrastructure or strong hardness assumptions. As such, our
construction broadens the applicability of cryptography by enabling it in more
realistic settings and weakening the preconditions it is based on.
Beyond the general feasibility result, we also signiﬁcantly improve the ef-
ﬁciency of secure protocols for performing general tasks even in the stand-
alone setting: We construct constant-round secure protocols for general tasks
based on enhanced trapdoor permutations; this yields the ﬁrst improvement
on the round-efﬁciency—from linear to constant—over the original construc-
tion of [GMW87] based on the same assumptions as [GMW87].
Towardsourconstructions, weidentifythekeyroleof“inputindependence”in achieving concurrent security. Intuitively, if adversaries are forced to act in-
dependently in different protocol executions, then concurrency comes for free
since it is as if each execution were taking place in isolation. We study two no-
tions of “input independence”: Non-malleability and adaptive hardness. Both
notions are central tools in cryptography and have been extensively studied. A
main question is to determine the number of rounds needed for protocols satis-
fying these notions. In this thesis, we completely resolve the round-complexity
of these two notions in the context of commitments: We construct constant-
roundnon-malleablecommitments—introducedby[DDN91]—and!(logn)-round
adaptivelyhardcommitments—orCCA-securecommitmentsintroducedinthis
thesis—from the minimal assumption of one-way functions without using any
trusted infrastructure; the latter construction as we show is round optimal.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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ixCHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Secure Multi-Party Computation
The notion of secure multi-party computation allows m mutually distrustful par-
ties to securely compute (or, realize) a functionality f(¯ x) of their corresponding
private inputs ¯ x = x1;:::; xm, such that party Pi receives the ith component of f(¯ x).
Loosely speaking, the security requirements are that the output of each party is
distributed according to the prescribed functionality—this is called correctness—
and that even malicious parties learn nothing more from the protocol than their
prescribed output—this is called privacy. These properties should hold even in
case that an arbitrary subset of the parties maliciously deviates from the proto-
col.
The above intuitive security requirements of correctness and privacy is later
formalized using the simulation paradigm, originally developed for capturing the
security of encryption and then extended to Zero-Knowledge [GM84, GMR89].
The idea is to say that a protocol  securely realizes f if running  “emulates”
an idealized process where all parties secretly provide inputs to an imaginary
trusted party that computes f and returns the outputs to the parties; more pre-
cisely, any “harm” done by a polynomial-time adversary in the real execution
of , could have been done even by a polynomial-time adversary (called a sim-
ulator) in the ideal process. The simulation paradigm provides strong secu-
rity guarantees: It ensures that running the protocols is “as good as” having
a trusted third party computing the functionality for the players, and an ad-
versary participating in the real execution of the protocols does not gain any
1“computational advantage” over the simulator in the ideal process (except from
polynomial time advantage). We call this deﬁnition basic security.
Soon after the conceptualization of secure multi-party computation, strong
results were established: General constructions of secure computation protocols
that satisfy basic security were developed for virtually all multi-party function-
alities [Yao86, GMW87]. These constructions require only authenticated com-
munication and are based on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations
(TDPs).
However, the original constructions of secure computation protocols take
many rounds of communication, speciﬁcally O(m) rounds, where m is the num-
berofplayersintheexecution. Subsequentworksimprovedtheround-complexity
by making stronger assumptions. Katz, Ostrovsky, and Smith [KOS03] obtained
a O(logn)-round protocol assuming TDPs and dense-crypto systems. By addi-
tionally assuming the existence of hash-function collision-resistant against cir-
cuits of sub-exponential size (and non-black-box technique), they also obtained
a O(1)-round protocol. The latter results was subsequently improved by Pass
[Pas04], showing the existence of a O(1)-rounds protocol assuming only TDPs
and (standard) collision resistant hash functions (but still using non-black box
techniques). But so far, no (asymptotic) improvement to the round-complexity
of multi-party computation has been established assuming only TDPs, leaving
open the following question:
Question 1: Can we construct sub-linear-round secure computation pro-
tocols assuming only TDPs ?
21.2 Concurrent security
A more fundamental problem with the traditional study on basic security is that
the setting in which it investigated secure multi-party computation, however,
only allowed the execution of a single instance of the analyzed protocol in isola-
tion; this is the so-called stand-alone setting. However, in modern networks like
the Internet, protocols are never run in isolation. A more realistic setting, is one
which allows the concurrent execution of many instances of different protocols;
this is the so-called concurrent setting. In the concurrent setting, new security
risk arises: Adversary may launch a coordinated attack that interleaves many in-
stances of different protocols and create “rogue connection” between them.
Unfortunately, the notion of basic security and its solution does not provide
security guarantees in the concurrent setting. It is thus imperative to develop a
notion of security and solutions for the concurrent setting. To prevent coordi-
nated attacks, any meaningful notion of security should provide the following
basic and, necessary, guarantee.
Concurrent Security: The security properties, correctness and pri-
vacy, of the analyzed protocol should remain valid even when it is
executed concurrently with instances of many other, potentially un-
known, protocols and are susceptible to coordinated attacks against
multiple instances.
Concurrent security considers the composition of the analyzed protocol with
arbitrary other protocols in a dynamic execution environment like the Internet.
A similar composition occurs in complex software systems, where different pro-
tocols co-exist and may interact with each other in a large system. A natural
3desideratum that arises is,
Modular analysis: The notion of security should support design-
ing composite protocols in a modular way, while preserving secu-
rity. That is, there should be a way to deduce security properties of
the overall protocol from security properties of its components. This
is essential for asserting security of complex protocols.
In the literature, the strongest and also the most realistic formalization of
concurrent security is the notion of Universal Composability (UC): It considers
the concurrent execution of an unbounded number of instances of the analyzed
protocol, in an arbitrary, and adversarially controlled, network environment.
It also supports modular analysis of protocols. But, these strong properties
come at a price: Many natural functionalities cannot be realized with UC se-
curity in the plain model, where players only have access to authenticated com-
munication channels. In fact, strong impossibility result has been established
showing that UC security for general functionalities is infeasible in the plain
model [CF01, CKL03]; to make the state of affairs worse, even when leaving
out the requirement for support to modular analysis, the infeasibility result still
holds for protocols satisfying only the concurrent security guarantees of UC se-
curity [Lin04].
To circumvent the broad impossibility results, two distinct veins of research
can be identiﬁed in the literature.
Trusted set-up models: A ﬁrst vein of work initiated by Canetti and Fischlin
[CF01] and Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky and Sahai [CLOS02] (see also e.g.,
[BCNP04, CDPW07, KLP05, CPS07]) considers constructions of UC-secure
4protocol using various trusted infrastructure (or set-up), where the parties
have limited access to a trusted entity (e.g., a trusted entity that publishes
a common reference string chosen randomly from a pre-determined dis-
tribution). A large body of works (e.g. [CLOS02, BCNP04, KLP05, CPS07,
GO07, Kat07, CDPW07]) show that with the appropriate trusted set-ups,
UC-security becomes feasible.
However, in many situations, trusted set-up is hard to come by (or at least
expensive). An important question is to identify the weakest possible set-
up that allows us to obtain general feasibility results for UC security.
Relaxed UC security: Another vein of work considers relaxed notions of secu-
rity such as super-polynomial time simulation (SPS) [Pas03a, PS04, BS05] and
angel-based security [PS04, MMY06]1. These works are relaxation of the UC
security and only provide weak guarantees on the “computational advan-
tage” gained by an adversary in a concurrent execution of protocols.
Still, for many applications, these relaxed notions of security provide an
adequate level of security. Furthermore, protocols satisfying these notions
are very attractive in practice: They use no trusted set-ups other than au-
thenticated communication, and provide a meaningful notion of security
in the concurrent setting. The only drawback is that, known constructions
are based on either strong super-polynomial time hardness assumptions
or speciﬁc and non-standard hardness assumptions.
In summary, the current state-of-the-art exhibits the following curious and
unsatisfactory phenomenon: Whereas basic security can be realized in the plain
1Intheliterature, thereisanotherrelaxednotionofsecurity, inputindistinguishability[MPR06].
Their security guarantee has the same ﬂavor as the notion of witness-indistinguishability for
interactive proof systems. In this thesis, we, however, focus only on the stronger, simulation-
based security guarantees.
5model under standard hardness assumptions, so far, no notion of concurrent secu-
rity is realized under the same conditions—known constructions all have to rely on
some additional “trust”, either in the form of trusted set-ups or strong hardness
assumptions. (The latter is just another form of trust that some hypothesis is
true).
This leaves open the following fundamental question:
Question 2: Is additional “trust” inherent for concurrent security, or, can
we achieve a meaningful notion of concurrent security without it?
1.3 Our Contribution
In this thesis, we answer the above two questions afﬁrmatively.
First, we construct constant-round secure computation protocols satisfying
basic security assuming only TDPs. In fact, our result applies to the stronger
UC security: We construct constant-round UC-secure protocols in essentially all
previously considered trusted set-up models (e.g. [CLOS02, BCNP04, KLP05,
CPS07, GO07, Kat07, CDPW07]) assuming only TDPs. Furthermore, we ob-
tain an essentially tight characterization on the “minimal” trusted set-up under
which UC security is feasible.
Second, weproposeanewnotionofconcurrentsecurity, thatprovidesmean-
ingful security guarantees in the concurrent setting (in particular, it implies SPS
security), and show that protocols satisfying this notion can be constructed in
the plain model under standard hardness assumptions (speciﬁcally, the exis-
6tenceofconstant-roundstand-alonesecuresemi-honestObliviousTransfer(OT)
protocols).
We obtain the above results by crucially relying on two notions of commit-
ment schemes that ensures “input independence”.
1.4 Input Independence
In the context of secure computation, it is important to ensure that players be-
have independently of each other; particularly, the input of a player should be
independent of the private inputs of other players. We study two notions of
commitments that ensures input independence: Non-malleable commitments
introduced by [DDN91] and chosen-ciphertext-attack secure commitments in-
troduced in this thesis.
1.4.1 Non-Malleable Commitments
Roughly speaking, a commitment scheme is often described as the “digital”
analogue of sealed envelopes that enables a sender or committer to commit it-
self to a value while keeping it secret from the receiver; this is called the hiding
property. Furthermore, the commitment is binding, and thus in a later stage
when the commitment is opened, it is guaranteed that the “opening” can yield
only a single value determined in the committing stage. Applications of com-
mitments range from coin ﬂipping [Blu83] to the secure multi-party computa-
tion [GMW87].
7For many applications, however, the most basic security guarantees of com-
mitments are not sufﬁcient. For instance, the basic deﬁnition of commitments
does not rule out an attack where an adversary, upon seeing a commitment to a
speciﬁc value v, is able to commit to a related value (say, v   1), even though it
does not know the actual value of v. This kind of attack might have devastating
consequences if the underlying application relies on the independence of com-
mitted values (e.g., consider a case in which the commitment scheme is used for
securely implementing a contract bidding mechanism). Indeed, as we will see
in Section 1.5, such independence is crucial for the task of general secure multi-
party computation [GMW87]. The state of affairs is even worsened by the fact
that many of the known commitment schemes are actually susceptible to this
kind of attack. In order to address the above concerns, Dolev, Dwork and Naor
(DDN) introduced the concept of non-malleable commitments [DDN91]. Loosely
speaking, a commitment scheme is said to be non-malleable if it is infeasible
for an adversary to “maul” a commitment to a value v into a commitment to a
related value ˜ v.
More precisely, we consider a man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacker that partici-
pates in two concurrent execution of a commitment scheme hC;Ri; in the “left”
execution it interacts with an honest committer (running C); in the “right” exe-
cution it interacts with an honest receiver (running R). Additionally, we assume
that the players have n-bit identities (where n is polynomially related to the se-
curity parameter), and that the commitment protocol depends on the identity
of the committer; we sometimes refer to this as the identity of the interaction.
Intuitively, hC;Ri being non-malleable means that if the identity of the right in-
teraction is different than the identity of the left interaction (i.e., A does not use
the same identity as the left committer), the value A commits to on the right
8does not depend on the value it receives a commitment to on the left; this is
formalized by requiring that for any two values v1;v2, the values A commits to
after receiving a left commitment to v1 or v2 are indistinguishable.
Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN91] constructed the ﬁrst non-malleable com-
mitment. Their protocol is in the plain model and does not assume any addi-
tional assumption other than the existence of commitment schemes, which is
necessary. The only drawback of their construction is that the protocol takes

(logn) communication rounds, where n 2 N is the security parameter. Since
the original work [DDN91], non-malleable commitments have been extensively
studied in the literature; the main question has been to determine the number
of communication rounds needed for non-malleable commitments.
DiCrenenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky [CKOS01] and follow-up works in e.g.,
[CKOS01,CIO01,CF01,FF09,DG03]showedhowtoimprovetheround-complexity
of the DDN construction when assuming the existence of some trusted set-up;
in such models non-interactive (i.e., single message) non-malleable commitments
based on only one-way function are known [DG03]. The ﬁrst improvement to
the round-complexity of the DDN construction without any trusted infrastruc-
ture came more than a decade later. Following the ground-breaking work by
Barak on non-black-box simulation [Bar01], in 2002, Barak [Bar02] presented a
constant-round protocol for non-malleable commitments; the security of this
protocol however relies on the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash
functions that are collision-resistant against circuits of sub-exponential size. A
few years later, Pass and Rosen [PR05b] (relying on a technique from [Pas04]),
showedthatcollisionresistanthashfunctionssecureagainstpolynomially-sized
circuits are sufﬁcient to obtain a constant-round protocol. Next, Pandey, Pass
9and Vaikuntanathan [PPV08] provided a construction of a non-interactive non-
malleable commitment based on a new hardness assumption with a strong non-
malleabilityﬂavour; incontrasttotheearlierconstant-roundconstructions, their
protocol has a black-box proof of security.
But, despite two decades of research, there have been no improvements over
the original DDN construction, when only assuming the existence of one-way
functions, leaving open the question:
Doesthereexistasub-logarithmic-roundnon-malleablecommitmentscheme,
assuming only one-way functions?
In this thesis we settle the round-complexity of non-malleable commitments:
we present a constant-round protocol in the plain model that is based on the
assumption of one-way functions, and has a black-box proof of security. Since
the existence of commitment schemes already implies the existence of one-way
functions (cl. [IL89]), we have:
Theorem. Assumetheexistenceofacommitmentscheme. Then, thereexistsaconstant-
round non-malleable commitment scheme with a black-box proof of security.
Concurrent Non-Malleability: The original notion of non-malleability con-
siders a MIM attacker participating in a single execution on the left and a sin-
gle execution on the right. Already the original DDN paper suggested that
a stronger notion of non-malleability—concurrent non-malleability—where the
MIM may participate in an unbounded number of executions on both the left
and the right, is desirable. Pass and Rosen [PR05a] provided the ﬁrst construc-
tion of a concurrently non-malleable commitment scheme; their scheme only
10has a constant number of rounds but relies on the existence of claw-free permu-
tations (and non-black-box techniques). Subsequently, Lin, Pass and Venkita-
subramaniam [LPV08] provided an O(n)-round construction based on one-way
functions. As we show, our construction of non-malleable commitment is also
concurrently non-malleable.
Robust Non-Malleability: In this thesis we also introduce a new notion of
non-malleability: robust non-malleability. Roughly speaking, whereas traditional
non-malleabilityconsidersascenariowhereaMIMparticipatesinthesamecom-
mitment protocol on the left and the right, r-robust non-malleability considers
a notion of non-malleability for commitments where the MIM attacker partici-
pates in an arbitrary r-round protocol on the left, and the commitment protocol
on the right. Robustness is useful when using non-malleable commitments as
sub-protocols within larger protocols (see Section 1.5). As we show, for any con-
stant r, our protocol can be made r-robust while still remaining constant-round.
Thus summarizing the above discussion, we have
Theorem. Assume the existence of a commitment scheme. Then, for any constant r,
there exists a constant-round commitment scheme that is r-robust concurrently non-
malleable with a black-box proof of security.
1.4.2 Chosen-Ciphertext-Attack Secure Commitments
In this thesis, we propose a new and stronger way of capturing input indepen-
dence through the notion of adaptive hardness [PPV08]: Namely, a primitive is
adaptively hard, if its security holds even in face of adversaries that have adap-
11tive access to some help that breaks security of other instances of the primitive
for them. For instance, we may ask the question whether factoring is adaptively
hard, that is, whether it is hard to factor the product of two big random primes,
even if the adversary has access to some help that factors products of other
primes of its choice. It has been observed in previous works [PS04, MMY06]
that adaptive hardness is useful for achieving a relaxed notion UC security,
angel-based security; but, these works all rely on certain, quite speciﬁc adaptive
hardness assumptions. However, such assumptions appear to be qualitatively
stronger than non adaptive ones. A natural question is then,
Can an adaptive hardness property be based on a standard, in particular
non adaptive, assumption?
We answer this question positively: We formulate a useful adaptive hardness
property in the context of commitment schemes—called the chosen-ciphertext-
attack(CCA)securecommitments—andshowthatthisadaptivehardnessprop-
erty can be based on a standard (non adaptive) assumption, speciﬁcally the ex-
istence of one way functions.
Roughly speaking, a commitment scheme is said to be CCA-secure if the hid-
ing property of the commitment holds even if the attacker receives help from a
“decommitment oracle” that extracts for the attacker decommitment informa-
tion of commitments of its choice, provided that the attacker does not query
the oracle on the exact same commitment it is supposed to violate the hiding
property of.
It is not hard to construct CCA-secure commitments using trusted set-up
(by e.g., relying on known constructions of CCA-secure encryption schemes).
12It is also quite simple to construct a CCA-secure commitment scheme under
an adaptive hardness assumption (such as the existence of adaptively-secure
one-way permutations—namely one-way permutations that remain uninvert-
ible even if the adversary has access to a inversion oracle) [PPV08].2
Instead, weshowhowtoconstructaCCA-securecommitmentschemebased
only on one-way functions, and without any trusted set-up.
Theorem. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then, for any positive constant
", there exists an O(n")-round CCA-secure commitment scheme.
As far as we know this yields the ﬁrst non-trivial primitive whose “adaptive
hardness” can be proven based on standard assumptions without set-up. Note
that many standard cryptographic primitives (such as pseudo-random func-
tions [GGM86], signatures [GMR89], and CCA-secure encryption [RS91]) con-
sider adaptive attacks where an adversary has access to an oracle breaking the
primitive. However, all these cryptographic primitives rely on some trusted set-
up (in the case of signatures and CCA-secure encryption, the public-key used
needs to be well-formed, whereas in the case of pseudo-random function, the
“seed” needs to be uniform and perfectly hidden from the adversary).
RobustCCA-Security: WealsointroduceastrengtheningoftheCCA-security,
robust CCA-security: Roughly speaking, a CCA-secure commitment is said to be
t-robust, if any t-round interaction with an adversary having help from the de-
commitment oracle can be simulated by another adversary without access to
the decommitment oracle; intuitively, this means having access to the decom-
2[PPV08]consideredavariantofthenotionofCCA-securityfornon-interactiveandperfectly
binding commitment scheme (called adaptively-secure commitments). We have extended this
deﬁnition to general commitment schemes.
13mitment oracle does not give an adversary any advantage when participating
in the execution of a t-round protocol. A CCA-secure commitment is said to
be robust if it is t-robust for all constant t. As the notion of robustness for non-
malleability, robustness for CCA-security is useful when putting CCA-secure
commitments as a sub-protocol in other protocols. (See Section 1.6.) Further-
more, our O(n")-round CCA-secure commitment scheme is robust with respect
to any constant-round protocols.
1.4.3 Connection between the Two Commitments
CCA-securitycanbeviewedasanaturalstrengtheningofconcurrentnon-malleability
[DDN00, PR03, LPV08]—roughly speaking, a commitment scheme is concur-
rently non-malleable if it is CCA-secure with respect to restricted classes of ad-
versaries that only ask a single parallel—i.e., non-adaptive—query to the de-
commitment oracle after it has received the commitment it is supposed to vio-
late the hiding property of.
Interestingly, we can go from non-malleability to CCA-security as well. Our
construction of O(n")-round CCA-secure commitment shows a connection be-
tween CCA-secure commitments and non-malleable commitments, as it cru-
cially relies on a key technique, the so-called message scheduling technique,
used in the original construction of non-malleable commitment in [DDN91]. We
formalize this connection and show a generic compilation technique that trans-
forms any robust non-malleable commitment scheme into a robust CCA-secure
commitment scheme, relying additionally on a concurrent extraction strategy
introducedinthecontextofconcurrentZK protocols(e.g.,[RK99,KP01,PRS02]).
14This connection immediately yields new constructions of CCA-secure com-
mitments. Combining our constant-round non-malleable commitments and the
concurrent extraction strategy of [PRS02], we obtain a !(logn)-round robust
CCA-secure commitment scheme based on one-way functions. This is essen-
tially optimal: In a companion lower bound, we show that any 4-robust CCA-
secure commitments must have ˜ 
(logn) rounds. This is established by show-
ing that the existence of k-round 4-robust CCA-secure commitments implies the
existence of k + 4-round concurrent ZK arguments, which is shown to have
˜ 
(logn) rounds [CKPR01].
Theorem. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then, there exists an !(logn)-
round robust CCA-secure commitment scheme. Furthermore, any 4-robust CCA-secure
commitments have ˜ 
(logn) rounds.
Finally, inspired by a work of [PV08] that circumvents the lower bound
on the round-complexity of concurrent ZK protocols by considering quasi-
polynomialtimeadversaries, weshowthatwhenconsideringrobustCCA-secure
commitments for quasi-polynomial time adversaries, constant-round construc-
tion becomes possible. Our constant-round construction, again, follows from
thegenericcompilationtechniquebyplugginginourconstant-roundnon-malleable
commitmentsandtheconcurrentextractionstrategyimplicitlydeﬁnedin[PV08].
Theorem. Assume the existence of quasi-polynomial time hard one-way functions.
Then, for any constant r, there exists an constant-round r-robust CCA-secure com-
mitment scheme for quasi-polynomial time adversaries.
151.5 Constant-Round Secure Multi-Party Computation
In a novel work by Lin, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam [LPV09], they present
a uniﬁed framework for achieving UC security. Their framework put forward a
template for constructing UC secure protocols from two much simpler primi-
tives: UC-puzzles and 4-robust non-malleable commitments, based on the existence
of enhanced trapdoor permutations. They demonstrated that constant-round
UC-puzzles can be obtained “easily” from essentially all previous set-up as-
sumptions (e.g. [CLOS02, BCNP04, KLP05, CPS07, GO07, Kat07, CDPW07]) as
well as in relaxed security models like super-polynomial time simulation (SPS).
This not only leads to conceptually simply solutions, but also allows weaken-
ing, and in some models minimizing, the set-up assumptions used in previous
works (as well as the hardness assumptions these works are base on). In fact,
the notion of UC-puzzles is essentially a tight characterization of the set-up as-
sumptions needed to obtain UC security. In other words, the existence of a
UC-puzzle is essentially the “minimal” trusted set-up for achieving UC.
Furthermore, the round-complexity of the UC secure protocols produced by
the uniﬁed framework of [LPV09] depends solely on the round-complexity of
the non-malleable commitments they rely on; speciﬁcally, the number of com-
munication rounds is of the same order as that of the non-malleable commit-
ments. Therefore, plugging our new constant-round 4-robust non-malleable
commitment scheme into the uniﬁed framework, we directly obtain constant-
round UC-secure protocols under “minimal” set-up.
Theorem (Informally stated). Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permuta-
tions. Then, for virtually every functionality F, there exists a constant-round protocol
 that securely realizes F with UC security under “minimal” trusted set-up.
16ObtainingConstant-RoundSecureComputationProtocols. Theuniﬁedframe-
workof[LPV09]alsoencompassesthestand-alonesetting: Itiseasytoconstruct
a constant-round UC puzzle in the stand-alone setting without relying on any
trusted set-up. Therefore, we obtain directly as a corollary of the above theorem
that there exist constant-round secure computation protocols for general func-
tionalities satisfying basic security, based only on TDPs. This yields the ﬁrst
improvement on the round-complexity of secure multi-party computation over
the original works of [Yao86, GMW87], without resorting to stronger assump-
tions.
Theorem (Informally stated). Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permuta-
tions. Then, for virtually every functionality F, there exists a constant-round protocol
 that securely realizes F with basic security.
1.6 Concurrent Security without Additional “Trust”
Our next goal is to ﬁnd a notion of security that provides guarantees in the
concurrent setting, and yet, is realizable in the plain model under standard as-
sumptions. In the literature, there are two relaxed notions of UC security that
are realizable in the plain model.
Super-Polynomial Time Simulation. Security with super-polynomial simula-
tors (SPS) [Pas03a] is a relaxation of UC security. Recall that UC guarantees that
any “harm” done by a polynomial-time adversary in a concurrent execution
of the protocol could have been done by a polynomial-time adversary (called
a simulator) in the ideal process. SPS allows the simulator to run in super-
17polynomial time. Informally, this corresponds to guaranteeing that “any poly-
time attack that can be mounted against the protocol can also be mounted in the
ideal execution—albeit with super-polynomial resources.” For many applica-
tions, SPS provides an adequate level of security, and it guarantees concurrent
security (with super-polynomial simulation). However, SPS security is not a
convenient basis for modular analysis of protocols.
Angel-based UC security. Angel-based UC security [PS04] is a framework for
notions of security that provides similar security guarantees as SPS and at the
same supports modular analysis. Speciﬁcally, angel-based security considers a
model where both the adversary and the simulator have access to an oracle (an
“angel”) that allows some judicious use of super-polynomial resources. Since
the angels can be implemented in super-polynomial time, for any angel, angel-
based security implies SPS security. Furthermore, akin to UC security, angel-
based UC security, with any angel, can be used as a basis for modular analysis
of protocols.
Both SPS and angel-based security implies meaningful notions of concur-
rent security. Unfortunately, so far, all known constructions are based on either
strong super-polynomial time hardness assumption [Pas03a, BS05, LPV09]) or
non-standard and speciﬁc hardness assumptions [PS04, MMY06].
UC with Super-Polynomial Time Helpers. In this work, we propose a new
notion of security, called UC with super-polynomial time helpers. This notion
is inspired by and very similar to the angel-based security where both the ad-
versary and the simulator have access to a helper that provides some super-
polynomial time help through a limited interface. Like angel-based security, UC
18security with super-polynomial time helpers implies SPS security. But, unlike
angel-based security where angels are basically non-interactive and stateless,
the helpers in our model are highly interactive and stateful. The qualitative dif-
ference between the non-interactive angels and our interactive helpers is that
the former is only known to be implemented based on non-standard and spe-
ciﬁc assumptions, whereas, as we show, interactive helpers can be implemented
based on the minimal assumption of one-way functions.
The notion of UC with super-polynomial time helpers is formalized within
the externalized UC (EUC) framework of [CDPW07]. Roughly speaking, this
framework is identical to standard UC security as in [Can00], except that all
parties have access to an additional global entity. We use this global entity to
model interactive helpers that, as in [PS04], interacts only with the adversary
and the simulator3. We call the global entity, H, a helper functionality, and denote
the corresponding notion of security H-EUC security.
We implement our helper functionality H using robust CCA-secure commit-
ments. Given a robust CCA-secure commitment scheme, H is simply its decom-
mitment oracle. In the real execution of the protocol, even though the adversary
have access to the decommitment oracle, the CCA-security ensures that it still
cannot break the security of commitments made by other honest players. On
the other hand, having access to the decommitment oracle allows the simulator
in the ideal process to extract the decommitment information of commitments
made by the adversary. This disparity in capability between the adversary and
3More precisely, it also interacts with the environment in the EUC framework. In [CDPW07],
the global entity is used to model global trusted set-up such as a reference string or strong
public-key infrastructure. Here, in contrast, we use it to model an interactive helper that inter-
acts only with the corrupted parties and the environment. This means that the actual protocol
uses no trusted infrastructure, and the global entity becomes a means for relaxing the security
requirement.
19simulator makes simulation relatively easy, and allows us to securely imple-
ment the ideal commitment functionality Fcom with H-EUC security.
At this point, if we are willing to assume super-polynomial time hardness
assumptions, we can already obtain general H-EUC security by directly com-
bining our protocol implementing Fcom with previous results [CLOS02, BMR90,
IPS08]. By crucially relying on the robustness of our CCA-secure commitments,
we eliminate the use of such super-polynomial time hardness assumptions, and
base general H-EUC security on the existence of constant-round stand-alone
secure semi-honest OT protocols. Therefore, we obtain,
Theorem (Informally Stated). Assume the existence of constant-round stand-alone
secure semi-honest OT protocols. Then, there exists a sub-exponential-time computable
interactive machine H such that for virtually every polynomial-time functionality F,
there exists a protocol that realizes F with H-EUC security, in the plain model.
This gives the ﬁrst construction of protocols achieving a meaningful notion
of concurrent security, in particular implying SPS-security, in the plain model
based only on standard assumptions.
Furthermore, when using instead our construction of constant-round CCA-
secure commitment scheme for quasi-polynomial time adversaries, we obtain
constant-round protocols satisfying concurrent security and supports modular
analysis, based on the existence of constant-round stand-alone semi-honest OT
protocols secure for quasi-polynomial time adversaries.
Theorem (Informally Stated). Assume the existence of constant-round stand-alone
semi-honest OT protocols secure for quasi-polynomial time adversaries. Then, there
exists a sub-exponential-time computable interactive machine H such that for virtu-
20ally every polynomial-time functionality F, there exists a constant-round protocol that
realizes F with H-EUC security, in the plain model.
1.7 Outline
In this thesis we investigate secure multi-party computation in the concurrent
setting. Our contribution is two-fold: First, we improve the round complex-
ity of secure computation protocols in the stand-alone setting to a constant,
and second, we enable secure multi-party computation in the concurrent set-
ting by achieving a meaningful notion of concurrent security in the plain model
based on standard assumptions. In this journey, we construct round-optimal
non-malleable commitments and CCA-secure commitments, which are of inde-
pendent interests.
Chapter 2: Preliminaries. We introduce basic notation and recall basic deﬁni-
tions that will be used throughout the thesis.
Chapter 3: Non-Malleability and Constant-Round Secure Computation.
We present our construction of a constant-round non-malleable commit-
ment scheme (in the plain model) based on one-way functions. As dis-
cussed above, the construction, when plugged in the uniﬁed framework
of [LPV09], yields constant-round UC secure protocols in various trusted
set-up and relaxed security models.
Chapter 4: CCA-Security and Concurrent Security without Additional “Trust”.
We introduce the notion of robust CCA-secure commitments, and present
our ﬁrst construction of robust CCA-secure commitments based on one-
way functions. Then, using this construction, we achieve H-EUC security
21with an interactive helper acting as the decommitment oracle of our CCA-
secure commitments, in the plain model based on standard assumptions.
Chapter 5: From Non-Malleability to CCA-Security. Wepresentagenericcom-
pilationtechniquethattransformsanynon-malleablecommitmentscheme
and a concurrent extraction strategy of a special type, into a robust CCA-
secure commitment scheme. This compilation technique leads to two new
constructions of robust CCA-secure commitments with improved round-
efﬁciency: The ﬁrst has !(logn) rounds and is based on one-way functions,
and the second has only constant rounds but is based on one-way func-
tionshardforquasi-polynomialtime(andisforquasi-polynomialtimead-
versaries). Furthermore, we show that our ﬁrst construction is round opti-
mal, by establishing a lower bound that any 4-robust CCA-secure com-
mitment protocol (for polynomial-time adversaries) must have ˜ 
(logn)
rounds.
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PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Basic Notation
2.1.1 General Notation
We employ the following general notation.
Integer and String representation. We denote by N the set of natural num-
bers: 0, 1, 2, :::. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, a natural number is presented in
its binary expansion (with no leading 0s) whenever given as an input to an algo-
rithm. If n 2 N, we denote by 1n the unary expansion of n (i.e., the concatenation
of n 1’s). We denote by f0;1gn the set of n-bit long string, by f0;1g the set of
binary strings, and by [n] the set f1;::;ng.
We denote the concatenation of two strings x and y by xky (or more simply
by xy). If  is a binary string, then jj denotes ’s length and 1 i denotes ’s
i-bit preﬁx.
Probabilistic notation. We employ the following probabilistic notation from
[GMR88]. We focus on probability distributions X : S ! R+ over ﬁnite sets S.
Probabilistic assignments. If D is a probability distribution and p a predicate,
then “x
R
  D” denotes the elementary procedure consisting of choosing an
element x at random according to D and returning x.
23Probabilisticexperiments. Let pbeapredicateand D1;D2;:::probabilitydistribu-
tions, then the notation Pr

x1
R
  D1; x2
R
  D2; ::: : p(x1; x2;:::)

denotes
the probability that p(x1; x2;:::) will be true after the ordered execution of
the probabilistic assignments x1
R
  D1; x2
R
  D1; :::
New probability distributions. If D1, D2, ::: are probability distributions, the nota-
tion fx
R
  D1;y
R
  D2; : (x;y;)g denotes the new probability distribu-
tionover f(x;y;)g generatedby theorderedexecution oftheprobabilistic
assignments x
R
  D1; y
R
  D2;.
Probability ensembles. Let I be a countable index set. A probability ensemble in-
dexed by I is a vector of random variables indexed by I: X = fXigi2I.
In order to simplify notation, we sometimes abuse notation and employ the
following “short-cut”: Given a probability distribution X, we let X denote the
random variable obtained by selecting x   X and outputting x.
Algorithms. We employ the following notation for algorithms.
Deterministic algorithms. By an algorithm we mean a Turing machine. We
only consider ﬁnite algorithms, i.e., machines that have some ﬁxed upper-
bound on their running-time (and thus always halt). If M is a determinis-
tic algorithm, we denote by STEPSM(x) the number of computational steps
taken by M on input x. We say that an algorithm M has time-complexity
TIMEM(n) = t(n), if 8x 2 f0;1g STEPSM(x)  t(jxj). (Note that time complexity
is deﬁned as an upper-bound on the running time of M independently of its
input.) We write M(xk), or M(x;) to denote the machine that proceeds
identically to M but with a part of its input ﬁxed to x.
24Probabilistic algorithms. By a probabilistic algorithms we mean a Turing ma-
chine that receives an auxiliary random tape as input. If M is a probabilis-
tic algorithm, then for any input x, the notation “Mr(x)” denotes the output
of the M on input x when receiving r as random tape. We let the notation
“M(x)” denote the probability distribution over the outputs of M on input
x where each bit of the random tape r is selected at random and indepen-
dently. (Bote that this is a well-deﬁned probability distribution since we
only consider algorithms with ﬁnite running-time.) We sometimes abuse
the notation and use M(x) to refer to the probablstic procedure of running
machine M on input x with uniformly and randomly chosen random tape.
We denote by PPT probabilistic polynomial time Turing machines and
PQT probabilistic quasi-polynomial time Turing machines.
Oracle algorithms. Given two algorithms M;A, we let MA(x) denote the output
of the algorithm M on input x, when given oracle access to A(). We denote
by query(MA(x)) the random variable representing the set of queries made
by oracle machine M to oracle A on input x.
Negligible functions. The term “negligible” is used for denoting functions
that are asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any ﬁxed polynomial. More
precisely, a function () from non-negative integers to reals is called negligible if
for every constant c > 0 and all sufﬁciently large n, it holds that (n) < n c.
252.1.2 Protocol Notation
We assume familiarity with the basic notions of an Interactive Turing Machine
[GMR89] (ITM for brevity) and a protocol. Brieﬂy, an ITM is a Turing Machine
with a read-only input tape, a read-only auxiliary input tape, a read-only ran-
dom tape, a read/write work-tape, a read-only communication tape (for receiving
messages) a write-only communication tape (for sending messages) and ﬁnally
an output tape. The content of the input (respectively auxiliary input) tape of an
ITM A is called the input (respectively auxiliary input) of A and the content of the
output tape of A, upon halting, is called the output of A.
A protocol hA; Bi is a pair of ITMs that share communication tapes so that
the (write-only) send-tape of the ﬁrst ITM is the (read-only) receive-tape of the
second, and vice versa. The computation of such a pair consists of a sequence
of rounds 1;2;:::. In each round only one ITM is active, and the other is idle. A
round ends with the active machine either halting —in which case the protocol
ends— or by it entering a special idle state. The string m written on the commu-
nication tape in a round is called the message sent by the active machine to the
idle machine.
In this thesis we consider protocols hA; Bi where the inputs to A and B are of
the form (xkxA) and (xkxB), which we also write as (x; xA) and (x; xB). The part of
input x that is shared between A and B is called the common input of A and B,
and the parts that are not shared xA and xB are called the private inputs of A and
B. We make use of the following notation for protocol executions.
Rounds. We say that a protocol has r(n) rounds or r(n) messages (or simply
is an r(n)-round protocol) if the protocol hA; Bi consists of r(n)-rounds of
26communication between A and B when executed on common input x 2
f0;1gn.
Executions, transcriptsandviews. Let MA; MB bevectorsofstrings MA = fm1
A;m2
A;:::g,
MB = fm1
B;m2
B;:::g and let x; x1; x2;r1;r2;z1;r2 2 f0;1g. We say that the pair
((x; x1;z1;r1; MA);(x; x2;z2;r2; MB)) is an execution of the protocol hA; Bi if,
running ITM A on common input x, private input x1, auxiliary input z1
and random tape r1 with ITM B on x, x2, z2 and r2, results in mi
A being the
i’th message received by A and in mi
B being the i’th message received by B.
We also denote such an execution by hAr1(x1;z1); Br2(x2;z2)i(x).
In an execution ((x; x1;z1;r1; MA);(x; x2;z2;r2; MB)) = (VA;VB) of the proto-
col hA; Bi, we call VA the view of A (in the execution), and VB the view
of B. We let viewA[hAr1(x1;z1); Br2(x2;z2)i(x)] denote A’s view in the execu-
tion hAr1(x1;z1); Br2(x2;z2)i(x), viewB[hAr1(x1;z1); Br2(x2;z2)i(x)] B’s view in the
same execution, and viewA;B[hAr1(x1;z1); Br2(x2;z2)i(x)] the joint view of A
and B in the execution.
In an execution ((x; x1;z1r1; MA);(x; x2;z2;r2; MB)), the pair (MA; MB) is called
the transcript of the execution.
Outputs of executions and views. If e is an execution of a protocol (A1;A2) we
denote by outC[e] the output of C, where C can be either A1 or A2, and by
outA1;A2[e] the joint output of or A1;A2. Analogously, if v is the view of A,
we denote by out[v] the output of A in v.
Random executions. We denote by hA(x1;z1); Br2(x2;z2)i(x), hAr1(x1;z1); B(x2;z2)i(x)
and hA(x1;z1); B(x2;z2)i(x) the probability distribution of the random vari-
able obtained by selecting each bit of r1 (respectively, each bit of r2, and
each bit of r1 and r2) randomly and independently, and then outputting
hAr1(x1;z1); Br2(x2;z2)i(x). The corresponding probability distributions for
27view and out are analogously deﬁned.
Counting ITM steps. Let A be an ITM and v = (x; x0;z;r;(m1;m2;::mk)). Then
by STEPSA(v) we denote the number of computational steps taken by A
running on common input x, private input x0, auxiliary input z, random
tape r, and letting the ith message received be mi.
Time Complexity of ITMs. We say that an ITM A has time-complexity TIMEA(n) =
t(n), if for every ITM B, every common input x, every private inputs x1; x2
and every auxiliary inputs z1;z2, it holds that A(x; x1;z1) always halts within
t(jxj) steps in an interaction with B(x; x2;z2), regardless of the content of A
and B’s random tapes). Note that time complexity is deﬁned as an upper-
bound on the running time of A independently of the content of the mes-
sages it receives. In other words, the time complexity of A is the worst-case
running time of A in any interaction.
2.2 Basic Notion
2.2.1 Basic Complexity Classes
We recall the deﬁnitions of the basic complexity classes P;NP and BPP.
TheComplexityClass P. Westartbyrecallingthe deﬁnition oftheclassP, i.e.,
the class of languages that can be decided in (deterministic) polynomial-time.
Deﬁnition 1 (Complexity Class P). A language L is recognizable in (determinis-
tic) polynomial-time if there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm M such
28that M(x) = 1 if and only if x 2 L. P is the class of languages recognizable in polynomial
time.
The Complexity Class NP. We recall the class NP, i.e., the class of languages
for which there exists a proof of membership that can be veriﬁed in polynomial-
time.
Deﬁnition2(ComplexityClassNP). Alanguage L isinNPifthereexistsaBoolean
relation RL  f0;1g  f0;1g and a polynomial p() such that RL is recognizable in
polynomial-time, and x 2 L if and only if there exists a string y 2 f0;1g such that
jyj  p(jxj) and (x;y) 2 RL.
The relation RL is called a witness relation for L. We say that y is a witness
for the membership x 2 L if (x;y) 2 RL. We will also let RL(x) denote the set of
witnesses for the membership x 2 L, i.e.,
RL(x) = fy : (x;y) 2 Lg
We let co-NP denote the complement of the class NP, i.e., a language L is in
co-NP if the complement to L is in NP.
The Complexity Class BPP. We recall the class BPP, i.e., the class of lan-
guages that can be decided in probabilistic polynomial-time (with two-sided er-
ror).
Deﬁnition 3 (Complexity Class BPP). A language L is recognizable in proba-
bilistic polynomial-time if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M
such that
29 8x 2 L;Pr[M(x) = 1]  2=3
 8x < L;Pr[M(x) = 0]  2=3
BPP is the class of languages recognizable in probabilistic polynomial time.
2.2.2 Indistinguishability
The following deﬁnition of (computational) indistinguishability originates in
the seminal paper of Goldwasser and Micali [GM84].
Deﬁnition 4 (Indistinguishability). Let X and Y be countable sets. Two ensembles
fAx;ygx2X;y2Y andfBx;ygx2X;y2Y aresaidtobecomputationally indistinguishable over X, if
for every probabilistic “distinguishing” algorithm D whose running time is polynomial
in its ﬁrst input, there exists a negligible function () so that for every x 2 X;y 2 Y:
   Pr
h
a   Ax;y : D(x;y;a) = 1
i
  Pr
h
a   Bx;y : D(x;y;b) = 1
i    < (jxj)
fAx;ygx2X;y2Y and fBx;ygx2X;y2Y are said to be statistically close over X if the above condi-
tion holds for all (possibly unbounded) algorithms D.
2.3 Interactive Proofs and Arguments
We state the standard deﬁnitions of interactive proofs (introduced by Gold-
wasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR89]) and arguments (introduced by Brassard,
Chaum and Crepeau [BCC88]).
Deﬁnition 5 (Interactive Proof (Argument) System). A pair of interactive ma-
chines (P;V) is called an interactive proof system for a language L if machine V is
30polynomial-time and the following two conditions hold with respect to some negligible
function ():
 Completeness: For every x 2 L there exists a (witness) string y such that
Pr

outV[hP(y);Vi(x)] = 1

= 1
 Soundness: For every x < L, every interactive machine B and every y 2 f0;1g
Pr

outV[hB(y);Vi(x)] = 1

 (jxj)
In case that the soundness condition is required to hold only with respect to a computa-
tionally bounded prover, the pair (P;V) is called an interactive argument system.
Public-CoinProtocols. Incertainapplicationsofinteractiveproofs/arguments
it is desirable that the veriﬁer only uses public random coins (i.e., all its random
coins are also revealed the prover; such proofs/arguments are called public-coin
or Arthur-Merlin[BM88]. Due to the fact that the veriﬁer in a public-coin proto-
col only uses public random coins, we can without loss of generality only con-
sider public-coin proofs/arguments having the following canonical structure:
 The veriﬁer only sends random messages to the prover, and
 at the end of the interaction, the veriﬁer determines whether to accept or
not by applying a deterministic predicate to the transcript of all messages
in the interaction.
Interactive proofs with efﬁcient provers. For cryptographic applications it is
necessary that the prover strategy can be implemented efﬁciently when given a
witness.
31Deﬁnition 6 (Efﬁcient Provers). Let (P;V) be an interactive proof (argument) system
for the language L 2 NP with the witness relation RL. We say that (P;V) has an
efﬁcient prover if P is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm and the completeness
condition of Deﬁnition 5 holds for every x 2 L and every y 2 RL(x).
In this thesis, when referring to an interactive proof/ argument system for a
language L 2 NP, by default we mean that the system has efﬁcient prover.
As an example of an interactive proof system with an efﬁcient prover, con-
sider the following “trivial” interactive proof system for a language L 2 NP,
with witness relation RL: on common input x, and auxiliary input w 2 RL(x), the
prover P simply send the witness w to veriﬁer V. V accepts if and only if (x;w) 2
RL. Belowweprovideless“trivial”examplesofinteractiveproof/argumentsys-
temsthathaveotherpropertieslikewitnessindistinguishability, proof/argument
ofknowledge, special-soundness, zero-knowledgeandconcurrentzero-knowledge.
2.3.1 Witness Indistinguishable Proofs
The notion of witness indistinguishability (WI) was introduced by Feige and
Shamir in [FS90]. Roughly speaking, an interactive proof is said to be WI if
the veriﬁer’s output is “computationally independent” of the witness used by
the prover for proving the statement. In this context, we focus on languages
L 2 NP with a corresponding witness relation RL, and consider interactions in
which, on common input x, the prover is given a witness in RL(x). By saying that
the output is computationally independent of the witness, we mean that for any
two possible NP-witnesses that could be used by the prover to prove the state-
ment x 2 L, the corresponding outputs are computationally indistinguishable.
32Deﬁnition 7 (Witness-indistinguishability). Let hP;Vi be an interactive proof sys-
tem for a language L 2 NP. We say that hP;Vi is witness-indistinguishable for RL, if
foreveryPPT ITMV andforeverytwosequencesfw1
xgn2N;x2L\f0;1gn andfw2
xgn2N;x2L\f0;1gn,
such that w1
x;w2
x 2 RL(x) for every x, the following probability ensembles are computa-
tionally indistinguishable.

n
view2[hP(w1
x);V(z)i(x)]
o
n2N;x2L\f0;1gn;z2f0;1g

n
view2[hP(w2
x);V(z)i(x)]
o
n2N;x2L\f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
2.3.2 Proofs and Arguments of Knowledge
Given a language L 2 NP and an instance x, a proof or argument of knowledge
(POK or AOK) not only convinces the veriﬁer that x 2 L, but also to demon-
strate that the prover possesses an NP-witness for x. This is formalized by the
existence of an extractor: given black-box access to a machine that can success-
fully complete the proof or argument of knowledge on input x, the extractor can
compute a witness for x.
Deﬁnition 8 (Proofs and arguments of knowledge [FS90, BG92]). An interactive
protocol  = (P;V) is a proof of knowledge (resp. argument of knowledge) of NP-
language L with respect to witness relation RL if  is indeed an interactive proof (resp.
argument) for L. Additionally, there exists a polynomial q, a negligible function , and
a probabilistic oracle machine E, such that for every interactive machine P (resp. for
every polynomially-sized machine P), every x 2 L and every auxiliary input z 2 f0;1g,
the following holds:
If Pr[out2[hP(z);Vi(x)] = 1] > (jxj), then on input x and oracle access to P(x;z),
33machine E outputs a string from the RL(x) within an expected number of steps bounded
by
q(jxj)
Pr[hP(z);Vi(x) = 1]   (jxj)
The machine E is called the knowledge extractor.
Special Soundness
Special-sound protocols are proofs of knowledge with a very rigid and useful
structure.
Deﬁnition 9 (Special soundness [CDS94]). A 4-round interactive proof (P;V) for
NP-language L with witness relation RL is special sound (SS) with respect to RL if
(P;V) is public-coin, and on input x, all veriﬁer messages have length g(jxj)  jxj.
Moreover, there exists a deterministic polynomial-time extraction procedure X such
that on input x, with all but negligible probability in jxj over the choice of a uniform
 2 f0;1g
g(jxj), for all , , 0, , 0 such that  , 0, and (;;;) and (;;0;0) are
both accepting transcripts of (P;V) on input x, X(x;(;;;);(;;0;0)) outputs a
witness w 2 RL(x).
2.3.3 Zero Knowledge
An interactive proof is said to be zero-knowledge if it yields nothing beyond the
validity of the statement being proved. Formally, zero-knowledge requires that
the view of any adversarial veriﬁer can be reconstructed by an efﬁcient simula-
tor.
34Deﬁnition 10 (Zero-Knowledge [GMR89]). An interactive protocol (P;V) for NP-
language L with a witness relation RL is zero-knowledge if for every PPT adversarial
veriﬁer V, there exists an expected PPT simulator S such that the following two en-
sembles are computationally indistinguishable over x 2 L:
fview2[hP(w);V
(z)i(x)]gx2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g  fS(x;z)gx2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g
A stronger deﬁnition is that of black-box zero-knowledge, in which there is one
universal simulator S that must generate the view of any adversarial V, given
only black-box access to V.
Deﬁnition 11 (Black-Box Zero-Knowledge [GO94]). An interactive protocol (P;V)
for NP-language L with a witness relation RL is black-box zero-knowledge if there
exists an expected PPT simulator S such that for every PPT adversarial veriﬁer V,
the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over x 2 L:
fview2[hP(w);V
(z)i(x)]gx2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g 
n
S
V(x;z)(x)
o
x2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g
Note that the simulator S does not have access to z, the auxiliary input of V.
As a result, we may assume that V is deterministic, because V can treat part of
z as its random tape.
Concurrent Zero-Knowledge
Given an interactive protocol (P;V) and a polynomial m, an m-session concurrent
adversarial veriﬁer V is a PPT machine that, on common input x and auxiliary
input z, interacts with up to m(jxj) independent copies of P concurrently. The
different interactions are called sessions. There are no restrictions on how V
35schedules the messages among the different sessions, and V may choose to
abort some sessions but not others (unless if the protocol is public-coin).
Deﬁnition 12 (Concurrent Zero-Knowledge [DNS04]). An interactive protocol
(P;V) for NP-language L with a witness relation RL is concurrent zero-knowledge if
for every PPT concurrent adversarial veriﬁer V (i.e., any m-session concurrent adver-
sarial veriﬁer for any polynomial m), there exists an expected PPT simulator S such
that the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over x 2 L
fview2[hP(w);V
(z)i(x)]gx2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g  fS(x;z)gx2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g
We may also extend the deﬁnition of black-box zero-knowledge to the con-
current setting.
Deﬁnition 13 (Black-Box Concurrent Zero-Knowledge [DNS04]). An interactive
protocol (P;V) for language L is is black-box concurrent zero-knowledge if for all
polynomials m, there exists an expected PPT black-box simulator S m such that for
every PPT m-session concurrent adversarial veriﬁer V, the following two ensembles
are computationally indistinguishable over x 2 L:
fview2[hP(w);V
(z)i(x)]gx2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g 
n
S
V(x;z)
m (x)
o
x2L;w2RL(x);z2f0;1g
As before, in the case of black-box simulation, we may assume that V is
deterministic. Notethatinordertosimulatetheviewofanm-sessionconcurrent
adversarial veriﬁer, the simulator must have running time at least m(jxj). This is
why we allow a different simulator S m for each polynomial m.
362.4 Signature Schemes
Signature schemes enables a sender or a signer to generete a digital signature for
any message it wishes to authenticate, so that the signature can be universally
verﬁed as a certiﬁcate for the “authenticity” of the message. More precisely,
Deﬁnition 14. A signature scheme is a triplet (Gen;Sign;Ver) of PPT algorithms
satisfying the following conditions:
 On input 1n, the key generation algorthm Gen outputs a pair of strings sk; pk 2
f0;1g. vk is called the veriﬁcation key and sk is called the signing key.
 For every pair (sk;vk) in the range ofGen(1n), and for every  2 f0;1g, algorithm
Sign and Ver satisfy
Pr

Ver(vk;;Sign(sk;)) = 1

= 1
We call Sign the signing algorithm and Ver the veriﬁcation algorithm.
 For every PPT oracle machine A, there exists a neglgible function , such that,
for all n 2 N,
Pr
h
(sk;vk)   Gen(1
n);(;)   A
Sign(sk;)(1
n) :
Ver(vk;;) = 1 ^  < query(A
Sign(sk;)(1
n))
i
 (n)
In this thesis, we focus on signature schemes  = (Gen;Sign;Ver) that have
ﬁxed-length, that is, the signing algorithm Sign on input 1n, a public key pk and
a message m 2 f0;1g, always outputs a signature of length n. We call such
signature schemes ﬁxed-length signature schemes.
372.5 Commitments
In this thesis, the central tool that we study is Commitment Schemes. Roughly
speaking, A commitment scheme enables a party, called the committer, to com-
mit itself to a value to another party, the receiver. At ﬁrst the value is hidden
from the receiver; this property is called hiding. At a later stage when the com-
mitment is opened, it can only reveal a single value as determined in the com-
mitting phase; this property is called binding. First we deﬁne the structure of a
commitment scheme.
Deﬁnition 15 (Commitment Schemes). A commitment scheme is an interactive
protocol hC;Ri with the following properties:
1. Both the committer C and the receiver R are PPT machines.
2. The commitment scheme has two stages: a commit stage and a reveal stage. In
both stages, C and R receive a security parameter 1n as common input. C addi-
tionally receives a private input v 2 f0;1gn that is the string to be committed.
3. The commit stage results in a joint output c, called the commitment, a private
output for C, d, called the decommitment string. Without loss of generality, c can
be the full transcript of the interaction between C and R.
4. In the reveal stage, committer C sends the pair (v;d) to the receiver R, and decides
to accept or reject the decommitment (c;v;d) deterministically.
If C and R do not deviate from the protocol, then R should accept (with probability 1)
during the reveal stage.
Next we deﬁne the binding and hiding property of a commitment scheme.
38Deﬁnition 16 (Binding). A commitment scheme hC;Ri is statistically (resp. com-
putationally) binding if for every machine (resp. non-uniform PPT machine) C (a
malicious committer), there exists a negligible function  such that C succeeds in the
following game with probability at most (n):
On security parameter 1n, C ﬁrst interacts with R in the commit stage to
produce commitment c. ThenC outputs two decommitments (c;v0;d0) and
(c;v1;d1), and succeeds if v1 2 f0;1gn, v2 2 f0;1gn, v1 , v2 and R accepts
both decommitments.
The commitment scheme is perfectly binding if no machine C can ever succeed at the
above game.
Deﬁnition 17 (Hiding). A commitment scheme hC;Ri is computationally (resp. sta-
tistically) hiding if for every non-uniform PPT machine (resp. every machine) R (a
malicious receiver), the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over
n 2 N (resp. statistically indistinguishable over n 2 N):
fview2[hC(v0);R
(z)i(1
n)]gn2N;v02f0;1gn;z2f0;1g  fview2[hC(v1);R
(z)i(1
n)]gn2N;v12f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
In this thesis, we focus on statistically binding and computationally hiding
commitment schemes, in short, statistically binding commitments. Addition-
ally, we will consider the following two properties:
Deﬁnition 18. Let hC;Ri be a statistically binding commitment scheme.
Tag-based commitment scheme [PR05a, DDN91]: hC;Riisatag-based scheme
with l(n)-bit identities if, in addition to the security parameter 1n, the committer
and the receiver also receive a “tag”—a.k.a. identity—id of length l(n) as common
input.
392.6 Useful Known Constructions
The following protocols are useful in our various constructions:
 2-roundstatisticallybindingcommitmentsconstructedfromone-wayfunc-
tions ([Nao91, HILL99]).
 4-round computational WI and SS proofs based on one-way functions.
This can be instantiated with a parallel repetition of the Blum Hamiltonic-
ity protocol [Blu86] with 2-round statistically binding commitments con-
structed from one-way functions.
 !(1) round ZK proof system based on one-way functions [GMR89].
 A ﬁxed-length signature scheme. Such signature schemes can be con-
structed relying on universal one-way hash functions [NY89], which in
turn can be based on any one-way function [Rom90]; see [Gol04].
40CHAPTER 3
NON-MALLEABILITY AND CONSTANT-ROUND SECURE
COMPUTATION
Non-malleable commitments provide strong guarantees on the “indepen-
dence” of inputs across different sessions; such input independence is crucial
for many applications and in particular, the task of secure multi-party compu-
tation for general functionalities. In this chapter, we settle the round complexity
of non-malleable commitments: We construct a constant-round non-malleable
commitment scheme based on one-way functions. A a direct application of
this result enables us to obtain constant-round secure multi-party computation
based on TDPs. Both our constructions of non-malleable commitments and se-
cure multi-party computation protocols yield the ﬁrst improvement on round-
efﬁciency over the original works by [DDN91] and [GMW87] under the same
assumptions they are based on.
3.1 Deﬁnition of Non-Malleable Commitments
3.1.1 Concurrent Non-Malleability
We recall the deﬁnition of concurrent non-malleability from [LPV08]. For con-
venience, we use a slightly different presentation (based on indistinguishability
rather than simulation); equivalence follows using a standard argument (c.f.
[GM84, PR05a]).
Let n 2 N be a security parameter, and let hC;Ri be a tag-based commitment
scheme with n-bit identities. Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary A (as
41shown in Figure 3.1) that, on inputs n and z (where z is received as an auxiliary
input), participates in m left and right interactions simultaneously. In the left
interactions the man-in-the-middle adversary A interacts withC, receiving com-
mitments to values v1;:::;vm, using identities of length n, id1;:::;idm 2 f0;1gn, of
its choice. In the right interactions A interacts with R attempting to commit to a
sequence of related values ˜ v1;:::; ˜ vm, again using identities of length n ˜ id1;:::; ˜ idm
of its choice. If any of the right commitments are invalid, or undeﬁned, its value
is set to ?. For any i such that ˜ idi = idj for some j, set ˜ vi = ?—i.e., any commit-
ment where the adversary uses the same identity as one of the left interactions
is considered invalid. Let mim
A
hC;Riv1;:::;vm;z denote a random variable that de-
scribes the values ˜ v1;:::; ˜ vm and the view of A, in the above experiment.
Deﬁnition 19. A commitment scheme hC;Ri is said to be concurrent non-malleable
(with respect to itself) if for every polynomial p(), and every PPT man-in-the-middle
adversary A that participates in at most m = p(n) concurrent executions, the following
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v1;:::;vm;z)
o
n2N;v1;:::;vm2f0;1gn;v01;:::;v0m2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v
0
1;:::;v
0
m;z)
o
n2N;v1;:::;vm2f0;1gn;v01;:::;v0m2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
We also consider relaxed notions of concurrent non-malleability: one-one,
one-many, and many-one secure non-malleable commitments (See Figure 3.2
below.) In a one-one (a.k.a., a stand-alone secure) non-malleable commitment,
we consider only adversaries A that participate in one left and one right interac-
tion; in one-many, A participates in one left and many right, and in many-one,
A participates in many left and one right.
As shown in [LPV08], any protocol that is one-many non-malleable is also
concurrent non-malleable.
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Figure 3.1: A concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary.
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(i) one-one
A Com(v)
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Com(˜ vi)
Com(˜ v1)
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A
Com(vm)
Com(vi)
Com(v1)
Com(˜ v)
  
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(ii) one-many (iii) many-one
Figure 3.2: Restricted man-in-the-middle adversaries.
Proposition 1 ([LPV08]). Let hC;Ri be a one-many concurrent non-malleable com-
mitment. Then, hC;Ri is also a concurrent non-malleable commitment.
3.1.2 k-Robustness: Non-Malleability w.r.t. k-round Protocols
The concept of non-malleability is traditionally only considered in a setting
where a man-in-the middle adversary is participating in two (or more) execu-
tions of the same protocol. We here consider a new notion of non-malleability
43with respect to arbitrary k-round protocols.
Consideraone-manyman-in-the-middleadversary A(asshowninFigure3.3)
thatparticipatesinoneleftinteraction—communicatingwithamachine B—and
many right interactions—acting as a committer using the commitment scheme
hC;Ri. As in the standard deﬁnition of non-malleability, A can adaptively choose
the identities in the right interactions. We denote by mim
B;A
hC;Ri(y;z) the random
variable consisting of the view of A(z) in a man-in-the-middle execution when
communicatingwith B(y)ontheleftandhonestreceiversontheright, combined
with the values A(z) commits to on the right. Intuitively, we say that hC;Ri is
one-many non-malleable w.r.t B if mim
B;A
hC;Ri(y1;z) and mim
B;A
hC;Ri(y2;z) are indistin-
guishable, whenever interactions with B(y1) and B(y2) cannot be distinguished.
A B(y)
Com(˜ vm)
Com(˜ vi)
Com(˜ v1)
     
  
Figure 3.3: A concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary with respect to protocol
B on input y.
Deﬁnition 20. Let hC;Ri be a commitment scheme, and B a PPT ITM. We say the
commitment scheme hC;Ri is one-many non-malleable w.r.t. B, if for every two se-
quences fy1
ngn2N and fy2
ngn2N, y1
n;y2
n 2 f0;1gn, such that, for all PPT ITM ˜ A, it holds
that
n
out ˜ A[hB(y
1
n); ˜ A(z)i(1
n)]
o
n2N;z2f0;1g 
n
out ˜ A[hB(y
2
n); ˜ A(z)i(1
n)]
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
then it also holds that, for every PPT one-many man-in-the-middle adversary A,
n
mim
B;A
hC;Ri(y
1
n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g 
n
mim
B;A
hC;Ri(y
2
n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
44We say that hC;Ri is one-many k-robust if hC;Ri is one-many non-malleable w.r.t.
any machine B that interacts with the man-in-the-middle adversary in k rounds.
3.2 Overview of Our Construction
The main idea underlying all non-malleable commitment schemes is to “en-
code” the identity of the committer into the protocol. At the very least, this en-
surethatunlesstheattackercopiestheidentityoftheleftcommitter, theattacker
cannot simply forward messages between the left and the right executions. But
we also need to ensure that the attacker cannot in a clever way maul the mes-
sages it receives on the left so they become useful on the right. For instance, in
the original DDN construction, the identity is encoded into the scheduling of
messages in the protocol; on a very high-level (and oversimplifying), the idea is
to ensure that at some point in the execution, the MIM must “speak” while only
receiving “useless” messages. The problem with this approach is that it requires
a high round-complexity.
We will revisit the DDN approach. The main idea behind our scheme is
to perform the message scheduling “in the head”. A bit more precisely, our
protocol follows the “simulation-soundness” paradigm of Sahai [Sah99], ﬁrst
used in the context of CCA-secure encryption, and next used by Pass and Rosen
[PR05a] in the context of non-malleable commitments; that is, the main com-
ponent of our construction is a method for enabling us to “simulate” the left
interaction, while ensure that the right interaction remains “sounds”. Towards
this, we embed a “trapdoor” into the protocol which depends on the identity
of the interaction; proving simulation-soundness then essentially amounts to
45showing that there exists a way to recover the trapdoor for the left interaction,
while ensuring that the adversary does not recover the trapdoor for the right
interaction (as long as the right interaction has a different identity than the left
interaction).
Theideaistohaveaprotocolwherethetrapdoorcanberecoveredby“rewind-
ing” some speciﬁc messages in the protocol—called “slots”—in a speciﬁc order
which depends on the identity of the interaction. Furthermore, the protocol should
have the property that if this speciﬁc rewinding order is not the rewinding order
actually used, then a trapdoor cannot be recovered. So, if we rewind the left in-
teraction according to the rewinding order corresponding to the identity of the
left interaction, this will still not enable the adversary to recover the trapdoor
corresponding to the right interaction (unless the identity of the right interac-
tion is the same as the identity of the left interaction). In our particular instan-
tiation of this idea, the trapdoor will be a “signature-chain” (i.e., a signature on
a signature on a signature, etc.) of length n (i.e., the identity length) using dif-
ferent keys; the choice of the keys in the signature chain are determined by the
identity of the interaction. Next, the protocol will have a “slot” for each of the
keys where the receiver is willing to sign a single message for the committer us-
ing the key corresponding to the slot. The key point is that the simulator is able
to rewind the slots in an appropriate order to recover a signature-chain corre-
sponding to the identity of the left interaction; but the rewindings will still not
enable the adversary to recover a signature-chain corresponding to any other
identity.
To explain the main ideas in more details, we here ﬁrst focus on outlining
the construction of a constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme that is
46secure for synchronizing and non-aborting adversaries; we next comment on how
to deal with general adversaries. An adversary is said to be synchronizing if it
“aligns” the left and the right executions; that is, whenever it receives message
i on the left, it directly sends message i on the right, and vice versa. An adver-
sary is said to be non-aborting if it never sends any invalid messages in the left
interaction (where it is acting as a receiver); it might still send invalid messages
on the right.
As mentioned above, the idea is to have a protocol with an “identity-based
trapdoor” embedded into it. The trapdoor will be a “signature-chain” using
a sequence of keys that are determined by the identity of the protocol. More
precisely, we say that (0;1;:::;n) is a plain signature chain1 with respect to the
signature scheme , the veriﬁcation keys vk0;vk1 and the pattern   2 f0;1gn if
0 = 0 and for all 0  i < n, i+1 is a signature on the message (i;i) with respect
to the key vk i+1. For convenience of notation, for the remainder of this section
we ﬁx a particular signature scheme ; all signatures we use are with respect to
this this particular scheme.
The following simple claim regarding signature chains will be useful. Con-
sider a “signature game” where an adversary A gets access to two randomly
chosen veriﬁcation keys vk0;vk1 and additionally has access to signature oracles
with respect to vk0 and vk1; let ' denote the “access pattern” of the adversary to
the signature oracle (that is, if the i’th oracle call is to the signature oracle w.r.t.
vkb, then 'i = b). The claim now is that, with overwhelming probability, if in
the signature game, A manages to output a plain signature chain with respect to
vk0;vk1 and pattern  , then   is a sub-string of '.
1We use the name “plain signature chain” (instead of just “signature chain”), since the actual
signature chains we will use in the ﬁnal construction will be a bit more complicated.
47The protocol for committing to a string v with identity id proceeds as follows:
 Slot1: ThereceiverRgeneratesakey-pair(sk0;vk0)forthesignaturescheme
, and sends vk0 to the committer C. C next send a random message r0 to
R who signs r0 and then returns the signature to C.
 Slot 2: R generates another key-pair (sk1;vk1) and sends vk0 to the commit-
ter C. As in Slot 1, C next send a random message r1 to R who signs r1 and
then returns the signature to C.
 Commit phase: C commits to v using a standard statistically binding com-
mitment.
 Proof phase: C gives R a “special-purpose”2 witness indistinguishable ar-
gument of knowledge of the fact that it either knows the value committed
to in the commit phase, or that it knows a plain signature chain with re-
spect to vk0;vk1 and id.
We now turn to argue that this protocol is non malleable with respect to
non-aborting and synchronizing adversaries. For simplicity, we here focus only
on one-one (i.e., stand-alone) non-malleability (but the same proof actually also
works for concurrent non-malleability). Consider a man-in-the-middle adver-
sary A that uses identity id on the left and identity ˜ id , id on the right, and
receives a commitment to the value v on the left. We will argue that no matter
what the value of v is, the value it commits to on the right will be indistinguish-
able. Towards this goal, consider a hybrid experiment where the left interaction
is simulated by acting honestly in Slot 1 and 2, next committing to 0, and ﬁnally
using a “fake-witness”—namely a signature chain—in the proof phase; the sim-
ulator obtains this fake witness by simply rewinding Slot 1 and 2 (that is, to
2We will shortly explain what makes this proof special.
48rewinding slot b, we restore the state of A after vkb has been sent, and send a
new message to be signed) in the appropriate order to obtain a signature chain
with respect to id (note that since A is non-aborting, each time the simulator asks
it to sign a message, it does). To show the above claim, we now argue that no
matter what the value of v is, the value A commits to on the right in the real exe-
cution (when receiving a commitment to v), is indistinguishable from the value
it commits to on the right when the left interaction instead is simulated.
The key-point of the proof is the claim that even in the simulation, A can-
not use a fake-witness in the right interaction. This follows from the fact that
since A is synchronizing, when we rewind Slot 1 and 2 on the left, the same slots
are rewound on the right in exactly the same order. Thus, by the signature-game
claim, if A manages to get a signature chain it must be a subset of the pattern
01id (the reason we need to append 01 is that A gets two signatures in the honest
emulation of Slot 1 and 2, already before we start the rewindings). So, if we ap-
propriately restrict the identity set (for instance, by requiring that all identities
start with 10) then the only valid identity that is a sub-string of 01id is id, and
thus ˜ id = id, which is a contradiction.
To argue that the value committed to on the right does not change when
we move from the real interaction to the simulation, consider an intermediary
hybrid where we only change the witness used in the proof phase (but keep the
value committed to in the commit phase to v). Note that since the adversary is
synchronizing, the proof phase of the left interaction appears completely after
the commitment (in Stage 2) in the right interaction. Therefore, the right value
does not change at all when switching the the witness used in the proof phase
on the left.
49Finally, we simply have to argue that the value on the right does not change
once we change the value committed to in the commit phase on the left. By
the hiding property of the left commitment, the view of the adversary does not
change when the left committed value switches. But since the value committed
to on the right cannot be efﬁciently recovered, this does not directly imply that
the committed value also is indistinguishable. To resolve this problem, we rely
on the argument of knowledge property of the proof phase: A witness on the
right can be extracted efﬁciently from the proof phase. Since the witness used in
the right interaction cannot be a fake witness (by the key-claim above), it must
be the value committed to in the commit phase, so indistinguishability of the
committed value follows from the hiding property of the the left commitment.
Dealing with aborting adversaries: When considering aborting adversaries,
we run into two obstacles:
 Theadversarymightnoticethatthesimulatorisfeedingitsignaturechains
to sign (instead of random messages) and thus decide to abort the left ex-
ecution. We handle this by adapting the deﬁnition of a signature chain:
instead of requiring the chain to be “a signature on a signature on a sig-
nature... etc”, we require a signature-chain to be a signature on “a commit-
ment of a signature on a commitment of a signature... etc”. And next, in
the protocol, we let C send commitments to 0 instead of random strings.
To be able to establish an analog of the above signature-game claim, we
additionally require C to give a zero-knowledge argument of knowledge
of the value it committed to before R agrees to sign it.
 Another problem is that A might abort the left execution with some proba-
50bility p. This means that we might have to rewind the left execution many
times (roughly 1=p times) before getting the signature we are looking for.
As a consequence, the ”access pattern” on the right will be a sub-string
of 01id

1id

2 :::id

n. To get around this problem, we add an additional slot
(and a corresponding signature key). Next, we require that the signature-
chain corresponding to the identity id to be with respect to the pattern
2id12id22id3 :::2idn.
Dealingwithnon-synchronizingadversaries: Asisusuallythecase, synchro-
nizing adversaries are the “hardest” to deal with. To prove security against non-
synchronizing adversaries, we follow basically the same argument: First, if A is
not synchronizing there exists some slot that is never rewound and so if the
identity of the right interaction contains at least two 0’s and two 1’s, we can still
establish the above key-claim. Next, to argue that the committed value on the
right does not change, we consider again the intermediary hybrid above. How-
ever, when the adversary is not synchronizing, it may choose to interleave mes-
sages in the proof phase of the left interaction and the commitment of the right
interaction, and thus the right committed value may change when the witness
on the left changes. To overcome this problem, we again rely on the argument of
knowledge property of the proof phase to extract a witness from the right inter-
action. Since the witness cannot be a signature-chain (by the key-claim), it must
be the committed value; then the indistinguishability of the committed value
follows from the witness-indistinguishability of the left proof phase. However,
one problem is that extraction on the right may rewind the left proof phase
and thus break the witness indistinguishability property. One way of resolving
this problem would be to (in analogy with [PR05a]) have the proof phase be
51statistically witness indistinguishable; but this requires additional assumptions
(to keep it constant-round). Instead, we here introduce a different technique to
overcome this problem: we let the proof phase consist of multiple sequentially or-
dered witness indistinguishable special-sound proofs.3 This allows us to change
the witness in each of the proofs, one by one, while ensuring that the witness
on the right can be extracted from some other proof, without rewinding the left
proof where the witness currently is being changed.
3.3 Signature Chains and Games
Let = (Gen;Sign;Ver)beaﬁxed-lengthsignaturescheme, andcomastatistically-
binding commitment scheme. For simplicity of notation, we keep these schemes
ﬁxed, and provide our deﬁnitions and protocols with respect to those particular
schemes. Furthermore, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that com that is
non-interactive; however, all of our deﬁnitions and protocols can be easily mod-
iﬁed to work with any two-round statistically-binding commitment schemes;
see Remark 1 for further details.
We now turn to formally deﬁning the notion of a signature-chain and then
proceed to deﬁning signature-games.
Deﬁnition 21 (Signature-Chain). Let ` 2 N,   2 f0;1;2g` and vk0;vk1;vk2 2 f0;1g
be three veriﬁcation keys for the signature scheme . We say that a triplet  = (¯ ; ¯ c; ¯ r)
is a signature-chain w.r.t. keys vk0;vk1;vk2 and pattern  , if ¯ , ¯ c, and ¯ r are vectors
of length ` satisfying the following properties.
3This method was originally used by us in the ampliﬁcation procedure of [LP09]; this “trick”
is also a central component enabling the works of [Wee10, Goy11].
52 For all i 2 [`], ¯ i is a valid signature of the message ¯ ci under key vk i, that is,
Ver(vk i; ¯ ci; ¯ i) = 1.
 For all 1 < i  `, ¯ ci is a commitment to the tuple (i   1; ¯ i 1) using com and
randomness ¯ ri; and ¯ c1 is a commitment to 0m using com and randomness ¯ r1,
where m = log` + n.
We say that a signature-chain  = (¯ ; ¯ c; ¯ r) has length ` if j¯ j = l.
We proceed to deﬁne a signature-game SG
A;`(n;z), where A on input 1n;z in-
teracts with a Challenger in the following three stages:
Stage 1: the Challenger samples three pairs of signing and veriﬁcation keys at
random, (skb;vkb)   Gen(1n), where b 2 f0;1;2g, and sends A the veriﬁca-
tion keys, vk0, vk1, and vk2.
Stage 2: A interacts with the Challenger in a sequence of iterations for as long
as it wishes. Iteration i proceeds as follows:
 AsendstheChallengeratuple('i;c), where'i 2 f0;1;2g, followedbya
5-round WISSP proof of the statement that c is a valid commitment
of com.
 if the proof is convincing, the Challenger signs the commitment c us-
ing the signing key s'i and returns the signature to A; otherwise, it
aborts the iteration (without giving back a signature).
Stage 3: Finally, A outputs the tuple (; ).
We call the sequence ' = '1;'2;::: of signing request, the “access pattern” of
A. We say that the output of A is well-formed if  is a length l(n) signature-chain
53with respect to vk0;vk1;vk2 and  . Finally, we say that A wins if its output is
well-formed at   is not a sub-string of its access pattern ' (and looses otherwise).
Lemma 1. For every PPT adversary A and every polynomial `, there exists a negli-
gible function , such that for every n 2 N;z 2 f0;1g, the probability that A wins in
SG
A;`(n;z) is at most (n).
Proof. Consider any adversary A, polynomial `, n 2 N, and z 2 f0;1g. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that A always outputs tuples ( = (¯ ; ¯ c; ¯ r); )
such that j¯ j = j¯ cj = j¯ rj =  j = l(n) (since whenever it doesn’t it loses). For each
i 2 [l(n)], deﬁne the random variable Ii to be the index of the ﬁrst iteration (in
Stage 2 of the game SG
A;`(n;z)) in which A queries the Challenger for a signature
of the commitment ¯ ci under key vk i; if A never queries the Challenger for a
signature of ¯ ci, Ii is set to ?.
Note that if the output of A is well-formed, it contains a signature-chain  =
(¯ ; ¯ c; ¯ r)w.r.t.pattern , suchthatforeveryi, ¯ i isavalidsignatureof ¯ ci underkey
vk i. It thus follows from the unforgibility of the signature scheme that, except
with negligible probability, for each i, A must have queried ¯ ci for a signature of
vk i in some iteration. We thus have the following claim.
Claim 1. For every PPT adversary A and polynomial `, there exists a negligible func-
tion 1, such that for all n 2 N;z 2 f0;1g, the probability that the output of A in
SG
A;`(n;z) is of A is well-formed and there exists an i 2 [`(n)] such that Ii = ?, is
smaller than 1(n).
We also have the following claim.
Claim 2. For every PPT adversary A and polynomial `, there exists a negligible func-
tion 2, such that, for all n 2 N;z 2 f0;1g, the probability that the output of A in
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A;`(n;z) is well-formed and there exists an i 2 [`(n)   1] such that , Ii , ?, Ii+1 , ?
and Ii  Ii+1, is smaller than 2(n).
Before proceeding to the proof of Claim 2, we let us ﬁrst prove Lemma 1 using
Claim 1 and 2. It follows from the two claims that, except with negligible proba-
bility, either the output of A is not well-formed, or the output is well-formed and
for all i, Ii , ? and Ii < Ii+1. In the former case, the adversary loses the game.
In the latter case, as Ii , ? for all i, A must have asked for a signature using key
vk i in the Ii
th iteration, which means 'Ii =  i. Furthermore, as Ii < Ii+1 for all i,
it follows that   is a sub-string of '. Therefore, A loses in this case as well. Thus,
except with negligible probability, A looses.
Proof of Claim 2. First notice that it follows from the (statistical) binding prop-
erty of com, that except with negligible probability4, if the output ( = (¯ ; ¯ c; ¯ r); )
of A is well-formed, then for all i, ¯ ci , ¯ ci+1, since ¯ ci; ¯ ci+1 are respectively commit-
ments to tuples of the form (i;) and (i + 1;). It follows that, except with neg-
ligible probability, if the output of A is well-formed, there doesn’t exists some
i such that Ii;Ii+1 , ? but Ii = Ii+1. Thus, it sufﬁces to bound the probability
that the output of A is well formed and there exists some i such that Ii;Ii+1 , ?
and Ii > Ii+1.
Towards this, assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary A and
a polynomial `, such that there exists a function i : N ! N and a polynomial p,
such that for inﬁnitely many n 2 N;z 2 f0;1g, the probability that the output of
A in the game SG
A;`(n;z) is well-formed, Ii;Ii+1 , ?, and Ii > Ii+1 for i = i(n), is
4Since we assume that com is non-interactive, we actually have perfect binding, but given
that we want an analysis that works also for two-round commitments, we here directly consider
the more general case of statistical binding.
55at least 1=p(n). We can construct a machine B that violate the unforgibility of the
signature scheme .
B, on input 1n;z and a randomly generated veriﬁcation key vk, has access
to the signing oracle corresponding to vk, and tries to forge a signature (of vk)
as follows: it internally emulates an execution of the signature game SG
A;`(n;z)
with A honestly, with the following exceptions:
 In Stage 1, it picks an index t 2 f0;1;2g at random and forwards the veriﬁ-
cation key vk to the adversary as the tth veriﬁcation key.
 In Stage 2, whenever A requests a signature of a message m under key vk,
it obtains such a signature from the signing oracle and forwards it to A.
Furthermore, it guesses that Ii = u and Ii+1 = k, for random u > k. Then, in
the kth iteration (in Stage 2 of SG
A;`(n;z)), after receiving a request from A
to sign the commitment c, it extracts out the value (j;) committed to in
c from the WISSP that A provides following the signing request. Later,
in the uth iteration, when A submits a query c to the Challenger, it checks
whether  is avalid signature of c under key vk. Ifso, ithalts and outputs
the message-signature pair (c;); otherwise, it halts and outputs fail.
By construction, B emulates the view of A in the signature game SG
A;`(n;z)
perfectly before it halts. Therefore, by our hypothesis, with probability at least
1=p(n), in emulation by B, A would query for the ﬁrst time the commitments
¯ ci and ¯ ci+1 in iterations Ii and Ii+1 respectively, such that Ii+1 < Ii and ¯ ci+1 is
a commitment to a tuple (i + 1; ¯ i+1), where ¯ i+1 is a signature of ¯ ci under the
veriﬁcationkeyvk i. Let M(n)bethemaximumnumberofiterationsinthegame;
M is polynomially bounded since the running-time of A is. With probability at
56least 1
q(n) = 1
3M(n)2p(n), it holds that (1) the above event occurs in the emulation
by B and (2) B correctly guesses the values of Ii, Ii+1 and vk i. In this case,
except with negligible probability, the committed value  that B extracts out
from the WISSP following c = ¯ ci+1 contains a valid signature of ¯ ci, which is
queried for the ﬁrst time in the uth iteration for a signature using key vk. Hence B
will output a valid message-signature pair (¯ ci;) for vk, without querying the
signingoracle ¯ ci (sinceoncethequery ¯ ci issubmittedfortheﬁrsttimeiniteration
u, Bhalts immediately and outputs the pair); this violates the unforgibility of the
signature scheme . 

3.4 A Constant-Round Non-Malleable Commitment Scheme
Let  = (Gen;Sign;Ver) be a ﬁxed-length signature scheme, and com a non-
interactive statistically-binding commitment scheme as deﬁned in the last sec-
tion. To simplify the presentation of the proof, we assume that both  and com
can be “broken”—i.e., signatures can be generated for any message, and the
value committed to can be recovered for any commitment—in time 2n=2 where n
is the security parameter; this is without loss of generality since we can always
appropriately “scale-down” the security parameter in  and com (and make
sure that com commits to values “bit-by-bit”). To further simplify the presen-
tation, we provide the construction of a non-malleable commitment hC;Ri that
works assuming player identities are `-bit binary strings that contains at least
two 0-bits and two 1-bits; any such scheme can trivially be turned into one that
works for arbitrary identities (by simply appending two 0’s and two 1’s to the
57identity).
To commit to a value v, the Committer and the Receiver of hC;Ri, on common
input a security parameter 1n (in unary) and an identity id 2 D`, proceed in the
following three stages:
Stage 1: The receiver interacts with the Committer in three iterations, where
iteration i 2 f0;1;2g proceeds in the following steps:
1. The Receiver generates a pair of signing and veriﬁcation keys of the
signature scheme , (ski;vki)   Gen(1n), and sends the veriﬁcation
key vki.
2. The Committer commits to 0m, where m = log` + n, using com. Let ci
be the commitment sent to the Receiver.
3. The Committer proves that ci is a valid com commitment using a 5-
round WISSP protocol.
4. The Receiver signs the commitment ci using the signing key ski, and
sends the generated signature i to the Committer.
Stage 2: The Committer commits to the value v using com. Let c0 be the com-
mitment generated.
Stage 3: The Committer proves that
 either c0 is a valid com commitment,
 orthereexistsasignature-chainw.r.t.vk0;vk1;vk2 andpatternpattern(id),
where the function pattern : f0;1g ! f0;1;2g maps a (binary) iden-
tity id of length ` to a trinary string of length 2` as follows:
pattern(id) = 2;id1;2;:::;idi;2;:::;id`
58This statement is proved using k + 5 sequential invocations of a 4-round
WI special sound proof system, where k is the number of messages in
Stage 1 of the protocol; we additionally require that the length of the “chal-
lenge” in each special-sound proof is n.
We refer to the last three steps of an iteration in Stage 1 as a slot, which opens
when the Committer send the com commitment to 0m, and closes when the Re-
ceiver returns a signature to the commitment. We call the slot in iteration i, the
i’th slot.
It is easy to see that the protocol hC;Ri consists of a constant number of mes-
sages. Furthermore, it follows using standard techniques that hC;Ri is a valid
commitment scheme.
Proposition 2. hC;Ri is a commitment scheme.
Proof. We show that hC;Ri satisﬁes the binding and hiding properties.
Binding: The binding property follows directly from the statistically binding
property of com used in Stage 2.
Hiding: The hiding property essentially follows from the hiding property of
com and the fact that Stage 3 of the protocol is WI (since WI proofs
are closed under concurrent composition [FS90]). For completeness, we
provide the proof. We show that any adversary R that violates the hiding
property of hC;Ri can be used to violate the hiding property of com. More
precisely, given any adversary R, such that, for inﬁnitely many n 2 N,
and v1;v2 2 f0;1gn, R distinguishes commitments to v1 and v2 made using
hC;Ri, we construct a machine R0 that distinguishes commitments to v1 and
59v2 made using com. Note that the execution of a commitment of hC;Ri to
v1 proceeds identically as that of a commitment to v2 before the Stage 2
commitment of com is sent. Then by our hypothesis, there must exist a
partial joint view  of the committer and R that determines the execution
of the commitment before Stage 2, such that, conditioned on  occurring,
R distinguishes commitments to v1 and v2. Let  be a valid signature-
chain corresponding to the transcript of Stage 1 in . R0 on auxiliary input
 and  proceeds as follows: it internally incorporates R, and feed R its
part of view in ; it then forwards the external commitment made using
com to R in Stage 2; in Stage 3, it gives WI proofs using  as a “fake
witness”. Finally, it outputs whatever R outputs. From the WI property
of Stage 3, it follows that R0 distinguishes the commitment made using
com, if R distinguishes the commitment made using hC;Ri conditioned
on  occurring.

Remark 1. Both the deﬁnition of of signature-games and our non-malleable commit-
mentprotocolsmakesuseofanon-interactivestatistically-bindingcommitmentscheme
com. Both can be easily modiﬁed to work also with any two-round statistically binding
commitmentschemescom. Inbothcases, wetheﬁrstmessager ofacommitmentofcom
is sent at the beginning of the execution, and then the rest of the execution proceeds just
as if com had been non-interactive. (Additionally, in the last stage of the protocol hC;Ri,
the sender proves that either the Stage 2 message is the second message of a valid com
commitment with ﬁrst message r, or it knows a signature-chain  = (¯ ; ¯ c; ¯ r), such that,
 is well-formed, except that, for all i, ¯ ci is the second message of a com commitment
to ¯ i 1, generated in responding to the ﬁrst message r using randomness ¯ ri). Exactly
the same proof as in Section 3.3 and Section 3.5 still go through using these modiﬁed
60construction, since commitments of com are hiding, no matter what the ﬁrst message
is, and even if the ﬁrst message is reused.
3.5 Proof of Non-Malleability
In this section, we ﬁrst show that hC;Ri is stand-alone non-malleable. Then, in
Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.2, we extend the proof to show that hC;Ri is also robust
and concurrent non-malleable.
Theorem 1. hC;Ri is (one-one) non-malleable.
Proof. The goal is to show that for every one-one man-in-the-middle adversary
A that participates in one left and one right execution, the following ensembles
are indistinguishable:
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v1;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v2;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
Towards this, we deﬁne a series of hybrid experiments H0;:::;Hk+6. In each of
these experiments, we show that the view of A, combined with the value that A
commits to on the right, are indistinguishable. Let hybi(v;z) denote the random
variable describing the view of A(z), combined with the value it commits to in
the right interaction in hybrid Hi (as usual, the committed value is replaced
with ? if the right interaction fails or if A has copied the identity of the left
interaction).
Hybrid H0: In H0 we ﬁrst perfectly emulate a real execution of mim
A
hC;Ri(v;z)—we
call this the Main Execution—and next, if A successfully completed Stage 1
61in the Main Execution, we try extract a “fake-witnesses” (i.e., a signature-
chain) for the left interaction. More precisely, let idl, vk0;vk1;vk2, respec-
tively be the identity and the veriﬁcation keys of the left interaction in
the Main Execution, and let   = pattern(idl); the Extraction Procedure now
proceeds in j j = 2` iterations described below.
Iteration 1: If A successfully completes Stage 1 of the left interaction in the
Main Execution, it must have provided three valid signatures 0;1;2
of commitments to 0m, where m = log` + n, under keys vk0;vk1;vk2 re-
spectively. Since a signature-chain with pattern   starts off with a
signature ¯ 1 of a commitment to 0m under key vk 1 = vk2, the proce-
dure simply sets ¯ 1 = 2, ¯ c1 to be the transcript of the commitment to
0m generated in iteration 2 (in Stage 1) of the left interaction, and ¯ r1 to
be the randomness used in the commitment.
Iteration i + 1: Assume that at the end of the ith iteration, for i 2 [2`   1],
the procedure has obtained a signature-chain i of length i w.r.t. (keys
vk0;vk1;vk2 and) pattern [ ]i
1, containing signatures ¯ 1;:::; ¯ i. Then,
in iteration i + 1, we obtain a signature-chain i+1 of length i + 1, w.r.t.
pattern [ ]i+1
1 by rewinding the appropriate slot in Stage 1 of the left
interaction. More precisely, the procedure repeatedly rewinds A from
where the slot  i+1 opens on the left in the Main Execution, and com-
mits to the tuple (i; ¯ i) (instead of 0m) in the rewindings, until this
left-slot closes successfully (i.e., A returns a valid signature on the
commitment under key vk i+1). In each of these rewindings, the right
executions are emulated using fresh randomness; in particular, this
means that whenever a rewinding goes beyond the point when a ver-
iﬁcation key is sent in the right interaction, in each such rewinding a
62fresh veriﬁcation key is picked. Then the extraction procedure sim-
ply sets ¯ i+1 to be this signature, and again sets ¯ ci+1 and ¯ ri+1 to be the
commitment and randomness used.
If the extraction procedure takes more than 2n=2 steps, it is “cut-off”; in this
case, a signature chain can be recovered in time poly(2n=2) by our assump-
tion on the signature scheme . The extraction procedure thus always
terminates and always recovers a valid signature chain for the left interac-
tion.
Since the view of A in the Main Execution in H0 is perfectly emulated as in
mim
A
hC;Ri(v;z), we trivially have that the view and value A commits to in H0
is identically distributed to that in the real execution.
Claim 3. For every PPT adversary A, it holds that:
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g =
n
hyb0(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
Hybrid H1 to Hk+5: In hybrids H1 to Hk+5, we change the witness used in the k+5
WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the left interaction. More speciﬁcally, experi-
ment Hi proceedsidenticallyto Hi 1, exceptthatintheﬁrstiproofsinStage
3 of the left interaction, we prove that there exists a signature-chain w.r.t.
vk0;vk1;vk2 and pattern pattern(idl), by using the extracted signature-chain
 as a “fake-witness”. We show that the view and value committed to on
the right interaction in Hi 1 and Hi are indistinguishable.
Proposition 3. For every PPT adversary A, and every function i : N ! N, it
holds that:
n
hybi(n) 1(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g 
n
hybi(n)(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
63Towardsthis, wereducetheindistinguishabilityoffhybi(n) 1(v;z)gandfhybi(n)(v;z)g
to the witness indistinguishability of the Stage 3. More speciﬁcally, con-
sider some adversary A, a function i, and a polynomial p, such that (for
inﬁnitely many n 2 N, inputs v 2 f0;1gn and z 2 f0;1g,) hyb
i(n) 1(v;z) and
hyb
i(n)(v;z) are distinguishable with probability 1=p(n). We show that there
exists a PPT machine B that can violate the WI property of the WISSP
protocol hP;Vi used in Stage 3 of the protocol.
On a high-level, the machine B, on common input 1n and auxiliary input
v;z, externally interacts with a machine C that proceeds as follows: Ma-
chine C on input b 2 f0;1g, after receiving in the ﬁrst round a statement x
and two valid witnesses w0 and w1, gives an honest proof of hP;Vi of the
statement x using witness wb. The statement x that B sends C corresponds
to a left-interaction Stage 3 statement and the two witnesses w0 and w1 are
respectively the real witness—the decommitment of the Stage 2 commit-
ment in the left interaction—or the fake witness w1—a signature chain for
the left interaction.
Internally, B emulates an execution of either hyb
i 1 or hyb
i with A (depend-
ing on the witness used in the external proof), except that, for the ith proof
in Stage 3 of the left interactions, it forwards the statement, the real and
fake witnesses, as well as messages in that proof externally to C. Further-
more, if the right interaction is successful and has a different identity from
the left, B attempts to extract the value committed to on the right by re-
peatedly rewinding the WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the right interaction
by sending new challenge messages in this proof. Since the ith left-proof
is forwarded externally, the rewinding has to be done in a manner that
does not “affect” the ith left-proof. Roughly speaking, this is possible since
64Description of B
Input: B receives a security parameter 1n and v and z as auxiliary input.
Procedure: B externally interacts with a prover P of the WISSP protocol
hP;Vi, receiving a proof of a statement x using witness w0 or w1, where x, w0
and w1 are chosen by B. Internally, it proceeds in the following three phases:
Simulation Phase: B internally emulates an execution of the experiment
hybi(v;z) with A, with the exception that messages in the ith left-proof
of the Main Execution are forwarded externally to P. More precisely,
at the beginning of the ith left-proof, B sends the external prover P the
statement x of the ith proof, together with the “real witness” w0 = (v;r)
(the decommitment of the Stage 2 commitment of the left interaction)
and the “fake witness” w1 =  (the signature-chain of the left interaction
extracted from A); B next forwards the proof of x generated by P (using
either w0 or w1) to A as the ith left-proof. Let  be the simulated view of
A in the Main Execution.
Rewinding Phase: If the right interaction is successful and has a different
identity from the left interaction in , B extracts the value committed
to in this interaction as follow:
 Find the ﬁrst WISSP proof (1;2;;) in , such that, during its
the execution, no messages belonging to Stage 1 or the ith proof of
the left interaction are exchanged. (Such a WISSP proof must ex-
ist since there are k+5 WISSP proofs, whereas only k+4 messages
in Stage 1 and the ith proof of the left interaction.)
 Rewinds the proof by sending new random challenges 0 until a
second transcript (1;2;0;0) is obtained.
In the rewindings, emulate the left and right interaction for A in
identically the same way as in the Main Execution, except that,
whenever A expects a new message in Stage 1 or the ith proof of
the left interaction, cancel the execution and start a new rewinding
again.
 If  , 0
, extract witness w from (1;2;;) and (1;2;0;0).
Otherwise halt and output fail1.
 If w = (v;r) is valid decommitment for the right interaction, then set
ˆ v = v. Otherwise halt and output fail2.
Output Phase: If the right interaction that is not convincing or the identity of
the right interaction is the same as the left interaction, set ˆ v =?. Output
ˆ v and .
Figure 3.4: The construction of B
65there are more WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the right interaction, than
the number of messages in the ith left-proof. Therefore, in the right inter-
action, there exist some WISSP proofs that does not interleave with any
messagesintheith left-proof, and Bcanuserewindingstoextractawitness
without rewinding the left-proof. Our actual rewinding strategy also avoids
rewinding Stage 1 of the left interaction, so that the fake-witness  of the
left interaction remains a valid signature chain also in the rewindings, and
thus can be reused to simulate the left interaction also in the rewindings.
This is again possible since there are more right-proofs than the number
of messages in Stage 1 and the ith proof in the left interaction. To slightly
simplify the analysis, we additionally “cut-off” the rewindings if B takes
more than 2n=2 steps and simply recover the value committed to in time
poly(2n=2); recall that this is possible due to our assumption on com.
If during the rewindings, B sends the same challenge message twice, it
aborts outputting fail1. Additionally, if the witness extracted from the right
interaction is not a valid decommitment (it could also be a fake-witness),
B aborts outputting fail2. Otherwise, B outputs the emulated view of A,
together with the value committed to in the right interaction.
See Figure 3.4 for a formal description of B. Let STAb(hP;Vi; B;v;z) denote
the output of Bin the above experiment with machineC on input b. Below,
in Lemma 2, we show that the running-time of machine B is “bounded”,
in the sense that the probability that B runs for super-polynomial time is
negligible.
Lemma 2. There exists a polynomial function T, such that for every polynomial
function q, every b 2 f0;1g, every sufﬁciently large n 2 N, and inputs v 2 f0;1gn
and z 2 f0;1g, the probability that machine B runs for more than q(n)T(n) steps
66in an execution of the experiment STAb(hP;Vi; B;v;z) is smaller than 1=q(n).
Roughly speaking, the Lemma is proven by ﬁrst bounding the running-
time of a “hypothetical procedure” which perform all the same rewind-
ings, but otherwise acts honestly (i.e., always commits to 0m in Stage 1,
and always uses the honest witness in Stage 3); it follows using a sim-
ple “p  1=p” argument (similar to those in [LPV08]) that the expected
running-time of this procedure is polynomial. Next we show that, with
high probability, the running-time of the actual procedure is not too far
off. We note that due to reasons similar to those in [GK96] we are not able
to bound the expected running-time of B. Additionally, it seems unclear if
the methods of [GK96] could be applicable to obtains a simulation with an
expected polynomial running-time. Fortunately, in our application, since
we do not actually per se care about the running time of the simulation
(but only care about breaking some speciﬁc security property, namely wit-
ness indistinguishability) our weaker bound sufﬁces.
A formal proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Section 3.5.1.
The following lemma is the core of our analysis.
Lemma 3. The following holds.
fSTA0(hP;Vi; B;v;z)gn2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g 
n
hyb
i 1(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
fSTA1(hP;Vi; B;v;z)gn2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g 
n
hyb
i(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
Before proceeding to the proof of 3, let us see how Lemma 3 and 2 together
violate the WI property of the Stage 3 proofs. Recall that by our assump-
tion, hyb
i(v;z) and hyb
i 1(v;z) canbe distinguished withprobability 1=p(n);
by Lemma 3, STA0(hP;Vi; B;v;z) and STA0(hP;Vi; B;v;z) can thus be distin-
67guished with probability at least, say, 3=4p(n). By Lemma 2, the probabil-
ity that B runs for more than, say, 4p(n)T(n) steps in either experiment is
at most 1=4p(n). Therefore, by the union bound, the outputs of B (in STA0
and STA1) are still distinguishable with probability at least 1=4p(n), even if
we cut-off the execution of B after 4p(n)T(n) steps (and output ? if B fails
to complete), which is a contradiction.
Let us now turn to proving Lemma 3.
Proof. (of Lemma 3) By construction, B perfectly emulates the view of A
in hyb
i 1(v;z) when receiving an external proof generated using the real
witness w0, and that in hyb
i(v;z) when receiving a proof generated using
the fake witness w1. Therefore, to show Lemma 3, it sufﬁces to show that B
(almost) always extracts a valid decommitment for the right interaction if
it is successful and has a different identity from the left interaction (recall
that by statistical binding of hC;Ri, the committed value is unique with
overwhelming probability). In other words, showing Lemma 3 amounts
to showing that the probability that B outputs fail1 or fail2 is negligible.
Claim 4. There exists a negligible function , such that for every b 2 f0;1g, every
sufﬁciently large n 2 N, and inputs v 2 f0;1gn and z 2 f0;1g, the probability that
B outputs fail1 in STAb(hP;Vi; B;v;z) is smaller than (n).
Proof. Recallthat Boutputs fail1 onlyifinsomerewindingitpicksthesame
challenge 0 as the challenge  used in the same proof in the Main Execu-
tion. Since the number of rewindings by B is bounded by 2n=2 and the
length of each challenge is n, by the union bound, the probability that this
happens is negligible. 
68Claim 5. There exists a negligible function , such that, for every b 2 f0;1g, every
sufﬁciently large n 2 N, and inputs v 2 f0;1gn and z 2 f0;1g, the probability that
B outputs fail2 in STAb(hP;Vi; B;v;z) is smaller than (n).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists a polynomial g(n), such
that, with probability 1=g(n), B extracts an invalid decommitment from the
right interaction. Towards reaching a contradiction, we consider another
machine B0, which proceeds identically to B except that it cuts-off the ex-
ecution after g(n)T(n) steps (and outputs ? in this case). It follows from
Lemma 2 that the probability that B runs for more than g(n)T(n) steps is
at most 1=2g(n). Therefore, the probability that B0 extracts out an invalid
decommitment from the right interaction k is at least 1=2g(n). Further-
more, by the special-soundness property of the right-proofs, if the witness
is not a valid decommitment, it must be a signature-chain  w.r.t. the right-
interaction keys vk0
0;vk0
1;vk0
2 and pattern pattern(idr). Consider the follow-
ing two possible adversarial schedulings w.r.t. the left and the kth right
interactions in the Main Execution:
Scheduling 1: A “aligns” the slots in the left and right interactions one by
one: a right-slot is said to be aligned with a left-slot if (1) its corre-
sponding veriﬁcation key is sent before the left-slot opens, and (2)
its opening message (i.e., the commitment from A) is sent after the
left-slot opens; see Figure 3.5 (i).
Scheduling 2: A does not align the slots in the left and right interactions;
see Figure 3.5 (ii). This means that there exists some right-interaction
slot that is not aligned with any left-interaction slot.
Since Scheduling 1 and 2 are the only two possible schedulings, by our
69vk0
com
ZKAOK
0
vk1
com
ZKAOK
1
vk2
com
ZKAOK
2
vk0
com
ZKAOK
0
vk1
com
ZKAOK
1
vk2
com
ZKAOK
2
vk0
com
ZKAOK
0
vk1
com
ZKAOK
1
vk2
com
ZKAOK
2
vk0
com
ZKAOK
0
vk1
com
ZKAOK
1
vk2
com
ZKAOK
2
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Figure 3.5: The two schedulings of the messages in Stage 1 of the left and right
interactions.
hypothesis, at least one of the following two conditions holds.
Condition 1: The probability that Scheduling 1 occurs in the Main Exe-
cution and that B0 extracts an invalid decommitment from the right
interaction is non-negligible.
Condition 2: The probability that Scheduling 2 occurs in the Main Exe-
cution and that B0 extracts an invalid decommitment from the right
interaction is non-negligible.
We show that neither condition can hold.
Assume Condition 1 holds. We reach a contradiction by constructing a ma-
chine C that externally participates in the signature game, while inter-
nally emulating an execution of STAb(hP;Vi; B0;v;z) except that messages
in Stage 1 of the right interaction are emulated by forwarding the appro-
priate messages from the signature games to A. More precisely,C forwards
70the three veriﬁcation keys vk0;vk1;vk2 in the signature game to A as the ver-
iﬁcation keys in Stage 1 of the right interaction in the Main Execution. If
Schedule 1 does not occur in the Main Execution, C simply aborts. Other-
wise, whenever during some rewinding, A requests another signature in
one of the slots on the Main Execution (and thus using one of vk0;vk1;vk2),
C obtains such a signature by accessing the appropriate signature oracle
in the game and forwards it to A. Recall that whenever we rewind be-
yond the point where a veriﬁcation key is sent, a new veriﬁcation key is
generated by B and thus B can obtain the appropriate signatures without
querying the oracle. Since the left and right slots in the Main Execution are
aligned one by one, we have that whenever the tth left-slot is rewound, the
adversary A may only request new signatures using key v0
t on the right. It
followsthatthe“access-pattern”ofthesignaturesrequestedisasub-string
of
' = 012k(idl)

1;2
;:::;(idl)

i;2
;:::;(idl)

`
So, whenever B0 extracts out a signature-chain  w.r.t. (keys vk0
0;vk0
1;vk0
2 and
pattern pattern(idr)), C wins in the signature game since pattern(idr) is not
a sub-string of ' (as idr , idl). Since the running-time of C is polynomial
this contradicts Lemma 1.
Assume Condition 2 holds. We construct a machine C0 just as in the previ-
ous case, except thatC0 abort whenever Schedule 2 does not happen in the
Main Execution. When Scheduling 2 does occurs in the Main Execution,
there exists a right-slot t that is not aligned with any left-slots; in other
words, in all the rewindings where A gets to request a new signature in
Slot t on the right, the rewinding goes beyond the point where the veriﬁ-
cation key for slot t is sent (and so new keys gets generated in each rewind-
71ing) and thus the t’th oracle is never used during the extraction phase. It
follows that the access pattern in the signature game has a single char-
acter t, but the signature extracted is with respect to a pattern with two of
each character. So, as in Condition 1, whenever B0 extracts out a signature-
chain , C0 wins in the signature game. There is just one slight complica-
tion with the implementation of C0: in the rewindings, B might rewind A
in the middle of one of the WISSP in Stage 1, and since the WISSP’s
are not public-coin, we might not be able to emulate the continuation of
the veriﬁer strategy for this protocol. Note, however, that Lemma 1 still
holds even if consider a slight variant of the signature game where after
each WISSP the veriﬁer reveals all of its random coins; this follows since
this adjusted protocol would still be an WISSP and Lemma 1 no mayyer
what WISSP we use in the signature game. C0 can now easily be imple-
mented as an adversary for this modiﬁed signature game. 

Hybrid Hk+6 : Hybrid Hk+6 proceeds identically to Hk+5 except that the Stage 2
commitment of the left execution is emulated by committing to 0n. It fol-
lows using the same argument as in hybrids Hi, for i 2 [k + 5], that the
value committed in the right interaction can be extracted without rewind-
ing Stage 2 of the left interaction. It then follows from the hiding property
of the Stage 2 commitment that the combined view and values committed
to by A in Hk+5 are indistinguishable from that in Hk+6.
It follows by a hybrid argument that,
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g 
n
hybk+6(v;z)
o
n2N;v2f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
72Since the above holds for every value v, we have
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v1;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g 
n
hybk+6(v1;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g, and
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v2;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g 
n
hybk+6(v2;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g
Finally, since by the deﬁnition of hybk+6, it holds that for every v1, v2 and z,
hybk+6(v1;z) = hybk+6(v2;z), we conclude that,
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v1;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g 
n
mim
A
hC;Ri(v2;z)
o
n2N;v1;v22f0;1gn;z2f0;1g

3.5.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. The running-time of B consists of three parts:
Part 1—Time spent simulating the Main Execution: Since Arunsinstrictpoly-
nomial time, the time T1(n) that B spends in the Main Execution polyno-
mially bounded.
Part 2—Time spent extracting the left “fake-witness”: We show that there ex-
ists a polynomial T2(n) such that for every polynomial q2, (every b 2 f0;1g,
every sufﬁciently large n 2 N, and inputs v 2 f0;1gn, z 2 f0;1g,) the prob-
ability that B spends more than q2(n)T2(n) steps extracting the left “fake-
witness” in STAb(hP;Vi; B;v;z) is smaller than 1=q2(n).
Part 3—Time spent extracting the committed value on the right: Weshowthat
there exists a polynomial T3(n) such that for every polynomial q3, the prob-
73ability that B spends more than q3(n)T3(n) steps extracting the right com-
mitted value in STAb(hP;Vi; B;v;z) is smaller than 1=q3(n).
So given an arbitrary polynomial q, we get by the union bound that, the proba-
bility B spends more than 2q(n)T2(n) step in part 2, or more than 2q(n)T3(n) steps
in part 3, is smaller than 1=q(n). We conclude that there exists some sufﬁciently
big polynomial T(n)  T1(n) + 2T2(n) + 2T3(n) such that for every polynomial q,
the probability that B takes more than q(n)T(n) steps is smaller than 1=q(n).
Analysis of Part 2: Recall that in an execution of STAb(hP;Vi; B;v;z), the ex-
traction of the left “fake-witness” proceeds in 2` iterations. The running-time
of the ﬁrst iteration is clearly polynomial; we proceed to analyze the time spent
in the remainder of the iterations. Recall that in an iteration i > 1, B takes the
signature-chain i 1 = ([¯ ]i 1
1 ;[¯ c]i 1
1 ;[¯ r]i 1
1 ) of length i   1, w.r.t. (keys vk0;vk1;vk2
and) pattern [ ]i 1
1 , (where   = pattern(idl),) obtained in the previous iteration,
and extends it to a signature-chain ¯ i of length i w.r.t. pattern [ ]i
1. This is done
by repeatedly rewinding A from the start of the left-slot  i and committing to
(i   1; ¯ i 1) in the rewindings, until A closes this left-slot successfully. (Below
we assume for simplicity that the extraction procedure is never cut-off and may
run for more than 2n=2 steps, since this only increases the running time). To-
wards bounding the running-time of this extraction procedure, we ﬁrst consider
a hypothetical procedure, which proceeds almost the same as the actual extraction
procedure, except that in the rewindings in iteration i > 1, instead of commit-
ting to (i   1; ¯ i 1), it commits to 0m. In other words, the hypothetical procedure
simulates the view of A in the rewindings using identically the same distribu-
tion as in the Main Execution. We show that the expected running-time of this
hypothetical procedure is poly(n); we next bound the running-time of the actual
74extraction procedure.
Running-time Analysis of the Hypothetical Procedure: Let   = pattern(idl) be the
pattern of the “fake-witness” of the left interaction. In iteration i > 1, the hy-
pothetical extraction procedure repeatedly rewinds the left-slot  i; let T i be the
random variable that describes the time spent in rewinding the left-slot  i in it-
eration i > 1. We show that E[Ti]  poly(n) and then by linearity of expectation,
we conclude that the expected running-time of the hypothetical procedure is
2` X
i=2
E[T
i] 
2` X
i=2
poly(n)  poly(n);
since the number of iterations is poly(n).
Letusturntobounding E[Ti]. Let  i denotethesetofpreﬁxes—i.e., partial
transcripts of the Main Execution—from where the left-slot  i opens. Given a
preﬁx  2   i, we introduce the following notations:
 let Pr



denote the probability that  occurs as a preﬁx in the Main Exe-
cution;
 let p denote the probability that, conditioned on the preﬁx  occurring (in
the Main Execution), the left-slot  i closes successfully in the Main Execu-
tion.
Take any  from   i. We claim that conditioned on  occurring, the expected
value of Ti—denoted E[Tij]—is poly(n). This follows since, ﬁrst, the hypotheti-
cal procedure starts rewinding the left-slot  i in iteration i only if this slot closes
successfully in the Main Execution; hence, (conditioned on  occurring,) the
probability the left-slot  i is rewound is at most p. Secondly, once it starts
rewinding the left-slot  i, it continues until the slot closes successfully again;
75since the hypothetical procedure proceeds identically in the rewindings as in
the Main Execution, the probability that the left-slot  i closes successfully in
any rewinding is also p, and thus, (conditioned on  occurring,) the expected
number of rewindings performed before this happens is 1=p. Therefore, the
overall expected number of rewindings from  is p 1
p = 1. As each rewinding
takes at most poly(n) steps, we conclude that E[Tij]  poly(n). Thus,
E[T
i] =
X
2  i
E[T
ij]Pr



 poly(n) 
X
2  i
Pr



 poly(n)
Running-time Analysis of the Actual Extraction Procedure: Given that the expected
running time of the hypothetical procedure is bounded by a polynomial ˜ T(n),
it follows using the Markov inequality that, for every polynomial q2, (every
b, every n 2 N, and inputs v;z,) the probability that the hypothetical proce-
dure takes more than q2(n) ˜ T(n)=2 steps is smaller than 2=q2(n). Then we claim
that the probability that actual extraction procedure takes more than q2(n) ˜ T(n)=2
steps is smaller than 1=q2(n). This follows since the only difference between
the hypothetical and the actual extraction procedures is that, in the former the
rewindings are simulated by committing to 0m using com, whereas in the lat-
ter rewindings are simulated by committing to a tuple that contains a signature.
SincetheWISSPprooffollowingthecommitmentisneverrewound, itfollows
directly from the hiding property of com and the zero knowledge property of
the WISSP proof that, the probability that the actual extraction procedure runs
for more than q2(n) ˜ T(n)=2 steps differs from that of the hypothetical procedure
by at most a negligible amount. Thus, for sufﬁciently large n, we have that the
probability B spends more than T2(n) = q2(n) ˜ T(n)=2 steps is smaller than 1=q2(n).
76Analysis of Part 3: We show that the time that B spends in the Rewinding
Phase is bounded by a polynomial T3(n) in expectation. It then follows by the
Markov inequality that, for every polynomial q3, the probability that B takes
more than q3(n)T3(n) steps is smaller than 1=q3(n).
It follows from the same argument as in the above “running-time analysis
of the hypothetical procedure” that to bound the expected time spent extracting
the right committed value (also here, we consider the running-time without
cut-offs), it sufﬁces to bound the expected time spent in rewinding each right
WISSP proof, since the total number of right-proofs is poly(n). Then recall
that a right-proof is rewound only if the proof completes successfully in the
Main Execution, without interleaving with any message in Stage 1 or the ith
proof of the left interaction. On the other hand, once the rewinding starts, it
continues until this right-proof completes successfully again, while cancelling
every rewinding in which the proof interleaves with any message in Stage 1 or
the ith proof of the left interaction. Furthermore, as every rewinding is simulated
exactlythesameasintheMainExecution, itfollowsusingthesame“ptimes1=p
argument” as in the analysis of part 2 that the expected number of rewindings
for every right-proof is 1, and hence the expected time spent in extracting the
right committed value is bounded by a polynomial T3(n). 
3.5.2 Proof of Concurrent Non-Malleability
Let us turn to proving that hC;Ri is also concurrently non-malleable. Recall
that in Proposition 1, to show concurrent non-malleability, it sufﬁces to prove
that hC;Ri is one-many non-malleable; that is, for every one-many man-in-the-
77middle adversary A, that participates in one left and many right interactions,
the view of A and the values it commits to on the right are indistinguishable, no
matter what value it is receiving a commitment to on the left. Towards this, we
consider the same hybrid experiments H0 to Hk+6 as in the proof of stand-alone
non-malleability. It follows from almost the same proof as before that the view
of A and the values it commits to on the right are indistinguishable in sequential
hybrids, except that, in hybrids H1 to Hk+6, we (or more precisely, the simulator
B) now need to extract out the values that A commits to in all the right interac-
tions (recall that the proof relies on the fact that the value that A commits to in
the right interaction can be extracted “efﬁciently”, to show the indistinguisha-
bility of hybrid Hi and Hi+1 for 1  i  k + 6). This is easy to achieve, since
we can simply extract the values that A commits to in each right interaction one
by one, after the Main Execution completes. More precisely, in the Rewinding
Phase, for every successful right interaction that has a different identity from the
left interaction in the Main Execution, B ﬁnds a WISSP proof in Stage 3 of
this right interaction that does not interleave with any message in Stage 1 and
the ith proof (or Stage 2 for hybrid Hk+6) of that left interaction, and repeatedly
rewinds the proof until a second transcript is obtain; it then computes a witness,
if the two transcripts are different. Since there are only polynomial number of
right interactions, it follows using almost the same proof of Lemma 2 that the
running time of B is “bounded”, and further using exactly the same proof of
Lemma 3 that, except with negligible probability, the witnesses that B extracts
out are indeed the values committed to in the right interactions. Thus by the
WI property of the Stage 3 proofs (or the hiding property of Stage 2 resp.), the
view and the values committed to by A are indistinguishable in hybrids Hi and
Hi+1 for 1  i  k + 4 (or in Hk+5 and Hk+6 resp.). We thus have:
78Theorem 2. hC;Ri is concurrent non-malleable.
3.5.3 Proof of Robust Non-Malleability
In this section, we show that, for any r 2 N, hC;Ri can be easily modiﬁed into a
O(r)-round (concurrent) non-malleable commitment scheme h ˜ C; ˜ Ri that is addi-
tionally one-many r-robust.
At a very high-level, one-many r-robust commitment schemes are easy to
construct: any commitment scheme that is “extractable” and has more than r
“rewinding slots” is directly one-many non-malleable w.r.t. r-round protocols,
since the committed values of the right interactions can be extracted out from
these rewinding slots, without hurting the indistinguishability property of the
r-round left interaction (since there are more slots than the number of messages
in the left), from which r-robustness follows. Therefore, to make our constant-
round non-malleable commitment scheme hC;Ri one-many r-robust, we simply
add more WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the protocol. More precisely, the com-
mitment scheme hCr;Rri proceeds identically to hC;Ri, except that in Stage 3 of
the protocol, the Committer ˜ C needs to provide max(r + 1;l) WISSP proofs (of
the statement that either the Stage 2 message is a valid commitment or that it
knows a “trapdoor”), where l is the number of WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the
original protocol hC;Ri.
Next we show that the modiﬁed protocol hCr;Rri is indeed r-robust. The
main idea of the proof is to reduce the one-many r-robustness to the indis-
tinguishability of the interaction with machine B(y1
n) or B(y2
n), by extracting the
value committed to in the right interactions from the WISSP proofs in Stage 3
79of the protocol, without rewinding the left interactions. This is achievable, (similar
to the proof of the indistinguishability of Hybrid Hi and Hi+1 in Section 3.5,) as
therearemoreWISSPproofsinStage3thanthenumberofmessagesintheleft
interaction, and one can always ﬁnd a WISSP proof that does not interleave
with the left interaction and extract a witness from this proof, without rewind-
ing the left interactions. The witness extracted must be a valid decommitment,
as otherwise, by the special-soundness of the proof, it must be a valid signature-
chain, which violates the soundness of the signature-game (since the adversary
here is never rewound and obtains only three signatures during the straight-
line execution of the right interaction). Therefore, we conclude that hCr;Rri is
one-many r-robust. It follows using the same proof in Section 3.5 that hCr;Rri
is stand-alone non-malleable; and it further follows using the same proof as in
Section 3.5.2 that it is, in fact, also concurrent non-malleable.
Lemma 4. For every r 2 N, the protocol hCr;Rri has O(r)-round, and is concurrently
non-malleable and one-many r-robust.
The following theorem follows directly from Lemma 4.
Theorem 3. Assume the existence of a commitment scheme. Then, for any constant
r, there exists a constant-round commitment scheme that is r-robust concurrently non-
malleable.
Furthermore, for r < l, the protocol hCr;Rri is the same as hC;Ri; thus,
Corollary 1. For any r < l, hC;Ri is concurrently non-malleable and one-many r-
robust.
803.6 Constant-Round Secure Computation
As mentioned, “independence” of inputs is crucial for secure multi-party com-
putation protocols. In the stand-alone setting, there has been a tight interplay
between work on the round-complexity of multi-party computation (MPC) and
work on non-malleable commitments.
Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson’s [GMW87] original work on secure multi-
partycomputationshoweda
(m)-roundmulti-partycomputationprotocolbased
on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations (TDPs), where m is the
number of players in the execution; implicit in their work is a O(n)-round non-
malleable commitment for the special case of so-called “synchronizing” ad-
versaries that have identities of length logn. Subsequent works improved the
round-complexity by making stronger assumptions. Following the work by
ChorandRabin[CR87], Katz, OstrovskyandSmith[KOS03]obtainedaO(logm)-
round MPC protocol assuming TDPs and dense-crypto systems by relying on
the non-malleable commitments from [DDN00]. By additionally assuming the
existence of hash-function collision-resistant against circuits of sub-exponential
size (and non-black-box techniques), they also obtained a O(1)-round MPC pro-
tocol by instead relying on the non-malleable commitment from [Bar02]. More
recently, Pass [Pas04], showed the existence of a O(1)-rounds MPC protocol as-
suming only TDPs and (standard) collision resistant hash functions (but still
using non-black box techniques); this technique in turned was used in the non-
malleable commitment of [PR05a].
Theimplicitconnectionbetweentheround-complexityofnon-malleablecom-
mitments and secure multi-party was formalized by Lin, Pass and Venkita-
81subramaniam in [LPV09]: they show that the existence of k-round 4-robust non-
malleable commitments and the existence of TDPs implies the existence of O(k)-round
secure multi-party computation. Combining the result of [LPV09] with Theorem 3,
we get that secure multi-party computations can be performed in a constant
number of round based on only TDPs.
Theorem 4. Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then there
exists a constant-round protocol for secure multi-party computation.
In fact, the result of [LPV09] applies to the much more general model of
UC security, in various trusted set-up and relaxed security models including
the CRS, URS, sun-spot, key registration, timing, tamper-proof hardware, and
quasi-polynomial time simulation models. They also provide an essentially
tight characterization on the models of computation that implies UC-security:
They show that UC is feasible in any model of computation that implies the ex-
istence of a UC-puzzle—which, intuitively, is a protocol with the property that
no adversary can successfully complete the puzzle and also obtain a trapdoor
(or an answer to the puzzle), but there exists a simulator who can generate (cor-
rectly distributed) puzzles together with trapdoors. More precisely, they show
that in any model of computation that implies the existence of a t-round UC-puzzle, the
existence of k-round 4-robust non-malleable commitments and the existence of TDPs
implies the existence of O(k + t)-round UC-secure computation in that model.
Then since it is relatively “easy” to construct a constant-round UC-puzzle in
essentiallyallpreviouslyconsideredtrustedset-upandrelaxedsecuritymodels,
combining the result in [LPV09] with Theorem 3, we get that UC-security can
be achieved in a constant number of round based on only TDPs, in essentially
all previously considered trusted set-up and relaxed security models.
82Theorem 5. Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then there ex-
ists a constant-round protocol for UC-secure computation, in the CRS, URS, sun-spot,
key registration, timing, tamper-proof hardware, and quasi-polynomial time simulation
models.
3.7 Historical Notes
This result in this chapter is a combined version of results in two papers of
[LP09] and [LP11b]. In [LP09], we ﬁrst showed the existence of a O(1)log n-
round protocol that is based on the existence of one-way functions and uses a
black-box proof of security. On a high-level, the main technique of [LP09] was a
method for amplifying non-malleability: that is, we presented a method for trans-
forming a non-malleable commitment scheme that handles identities of length t
into one that handles identities of length O(2t). The O(1)log n-round protocol was
ﬁnally obtained starting off with the protocol of DDN for constant length iden-
tities and next iteratively amplifying it. The notion of robust non-malleability
was also ﬁrst deﬁned in [LP09] and was an integral part of the ampliﬁcation
procedure: in fact, our ampliﬁcation procedure could only be applied to robust
non-malleable commitments.
In [LP09], we additionally pointed out that ampliﬁcation procedure also
yield a natural route towards constant-round non-malleable commitments: it
sufﬁces to come with a constant-round protocol that handles identities of length
log
k n = loglog:::logn, where k is a constant; any such protocol can be am-
pliﬁed to a full-ﬂedged non-malleable commitment while still remaining con-
stant round. Subsequent work by Pass and Wee [PW10] obtained a constant-
83round protocol based on sub-exponentially hard one-way functions (again us-
ing a black-box proof of security), by following this paradigm: sub-exponential
one-way functions were used to construct a constant-round non-malleable com-
mitmentfor“small”identities, andtheprotocolcanthenbeampliﬁedintoafull-
ﬂedged one. An elegant work by Wee [Wee10] later simpliﬁed an improved the
ampliﬁcation procedure of [LP09], leading to a protocol using O(log
 n)-rounds,
based on one-way functions.Finally, independently of [LP11b], a beautiful work
by Goyal also obtains a constant-round non-malleable commitment based on
one-way functions; the construction of [Goy11] also follows the above ampli-
ﬁcation paradigm by Goyal instead constant-round robust non-malleable com-
mitment protocol for small identities based on one-way functions.
The construction from [LP11b] is direct: we no longer require ampliﬁca-
tion; instead we directly construct a full-ﬂedged robust non-malleable protocol.
Nevertheless, some of the ideas used in the ampliﬁcation procedure are helpful
when analyzing our protocol.
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CCA-SECURITY AND CONCURRENT SECURITY WITHOUT
ADDITIONAL “TRUST”
In this chapter, we introduce a new and stronger way of capturing input inde-
pendence than non-malleability—the notion of robust CCA-security. We show
that robust CCA-secure commitments can be constructed in the plain model
from any one-way functions. This gives the ﬁrst implementation of a primitive
with adaptive hardness property based on standard non adaptive assumption.
Then, by using our robust CCA-secure commitments as a key tool, we achieve
a meaningful notion of concurrent security in the plain model from standard
hardness assumptions, enabling, for the ﬁrst time, secure multi-party computa-
tion in the concurrent setting without additional “trust”.
4.1 Deﬁnition of CCA-Secure Commitments
4.1.1 Efﬁciently Veriﬁability
When considering robust CCA-security, we focus on commitment schemes that
are efﬁciently veriﬁable. Roughly speaking, a commitment scheme hC;Ri is efﬁ-
ciently veriﬁable if the honest receiver, after participating in an interaction of
the commit stage of hC;Ri with an arbitrary (potentially unbounded) committer,
can already efﬁciently verify whether the commitment produced at the end of
the commit stage has a valid decommitment or not. Formally,
Deﬁnition 22. A statistically binding commitment scheme hC;Ri is efﬁciently veriﬁ-
85able, if it has the following structure:
 At the end of the commit stage, the committerC and the receiver R produce a joint
output, the commitment c; additionally R outputs a bit b. In an honest execution
between C and R, the receiver R always outputs 1. We say that the receiver R
accepts in this case and rejects if it outputs 0.
We say that a commitment is accepting if R outputs 1 at the end of the commit
stage, and a commitment is valid if there exists a valid decommitment (v;d) that
makes R accept in the reveal stage.
 For every machine A, the probability that A in an interaction with the honest
receiver R in the commit stage of the hC;Ri, produces a commitment that is ac-
cepting but not valid is negligible.
4.1.2 CCA-Security
Security under chosen-ciphertext-attacks (CCA security) [RS91] has been stud-
ied extensively in the context of encryption schemes, where the conﬁdentiality
of encrypted messages is guaranteed even in the presence of a decryption or-
acle. We here deﬁne an analogous notion for commitment schemes. Roughly
speaking, a commitment scheme is CCA (chosen-commitment-attack) secure if
the commitment scheme retains its hiding property even if the receiver has ac-
cess to a “decommiment oracle”.
Let hC;Ri be a tag-based efﬁciently veriﬁable commitment scheme with l(n)-
bit identities. A decommitment oracle O of hC;Ri acts as follows in interaction
withanadversary A: itparticipateswith Ainmanysessionsofthecommitphase
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A. At the end of each session, if the session is accepting and valid, it reveals a
decommitment of that session to A; otherwise, it sends ?. (Note that when a
session has multiple decommitments1, the decommitment oracle only returns
one of them. Hence, there might exist many valid decommitment oracles.)
Looselyspeaking, atag-basedefﬁcientlyveriﬁablecommitmentschemehC;Ri
is said to be CCA-secure, if there exists a decommitment oracle O for hC;Ri, such
that the hiding property of the commitment holds even with respect to adver-
saries with access to O. More precisely, denote by AO the adversary A with ac-
cess to the decommitment oracle O. Let INDb(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z), where b 2 f0;1g,
denote the output of the following probabilistic experiment: on common input
1n and auxiliary input z, AO (adaptively) chooses a pair of challenge values (v0,
v1) 2 f0;1gn—the values to be committed to—and an identity id 2 f0;1gl(n), and
receives a commitment to vb using identity id. Finally, the experiment outputs
the output y of AO; the output y is replaced by ? if during the execution A sends
O any commitment using identity id (that is, any execution where the adversary
queries the decommitment oracle on a commitment using the same identity as
the commitment it receives, is considered invalid).
Deﬁnition 23 (CCA-secure Commitments.). Let hC;Ri be a tag-based efﬁciently
veriﬁable commitment scheme with l(n)-bit identities, and O a decommitment oracle for
it. We say that hC;Ri is CCA-secure w.r.t. O, if for every PPT ITM A, the following
ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
 fIND0(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z)gn2N;z2f0;1g
1Note that the statistically binding property only guarantees that, with overwhelming prob-
ability, the committed value is unique. However, there may still exist many different decommit-
ments.
87 fIND1(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z)gn2N;z2f0;1g
We say that hC;Ri is CCA-secure if there exists a decommitment oracle O0, such that,
hC;Ri is CCA-secure w.r.t. O0.
As mentioned in the introduction, CCA-security easily implies concurrent non-
malleability [DDN00, PR03, LPV08]. The proof is standard and omitted. Note
that in the deﬁnition of CCA-security, we could also have considered an adver-
sary that can select a pair of sequences ~ v0;~ v1 of challenge messages, and receives
commitments to one of the sequence ~ vb using a sequence ~ id of identities of its
own choice. (The output of the experiment INDb is now replaced with ? if A
copies any of the left identities on the right). It follows using a standard hybrid
argument that CCA-security implies security also in this setting; we omit the
proof.
4.1.3 k-Robust CCA-Security
We introduce a strengthening of the notion of CCA-security analogously to the
notion of robust non-malleable commitments introduced in Chapter 3. We here
consider a man-in-the-middle adversary that participates in an arbitrary left in-
teractionwithalimitednumberofrounds, whilehavingaccesstoadecommitment
oracle.
Deﬁnition 24. Let hC;Ri be a tag-based efﬁciently veriﬁable commitment scheme, with
l(n)-bit identities, and O a decommitment oracle for it. We say that hC;Ri is k-robust
CCA-secure w.r.t. O, if hC;Ri is CCA-secure w.r.t. O, there exists a PPT simulator S,
such that, for every PPT adversary A, and every PPT k-round ITM B, the following
88two ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.

n
outB;AO[hB(y);AO(z)i(1n)]
o
n2N;y2f0;1g;z2f0;1g

n
outB;S A[hB(y);S A(z)i(1n)]
o
n2N;y2f0;1g;z2f0;1g
Thus, roughly speaking, hC;Ri is k-robust if the (joint) output of every k-
round interaction, with an adversary having access to the oracle O, can be sim-
ulated without the oracle. In other words, having access to the oracle does not
help the adversary in participating in any k-round protocols.
We say that a tag-based efﬁciently veriﬁable commitment hC;Ri with l(n)-bit
identities is robust CCA-secure if there exists a a decommitment oracle O, such
that, hC;Ri is k-robust CCA-secure w.r.t. O, for every constant k.
On the identity length Recall that in the deﬁnition of CCA-security, the ad-
versary can pick arbitrary identities id of length n for both the left and the right
interaction. We may also consider a restricted notion of (robust) CCA-security
where the adversary is restricted to use identities of some bounded length. As
we show below, standard techniques [DDN00] can be used to show that any ro-
bust CCA-secure commitment that is secure for identities of length `(n) = n" can
be turned into a robust CCA-secure commitment (that is secure for identities of
length n), by adding one extra message at the beginning of the protocol.
Proposition 4. Let " be any constant such that 0 < " < 1, ` a polynomial such that
`(n) = n", and hC;Ri a k-round robust CCA-secure commitment scheme with `-bit
identities. Then assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists a robust
k + 1-round CCA-secure commitment scheme h ˆ C; ˆ Ri with n-bit identities.
89Proof. ThetransformationfromarobustCCA-securecommitmenthC;Riforshort
(n"-bit) identities into one for long identities (n-bit) uses a standard technique
from [DDN00] as follows: to commit to a message v 2 f0;1gn, the committer ˆ C
on common input a security parameter n 2 N and an identity id 2 f0;1gn, ﬁrst
generates a key pair (sk;vk) of a signature scheme, such that the veriﬁcation-key
vk is of length n"2, and sends vk and a signature of the n-bit identity id (using sk)
to the receiver in the ﬁrst stage. (The receiver veriﬁes that the signature is valid;
it aborts otherwise). Then, in the second stage, it simply commits to v using
hC;Ri and the veriﬁcation key vk as the identity.
Let O be a decommitment oracle of hC;Ri, with respect to which hC;Ri is ro-
bust CCA-secure. Then consider a decommitment oracle ˆ O of h ˆ C; ˆ Ri that extends
O in the following straightforward way: to decommit an accepting commitment
of h ˆ C; ˆ Ri, ˆ O returns the decommitment that O returns for the Stage 2 commit-
ment of hC;Ri. Below we show that h ˆ C; ˆ Ri is robust CCA-secure w.r.t. ˆ O. First,
it follows directly from the robustness of hC;Ri w.r.t. O (and the fact that, given
access to O, the decommitment oracle ˆ O can be emulated perfectly) that h ˆ C; ˆ Ri is
robust w.r.t. ˆ O. Then, for CCA security, consider an arbitrary adversary A that
participates in an experiment of INDb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri;A;n;z). We claim that, except with
negligible probability, A never picks the same veriﬁcation key vk, as that picked
in the left interaction (by the left committer), in any accepting right interac-
tion that has a different identity from the left interaction. Otherwise, we could
construct an adversary, who with access to ˆ O, is able to forges a signature of a
randomly chosen key (corresponding to the key chosen by the left committer);
then, by the robustness of h ˆ C; ˆ Ri w.r.t. ˆ O, there exists a simulator B that is able
2The existence of signature schemes is implied by the existence of one-way functions
[Rom90]. To get a signature scheme with a “short” veriﬁcation-key, simply “scale-down” the
security parameter.
90to forge a signature even without access to ˆ O, which violates the unforgibility
of the signature scheme. In other words, every successful right interaction that
has a different identity from the left, also has a different veriﬁcation key from
the left interactions. It thus follows from the CCA-security of hC;Ri that h ˆ C; ˆ Ri is
CCA-secure w.r.t. ˆ O. 
4.2 A CCA-Secure Commitment Scheme
In this section, we show the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then, for every  > 0, there
exists an O(n)-round robust CCA-secure commitment scheme (where n is the security
parameter).
Our CCA-secure commitment hC;Ri is based on a variant of the concurrent
non-malleable commitment protocol of [LPV08], which in turn is based on the
message scheduling technique of [DDN00]. However, here we use a slightly
different message schedule in order to provide more “safe” rewinding slots. For
simplicity of exposition, below we describe out protocol assuming the existence
of one-way functions with efﬁciently recognizable range, but the protocol can
be easily modiﬁed to work with any arbitrary one-way function (see Remark 2
for more details). Furthermore, we also rely on 3-round special-sound proofs in
our protocol, but the analysis also works also with 4-round proofs (see Remark 3
for more details). Additionally, we will rely on a statistically binding two-round
commitment scheme com with binding error 2 2n; the construction in [HILL99,
Nao91] gives such a commitment scheme. 3
3Any statistically binding commitment scheme with exponentially small binding error can
91Let ` and  be polynomials in the security parameter n. To commit to a value
v, the Committer C and the Receiver R, on common input 1n and the identity
id 2 f0;1g`(n), proceed in the following three stages in the commit phase.
 Stage 1: the Receiver picks a random string r 2 f0;1gn, and sends its image
s = f(r), through a one-way function f with an efﬁciently recognizable
range to the Committer. The Committer checks that s is in the range of f
and aborts otherwise. Additionally, the receiver also sends the ﬁrst mes-
sages r1;r2 for two commitments, using a two-round statistically binding
string commitment com.
 Stage 2: The Committer provides a commitment c1 to v using the commit-
ment scheme com and r1 as the ﬁrst message; let (v;d) denote the decom-
mitment information. Next, it provides a commitment c2 to (v;d) using
com and r2 as ﬁrst message. We refer to (r1;c1) as the ﬁrst commitment and
(r2;c2) as the second commitment4.
 Stage 3: The Committer proves that
– (r1;c1) is a valid commitment to v and (r2;c2) is a valid commitment
to a decommitment pair for (r1;c1),
– or s is in the image set of f.
This is proved using 4`(n)(n) invocations of a special-sound WI proof
system where the veriﬁer query has length 3n.5 The messages in the proofs
are scheduled based on the identity id and relies on scheduling pairs of
be turned into a scheme with binding error 2 2n by using a scaled-up security parameter. As we
shall see later, this property will be used later in the security proof.
4A statistically binding commitment may have multiple decommitments. However, here the
second commitment uniquely decides one decommitment of the ﬁrst commitment. As we shall
see later in the security proof, this helps us deﬁne a decommitment oracle with respect to which
the protocol is robust CCA secure.
5As we shall see later on, the length restriction will facilitate the security proof.
92proofs according to schedules design0 and design1 depicted in Figure 4.1.
More precisely, the proof stage consist of `(n) phases. In phase i, the com-
mitter provides (n) sequential designidi pairs of proofs, followed by (n)
sequential design1 idi pairs of proofs.
In the reveal phase, the Committer simply decommits to the ﬁrst commitment
(r1;c1). The Receiver accepts if the decommitment is valid and rejects otherwise.
design0 design1
2
2
1
1
1;2
2
2
1
1
1;2
Figure 4.1: Description of the schedules used in Stage 3 of the protocol.
(1;1;1) and (2;2;2) are respectively the transcripts of a pair of
3-round special-sound proofs.
OntheroundcomplexityofhC;Ri: TheroundcomplexityofhC;RiisO(`(n)(n)).
We will show that hC;Ri is robust CCA-secure when (n) = n for any constant
 > 0. Furthermore, by Proposition 4, it sufﬁces to consider identities of length
`(n) = n"0
for any constant "0 > 0. Thus by setting " and "0 properly so that
 = " + "0, we obtain a O(n)-round protocol.
Proposition 5. hC;Ri is a statistically binding commitment scheme with efﬁcient ver-
iﬁability.
Proof. It follows using essentially the same proof as in [LPV08] that the protocol
is statistically binding and computationally hiding; for completeness, we pro-
vide the proof below.
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com.
Hiding: The hiding property essentially follows from the hiding property of
com and the fact that Stage 3 of the protocol is WI (since WI proofs are
closed under concurrent composition [FS90]). More precisely, we show
that any adversary R that violates the hiding property of hC;Ri can be
used to violate the hiding property of com. More precisely, given any
adversary R (without loss of generality, deterministic) that distinguishes
a commitment made using hC;Ri, we construct a machine R0 that distin-
guishes commitments—two commitments constructed in the same way as
that in Stage 2 of hC;Ri—made using com. Let s be the value in the range
of one way function f sent by R in the ﬁrst message. R0 on auxiliary-input
a “fake” witness r such that s = f(r), proceeds as follows. It internally in-
corporates R and forwards the external commitments to R in Stage 2. In
Stage 3, R0 gives WI proofs using the “fake witness” r. Finally, it outputs
whatever R outputs. From the WI property of Stage 3, it follows that R0
distinguishes the commitments made using com, if R distinguishes the
commitment made using hC;Ri. On the other hand, it follows from the
hiding property of com that no adversary can distinguish commitments
of com even if it receives an arbitrary number of commitments. This gives
a contradiction.
Efﬁcient Veriﬁability: It remains to show that the validity of an hC;Ri commit-
ment is efﬁciently checkable. By construction, an hC;Ri commitment is
valid if and only if the “ﬁrst commitment” is valid. It then follows from
the soundness of Stage 3 of the protocol that, whenever the receiver is ac-
cepting (at the end of the commit phase), the ﬁrst commitment is valid
94except with negligible probability. Thus, the validity of hC;Ri is also efﬁ-
ciently checkable.

We turn to show that hC;Ri is a robust CCA-secure commitment when (n) =
n for any constant  > 0.
Theorem 7. Let  > 0 be a constant, and let (n) = n. Then hC;Ri is a robust CCA-
secure commitment.
To show that hC;Ri is a robust CCA-secure commitment, we need to exhibit
a decommitment oracle O for hC;Ri such that hC;Ri is robust CCA-secure w.r.t.
O. Consider the following decommitment oracle O: O acts just as an honest re-
ceiver during the commit phase. At the end of every accepting interaction, if
the “second commitment” (r2;c2) deﬁnes a unique value (v;d) such that (v;d) is
a valid decommitment for the “ﬁrst commitment” (r1;c2), O returns (v;d). Other-
wise, O returns the lexicographically ﬁrst decommitment, or ? if there does not
exists a valid decommitment. The main technical challenge consists of proving
the following proposition.
Proposition 6. hC;Ri is robust CCA-secure w.r.t O.
We provide a high-level overview of the proof below. The formal proof can be
found in Second 4.3: we will ﬁrst introduce the notion of safe-points, and then
provide the proofs of CCA security and robustness, which rely on the notion of
safe-points, in Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 respectively.
954.2.1 Proof Overview of Robust CCA-Security
Towards proposition 6, we ﬁrst argue that hC;Ri is CCA-secure w.r.t. O. Con-
sider the CCA-experiment INDb, where the adversary A interacts with an honest
committer C, and is given access to O. We refer to its interaction with C as the
left interaction, and its interactions with O as the right interactions. Recall that
proving CCA-security w.r.t. O amounts to showing that the views of A in exper-
iments IND0 and IND1 are indistinguishable (when A has oracle access to O). The
main hurdle in showing this is that the oracle O is not efﬁciently computable; if
it were, indistinguishability would directly follow from the hiding property of
theleftinteraction. However, sincehC;Riconsistsofasequenceofspecial-sound
proofs of the committed value, the oracle O can be efﬁciently implemented by
“rewinding” the special-sound proofs in the right interactions. But, the problem
is that once we start rewinding the right interactions, A might send new mes-
sages also in the left interaction. So, if done naively, this would require us to
also rewind the left interaction, which could violate its hiding property.
The crux of the proof is showing how to appropriately rewind the right in-
teractions (so as to extract out the right committed values), without violating
the hiding property of the left interaction. This implies that the view of A in
INDb can be efﬁciently emulated, without the oracle O, and hence by the hiding
property of the left interaction, A’s view is indistinguishable. Towards doing
this, we rewind the right interaction only at special points in the interaction; we
call such points safe points.
Note that the hiding property of the left interaction remains intact if during
the rewinding, one of the following two cases occurs.
96 Case 1: A does not request any new messages in the left interaction.
 Case 2: The only new messages A requests in the left interaction are com-
plete WISSP proofs.
The fact that the left interaction is still hiding even if case 2 happens follows
using exactly the same proof as the proof of hiding of hC;Ri. Obviously, the left
interaction remains hiding if case 1 happens.
Roughly speaking, we now say that a preﬁx  of a transcript  (which con-
sists of one left interaction and many right interactions) is a safe-point for the
kth right interaction if  “lies in between” the ﬁrst two messages r and r of
a WISSP proof (r;r;r) in the kth interaction (i.e., it contains r but not r),
and satisﬁes that from  to the point when r is sent, one of the two cases above
occurs in the left interaction. We call (r;r;r) the WISSP associated with the
safe point . It follows using a combinatorial argument (similar in spirit, but
more complicated than, [DDN00, LPV08]) that the message scheduling in Stage
3 of hC;Ri guarantees the following key property:
Let  be any transcript of one left interaction, and many right in-
teractions, of hC;Ri. Then, any right interaction k that 1) has com-
pleted, and 2) uses a different identity from the left interaction, has

(n) non-overlapping WISSP (i.e., WISSP’s that are sequentially
arranged) that are associated with a safe point in .
We will now use these safe-points to construct a simulator that can efﬁciently
emulates the oracle O. (As mentioned in the Introduction, the reason we need
“many” safe-points is to ensure that we can extract out the committed values
97in all the right interactions while ensuring an expected polynomial running-
time.) On a high-level, the simulation emulates O by following the honest re-
ceiver strategy of hC;Ri, until it encounters a “good” safe-point . It then keeps
rewinding the execution back to  until it obtains another accepting transcript
of the right proof associated with . Once two accepting proof transcripts are
obtained, the special-soundness property allows the simulator to extract the de-
commitment information.
More precisely, the simulation is deﬁned recursively in the following man-
ner: On recursion level d, we say that a safe-point  of a transcript  is “good”
(we call this a d + 1-good safe-point) if the number of right-execution WISSP
proofs—possiblyfromdifferentinteractions—startinginbetweenandthepoint
where  is sent in , is smaller than kd = M=0d+1, where M is a (polynomial)
upper-bound on the total number of messages in , and 0 = n"0
for some con-
stant "0 such that 0 < "0 < ".
Then, on recursion level d, the simulator emulates every right interaction
honestly, but as soon as it encounters a d + 1-good safe-point in the current tran-
script, it begins “rewinding” the execution back to the safe-point, and invokes
itself recursively at level d + 1. In each rewinding, if it notices that  might
no longer be a d + 1-good safe-point, it cancels the rewinding and starts a new
rewinding. It continues the process until it gets another transcript where  is a
d + 1-good safe-point again; from this second transcript we can extract out (and
store) the decommitment information for the right interaction associated with
the safe-point. Finally, whenever in the emulation a right interaction completes,
the simulator provides A with the decommitment information extracted out (or
outputs fail if the decommitment information has not been recovered). By can-
98celling “bad” rewindings (i.e., rewindings that are not d+1-good safe-points) we
are guaranteeing two properties: 1) we never violate the hiding property of the
left interaction, and 2) the running-time of the simulation does not blow up.
Let us now brieﬂy argue that the simulator indeed emulates O both correctly
and efﬁciently, without violating the hiding property of the left interaction.
Hiding property of the left interaction: Since the simulator only rewinds the right
interactions from safe-points, and cancels every rewinding in which the point is
no longer a safe-point, it follows that the left interaction remains hiding.
Correctness: We argue that for each right interaction that uses an identity that
is different from the left interaction, we extract out the decommitment informa-
tion before the interaction completes successfully. First, note that the recursion
level is bounded by c = log0 M, which is a constant (since is M is polynomial
in n and 0 = n0
). Since each successful right interaction that uses a different
identity than the left interaction has n safe-points (by the key property above), it
follows that for each such interaction, there exists some recursive level d, such
that the right interaction has at least n=c > 0 safe-points on level d. But, as
the total number of right-proofs that start on level d is bounded by kd = M=0d
(otherwise, the simulation at this recursive level is cancelled), there must exist
one right-proof with an associated safe-point , such that less than M=0d+1 right-
proofs start in between  and the last message of the proof. Therefore  is a
d +1-good safe-point and will be rewound. Finally, since we continue rewinding
until the decommitment information is found, it follows that for each successful
right interaction that uses a different identity than the left interaction, the de-
commitment information is recovered by the simulator.
Efﬁciency: To prove that the simulation is efﬁcient, consider a simpliﬁed scenario
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ent values—i.e., A never manages to violate the statistical binding property of
com. We argue that the simulation is efﬁcient in this case. (It sufﬁces to consider
this case, since the probability that A violates the statistical binding property
of com is negligible, and thus we can always “cut-off” the simulation without
loosing “too much”.) To prove that the expected running-time of the simulation
(in the simpliﬁed scenario) is polynomially bounded, ﬁrst recall that the recur-
sive depth is a constant c. Secondly, at each recursive level d, there are at most
M possible points from which we can rewind and from each of these points,
the expected number of rewindings is 1. The latter follows since the simulator
only starts rewinds from a point  if it is a d +1-good safe-point, and it continues
rewinding until  becomes a d + 1-good safe-point again; furthermore, in each of
the rewindings the simulated view of the adversary is identically distributed to
its view in the ﬁrst execution (this fact relies on us considering the case when all
com commitments are well-deﬁned). Thus, the probability that a point is a d+1-
good safe-point (conditioned on it occurring as a preﬁx in the execution) is the
same in the ﬁrst execution and in the rewindings. Therefore, the expected num-
ber of recursive calls starting from  is 1. We now conclude that the expected
total number of rewindings is bounded by O(M)c.
The robustness w.r.t. O property of hC;Ri follows using essentially the same
proof as above: the key step here is, again, to show that the decommitment
oracle O can be emulated efﬁciently, without “affecting” the security of the left
interaction. Now, however, a rewinding is “safe” only if the adversary does
not request any new message in the left (constant-round) interaction. That is,
the the left interaction is never rewound during the extractions on the right.
Roughly speaking, this is achieved by rewinding only those WISSP proofs
100that do not interleave with any message in the left interaction (and cancelling
every rewinding in which the WISSP proof interleaves with a left-message).
4.3 Proof of Robust CCA-Security
In this section, we formally prove Proposition 6. Below we ﬁrst provide the
deﬁnition of safe-points. The formal proof of Proposition 6 consists of two parts:
in Section 4.3.2, we show that hC;Ri is CCA-secure w.r.t O; and in section 4.3.3,
we show that it is also robust w.r.t. O.
4.3.1 Safe-Points
Our notion of safe-points is almost the same as that in [LPV08] (which in turn is
based on the notion of safe rewinding block of [DDN00]), with the only excep-
tion that our deﬁnition also considers the Stage 1 and 2 messages of the proto-
col, whereas the deﬁnition in [LPV08] only concerns messages in the WISSP
proofs.
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Figure 4.2: Three characteristic safe-points.
101Intuitively, a safe-point  of a right interaction k is a preﬁx of a transcript
 that lies in between the ﬁrst two messages r and r of a WISSP proof
(r;r;r) in interaction k, such that, when rewinding from  to r, if A uses the
same “scheduling of messages” as in , then the left interaction can be emulated
without affecting the hiding property. This holds, if in  from  to where r is
sent, A expects either no message or only complete WISSP proofs in the left
interaction, as shown in Figure 4.2 (i) and (ii) respectively, (Additionally, in both
cases, A may request the reply message of some WISSP proof, as shown in
Figure 4.2 (iii). This is because, given the ﬁrst two messages of a WISSP proof,
the reply message is deterministic, and hence can be emulated in the rewinding
by replaying the reply in .)
0
l
0
l
l
r
r
r 
Figure 4.3: Preﬁx  that is not a safe point.
Deﬁnition 25. Let  be any transcript of one left interaction, and many right interac-
tions, of hC;Ri. A preﬁx  of a transcript  is called a safe-point for right interaction
k, if there exists an accepting proof (r;r;r) in the right interaction k, such that:
1. r occurs in , but not r (and r).
2. for any proof (l;l;l) in the left interaction, if l occurs in , then l occurs after
r.
3. messages in Stage 1 and 2 of the left interaction occur either before  or after r.
If  is a safe-point, let (;;) denote the canonical “safe” right proof associ-
ated with . Note that the only case a right-interaction proof is not associated
102with any safe-point is if it is “aligned” with a left-execution proof, as shown in
Figure 4.3. In contrast, in all other cases, a right-interaction proof has a safe-
point, as shown in Figure 4.2. Below we show in Lemma 5 that in any transcript
ofoneleftandmanyrightinteractionsofhC;Ri, everyacceptingrightinteraction
that has a different identity from the left interaction, has at least (n) safe-points.
This technical lemma will be very instrumental in the proof of CCA-security in
the next section.
Lemma 5 (Safe-point Lemma). Let  be any transcript of one left interaction, and
many right interactions, of hC;Ri. Then, in , for every successful right interaction
that has a different identity from the left interaction, there exist at least a number of

((n)) non-overlapping WISSP proofs that are associated with a safe-point.
Proof. Consider any transcript  of one left and many right interactions of hC;Ri
with A, and any right interaction k in  that is accepting and has a different iden-
tity from the left interaction. We show that there are at least 
((n)) WISSP
proofs (r;r;r) in the right interaction k, for which there exists a point —a
preﬁx of —satisfying the following two properties:
  contains r, but not r and r.
 Foranyproof(l;l;l)intheleftinteraction, ifl occursin, thenl occurs
after r.
We call  a “weak” safe-point for (r;r;r). It is easy to see that, if a right in-
teraction has a number of  = 
((n)) proofs that are associated with a weak
safe-point, then at least a number of =2 of these proofs are completely sequen-
tially arranged (as all the designs are sequentially arranged), and hence non-
overlapping. Furthermore, since there are only a constant number of messages
103in Stage 1 and 2 of the protocol, at least =2   c of these weak safe-points are
actually full safe-points. Hence, we can conclude that there are 
((n)) non-
overlapping proofs in this right interaction that are associated with a safe-point.
Now it only remains to show that there are 
((n)) proofs with a weak safe-
point. Consider the following two adversarial schedulings in  with respect to
the left and the kth right interaction.
 The adversary “aligns” the proofs in the left and right interactions one by
one, where a left proof is aligned with a right proof if its challenge mes-
sage lies in between the challenge and reply messages of the right proof
in . (Similarly, we say that two designs are aligned with each other if the
two proofs in the left design are aligned with the two in the right design
respectively.)
 The adversary does not “align” the proofs in the left and right interactions.
We show that in the ﬁrst case, there exist (n) weak safe-points. Then we show
that, starting from an aligned scheduling, no matter how the adversary changes
themessagescheduling, thenumberofweaksafe-pointsneverdecreases; hence,
the claim also holds in the second case.
Assume that Case 1 holds. Since the identities of the left and right interac-
tions, id
l and id
r, are different, they must exist one bit, i, on which they differ
(i.e., id
l
i , id
r
i). Then each of the (n) design1’s in the ith iteration (in Stage 3) of
the right interaction k is aligned with a design0 on the left. Next we show that
whenever a design1 is aligned with a design0 on the left, there exists a weak
safe-point. Let (r
b;r
b;r
b) for b = 1;2 be the two proofs in the right design1, and
(l
b;l
b;l
b) for b = 1;2 the two proofs in the left design0 that are aligned with
104them, as shown in Figure 4.4. Then consider the preﬁx  of  that includes all
the messages up to l
1. As l
1 lies in between r
1 and r
1, so does . Hence,  is
associated with the right-proof (r
2;r
2;r
2), and every left proof either has its ﬁrst
two messages inside , or after, which means  is a weak safe-point. Therefore
each of the (n) design1’s in the ith iteration of the right interaction has a weak
safe-point.
l
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l
2
l
1
l
1
l
1;l
2
r
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r
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r
1
r
1
r
1;r
2 
Figure 4.4: A design0 matches up with design1.
Next consider a game in which the adversary tries to decrease the number of
weak safe-points to below (n), by changing the message-scheduling. By the ar-
gumentabove, weknowthatifthe(n)design1’sintheith iterationofinteraction
j are aligned with design0’s, then there are at least (n) weak safe-points, with
one for each design1. Then to succeed, the adversary must manage to eliminate
the weak safe-points associated with at least one design1 (in iteration i). Take
any design1 on the right.
 If one of the two proofs in the design1 is not aligned with any proof on the
left, then there exists a weak safe-point associated with that proof.
 Ifthetwoproofsinthedesign1 arealignedwiththetwoproofsina design0
on the left, then as argued above, there exists a weak safe-point.
 If the two proofs in the design1 are aligned with two left-proofs belonging
to two different designs, then since the two left-proofs are sequentially
105arranged as in a design0, it follows using the same argument as in the
second case that there exists a weak safe-point.
Therefore, the only way to ensure that a design1 is not associated with any weak
safe-point is to align it with a design1 on the left. Then if the adversary wants to
eliminate the weak safe-points associated with j design1’s in the ith iteration on
the right, say right proofs kr
1 < kr
2 < ::: < kr
j, it must align them with j design1’s
on the left, say designs kl
1 < kl
2 < ::: < kl
j. Since the (n) design1’s in the i’th
iterations corresponds to design0’s on the left, it holds that for every kl
h, either
kl
h < kr
1 or kl
h > kr
j. There are only three possibilities:
The adversary shifts j left-designs down, i.e., kl
j < kr
1. Thentheﬁrstkr
1 1right-
designs can only be aligned with the ﬁrst kl
1   1 left-designs. Since kl
1   1 
kl
j  j  (kr
1 1)  j, there are at least 2j proofs on the right (belonging to the
ﬁrst kr
l   1 right-designs) that are not aligned with any proofs on the left.
Then each of them is associated with a weak safe-point.
The adversary shifts j left-designs up, i.e., kl
1 > kr
j. It follows from the same
argument as above that there are at least 2j weak safe-points in the last
2`(n)(n)   kr
j designs on the right.
The adversary shifts some left-designs down and some up, i.e., kl
1 < kr
1 andkl
j >
kr
j. Then every right-design k, such that k < kr
1 or k > kr
j, can only be aligned
with a left-design k0, such that k0 < kl
1 or k0 > kl
j. Since there are at least
2`(n)(n)   (n) right-designs with indexes smaller than kr
1 or greater than
kr
j, but at most 2`(n)(n) (n)  j left-designs with indexes smaller than kl
1
or greater than kl
j, there are (again) at least 2j proofs on the right that are
not aligned with any proofs on the left, which gives 2j weak safe-points.
106Therefore no matter how the adversary changes the message scheduling, there
always exist at least (n) weak safe-points in the right interaction. Hence we
conclude the Lemma. 
4.3.2 Proof of CCA Security
We show that for every PPT adversary A, the following ensembles are compu-
tationally indistinguishable.
 fIND0(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z)gn2N;z2f0;1g
 fIND1(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z)gn2N;z2f0;1g
Towardsthis, weconsidernewcommitmentschemeh ˆ C; ˆ Ri(similartothe“adap-
tor” schemes of [DDN00, LPV08]), which is a variant of hC;Ri where the receiver
can ask for an arbitrary number of special-sound WI designs in Stage 3. Fur-
thermore, h ˆ C; ˆ Ri does not have a ﬁxed scheduling in Stage 3; the receiver instead
gets to choose which design to execute in each iteration (by sending bit b to se-
lect designb). Note that, clearly, any execution of hC;Ri can be emulated by an
execution of h ˆ C; ˆ Ri by simply requesting the appropriate designs. It follows us-
ing essentially the same proof for the hiding property of hC;Ri in Proposition 5
that h ˆ C; ˆ Ri is computationally hiding; we omit the proof here.
Now assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary A, a distin-
guisher D, and a polynomial p, such that for inﬁnitely many n 2 N, there exists
z 2 f0;1g, such that,
  Pr[D(IND0(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z)) = 1]   Pr[D(IND1(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z)) = 1]
   
1
p(n)
107We reach a contradiction by exhibiting a (stand-alone) adversary B that dis-
tinguishes commitments using h ˆ C; ˆ Ri. Let STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z) denote the output
of B(1n;z) after receiving a commitment of h ˆ C; ˆ Ri to value vb, where as in exper-
iment INDb the challenges v0 and v1 are chosen adaptively by B. We show that
the following two claims hold w.r.t B.
Claim 6. There exists a polynomial function t, such that for every b 2 f0;1g, n 2 N and
z 2 f0;1g, B in experiment STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z) takes t(n) steps in expectation.
Claim 7. Let b 2 f0;1g. The following ensembles are computationally indistinguish-
able.

n
STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g

n
INDb(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
By Claim 7, it thus follows that for inﬁnitely many n 2 N, there exists z 2 f0;1g,
such that,
   Pr
h
D(STA0(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B
;n;z)) = 1
i
  Pr
h
D(STA1(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B
;n;z)) = 1
i    
3
4p(n)
Furthermore, by Claim 6, the probability that B runs for more than T(n) =
4t(n)p(n) steps is smaller than 1=4p(n). Therefore, the execution of B can be
truncated after T(n) steps, while only affecting the distinguishing probability by
at most 1
4p(n), which means there exists a PPT machine that distinguishes com-
mitments with probability 1
2p(n); this contradicts the hiding property of h ˆ C; ˆ Ri.
Construction of B. On a high-level, B in interaction with an honest commit-
ter ˆ C on the left emulates the decommitment oracle O for A by extracting the
decommitments of the right interactions from the WISSP proofs in hC;Ri. It
108does this by rewinding A only from safe-points. This ensures that we do not
have to rewind the external left execution; rather, it sufﬁces to request an addi-
tional design on the left to handle these rewindings. But, as the simulator needs
to provide the decommitments in a “on-line” fashion (i.e., as soon as a right-
interaction completes, the simulator needs to provide A with decommitment
information for this interaction), these rewindings might become recursive (if
the right interactions are nested). And, if we were to perform these rewindings
naively, the running-time quickly grows exponentially (just as in the context of
concurrent zero knowledge [DNS04]). To make sure that the recursion depth is
constant, we instead only rewind from safe-points  such that the number of
new right-proofs that start between  and the last message  of the right-proof
associated with , is “small”; here, “small” is deﬁned appropriately based on
the recursion level. More precisely, we say that a safe-point  is d + 1-good for
a transcript  if less than kd = M=0d right-proofs start between  and , where
M is an upper-bound on the total number of messages that A sends or receives,
and 0 = n"0
for some constant "0 such that 0 < "0 < ". On recursion level d, B
then only rewinds A from d + 1-good safe-points.
Formally, we describe B using a recursive helper procedure EXT. EXT, on
input an integer d (the recursion level), a partial joint view V of A and the (em-
ulated) right receivers, the index s of a right-proof, a “repository” R of decom-
mitments of the right interactions that have been previously collected, proceeds
as follows.
Procedure EXT(d;V; s;R): Let  be the (partial) transcript contained in V. If
d = 0, EXT will emulates a complete execution of IND with the adversary A. If
d > 0, it will instead extends the partial view V to the completion of the right-
proof s; if at any point in the emulation,  is not a d+1-good safe-point for s, EXT
109aborts and returns ?. Finally, EXT returns the the view VA of A in the emulation
(generated so far). We now turn to describe how EXT emulates the left and the
right interactions.
The left interaction is emulated by simply requesting the appropriate mes-
sages from the external committer. At the top level (i.e., d = 0), A participates
in a complete hC;Ri commitment on the left, which can be easily emulated by
simply requesting the appropriate designs from ˆ C. At lower levels (i.e., d > 0),
EXT cancels every execution in which  is not a safe-point. Hence it only needs
to emulate the left interaction when  is a safe-point. In this case, as previously
discussed, A either does not request any new messages on the left, or only asks
for complete new WISSP proofs; the former case can be trivially emulated (by
simply doing nothing or replaying old messages if A asks for the third message
of a left WISSP proof again), in the latter case, EXT emulates the left interac-
tion by asking for more designs from ˆ C.
On the other hand, in the right interactions EXT follows the honest receiver
strategy of hC;Ri. Furthermore, whenever A completes a proof (r;r;r) in a
right interaction j, EXT attempts to extract a decommitment for this interaction,
if the proof (r;r;r) is associated with a d + 1-good safe-point 0. To extract,
EXT invokes itself recursively on input (d +1;V0; s0;R), where V0 is the (partial)
joint view of A and the right receivers corresponding to the transcript 0, and
s0 is the index of the right-proof (r;r;r). It continues invoking itself recur-
sively until one of the recursive invocations returns a view containing another
accepting transcript (r;0
r;0
r) of the s0th proof. When this happens, if r , 0
r,
EXTcomputes a witness w by the special-soundness property of the WISSP.
Furthermore, if w contains a valid decommitment (v;d) of the right interaction
110j (i.e., (v;d) is the value committed to in the second commitment and is a valid
decommitment of the ﬁrst commitment), EXT records (v;d) in the repository R.
Later, whenever A expects a decommitment for a right interaction j, it simply
checks the repository R for a matching decommitment; it aborts and outputs fail
if no valid decommitment is available—we say that EXT “gets stuck” on inter-
action j in this case. (If A expects the decommitment of a right interaction that
fails or has the same identity as the left, it simply sends ? to A.)
We now return to the description of B. B in interaction with ˆ C, simply
invokes EXT on inputs (0;V;null;;), where V is the initial joint states of A and
honest right receivers. Once EXT returns a view VA of A, B return the output of
Ainthisviewif Aneverusedtheidentityoftheleftinteractioninanyoftheright
interactions, and returns ? otherwise. Furthermore, to simplify our analysis, B
cuts-off EXT whenever it runs for more than 2n steps. If this happens, B halts
and outputs fail.
Proof of Claim 6—Running-time Analysis of B. Let Bind denote the event
that in an execution between B and ˆ C, the adversary A (in simulation by B)
provides a com commitment that can be decommitted to more than one values.
Then we claim the following:
Subclaim 1. For every b 2 f0;1g, n 2 N and z 2 f0;1g, the probability that event Bind
occurs in experiment STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z) is at most 1=2n.
Proof. It follows from the statistically binding property of com that the proba-
bility that A sends a commitment with more than one valid committed value is
bounded by 1=22n. Since B never runs for more than 2n steps, by union bound,
111the probability that A sends any commitment that can be decommitted to more
than one values in the execution of B is bounded by 2n 1
22n = 1
2n. 
Next we bound the expected running time of B by analyzing separately the
running time of B conditioned on Bind occurring and not. In the ﬁrst case, by
construction, the running time of B is bounded by 2n. Below we show that in
the second case the expected running time of B is bounded by a polynomial
t0(n). Then overall the expected running of B is also polynomially bounded and
Claim 6 follows.
E[running time of B
]
= Pr
h
Bind occurs
i
E[running time of B
 j Bind occurs]
+Pr
h
Bind not occur
i
E[running time of B
 j Bind not occur]

1
2n2
n + (1  
1
2n)t
0(n)  poly(n)
Now it only remains to show that the expected running time of B condi-
tioned on Bind not occurring is bounded by a polynomial, or equivalently, the
expected running time of the procedure EXT is bounded by a polynomial (con-
ditioned on Bind not occurring). Below in Subclaim 2 we ﬁrst show that the
recursive depth of EXT is always a constant, and then bound the running time
of EXT in Subclaim 3.
Subclaim 2. There exists a constant D such that for every n 2 N, and every V, s, and
R, EXT(D;V; s;R) does not perform any recursive calls.
Proof. Recall that at recursion level d, the procedure EXT terminates and returns
? whenever more than kd = M(n)=0(n)d new right-proofs has started in its ex-
ecution, where M(n) is an upper bound on the total number of messages that
112the adversary A may send and receive, and 0(n) equals to n"0
for some constant
0 < "0 < " < 1. Let nc be an upper bound on M(n); set D to dlog0(n) nce, which is a
constant. When d = D, kD < 1, which means the execution terminates whenever
A starts a new right-proof. On the other hand, EXT only makes a recursive call at
the completion of a new right-proof. Therefore at recursion level D, EXT never
makes any recursive calls. 
Next, we show that the expected number of queries that EXT makes to A at
every recursion level d  D is always bounded by a polynomial, conditioned
on the event that A never sends a com commitment that can be decommitted to
two different values.
Subclaim 3. For every 0  d  D, it holds that for every n 2 N, V, s, and R,
the expected number of queries that EXT(d;V; s;R) makes to A is bounded by (d) =
M(n)3(D d+1), conditioned on that every com commitment that A sends has a unique
committed value in EXT.
Proof. Consider some ﬁxed V; s and R. We prove the subclaim by induction on
d. When d = D, the claim follows, since EXT does not perform any recursive
calls and the number of queries made by EXT can be at most the total number
of messages, which is M = M(n).
Assume the claim is true for d = d0 + 1. We show that it holds also for
d = d0. The procedure EXT simulates an execution with A in a straight-line on
recursion level d0, until it encounters the completion of a right-proof s that has
a d0 + 1-good safe-point , then it tries to extract a witness of s, by repeatedly
invoking EXT on recursion level d0 + 1 from (the partial transcript) . Hence,
the number of queries made by EXT is bounded by the sum of the number of
113queries made on level d0, and the queries made by the recursive calls: the former
is at most the total number of messages, that is, M, while the latter is bounded
by the sum of the queries made by those recursive calls invoked for every right-
proof s. Furthermore we compute the expected number of queries made by the
recursive calls for a right-proof s by taking expectation over all partial transcript
that is potentially a d0-good safe-point for s. let  i denote the set of all partial
transcripts of length i that are consistent with V; for every  2  i, we denote by
Pr

 occurs on level d0
the probability that  occurs (in the simulation) on level
d0, and E[Qs
d0()j] the expected number of queries made by the recursive calls
started from  for the right-proof s, conditioned on  occurring on level d0. Then
E[number of queries by EXT] = M+
X
s
X
i
X
2 i
Pr[ occurs on level d
0] E[Q
s
d0()j]
Next we bound E[Qs
d0()j] in two steps: the ﬁrst step bounds the expected num-
ber of recursive calls started from  for proof s, and the second step uses the
induction hypothesis to derive a bound on E[Qs
d0()j].
Step 1: Given a partial transcript  from  i, let ps
d0() denote the probability
that conditioned on  occurring on level d0, EXT starts recursive calls from  for
the right-proof s, which happens if and only if EXT does not output fail (before
the proof s completes), and  is a d0 + 1-good safe-point for proof s, that is,
p
s
d0() = Pr
h
EXT at level d0 does not output fail ^  is d0 + 1-good at level d
0 j 
i
When this happens, EXT repeatedly calls itself on recursion level d0 +1, until an
invocation succeeds without cancelling, or it outputs fail. Let qs
d0() denote the
probability that conditioned on  occurring on level d0, a recursive call to EXT
on level d0 +1 succeeds without cancelling or outputs fail. Since an invocation is
114cancelled if and only if  fails to be a d0+1-good safe-point for s in the invocation
on level d0 + 1, we have
q
s
d0() = Pr
h
EXT at level d0 + 1 outputs fail _  is d0 + 1-good at level d
0 + 1 j 
i
We claim that qs
d0()  ps
d0(). This is because,
qs
d0() = Pr
h
EXT at level d0 + 1 outputs fail j 
i
+
Pr
h
 is (d0 + 1)-good at level d0 + 1 j EXT at level d0 + 1 not outputs fail ^ 
i
 Pr
h
 is (d0 + 1)-good at level d0 + 1 j EXT at level d0 + 1 not outputs fail ^ 
i
= Pr
h
 is (d0 + 1)-good at level d0 j EXT at level d0 not outputs fail ^ 
i
 Pr
h
 is (d0 + 1)-good at level d0 ^ EXT at level d0 not outputs fail j 
i
= ps
d0()
The second last equality in the above derivation holds because conditioned on
 occurring and that EXT does not output fail, the view of A on levels d0 and d0+1
are simulated identically: on both levels d0 and d0+1, EXT emulates messages in
the commitments of hC;Ri for A perfectly; and furthermore, whenever A expects
a decommitment of a right interaction, EXT sends it the value committed to in
the second com commitment obtained through recursive calls; conditioned on
EXT not outputting fail and Bind not occurring, A always receives the same value
on both level d0 and d0 + 1.
Then conditioned on  occurring on level d0, the expected number of recur-
sive invocations to level d0 + 1 before encountering a successful one or aborting
is 1=qs
d0(). Since EXT only starts recursive invocations from  with probability
ps
d0(), we have that the expected number of recursive calls from  for proof s,
conditioned on  occurring on level d0, is at most ps
d0()=qs
d0()  1.
115Step 2: From the induction hypothesis, we know that the expected number
of queries made by an invocation of EXT on level d0 + 1 is at most (d0 + 1).
Therefore, if u recursive invocations are made from  for a right proof s, the
expected number of queries made is bounded by u(d0 + 1). Then we bound
E[Qs
d0()j] as follow:
E[Q
s
d0()j] 
X
u2N
Pr

u recursive calls are made from  for s

u (d
0 + 1)
= (d
0 + 1)
X
u2N
Pr

u recursive calls are made from  for s

u
 (d
0 + 1)
Therefore,
E[number of queries by EXT]
 M +
X
s
X
i
X
2 i
Pr

 occurs on level d
0
(d
0 + 1)
= M + (d
0 + 1)
X
s
X
i
X
2 i
Pr

 occurs on level d
0
= M + (d
0 + 1)M
2
 M
3(D d0+1) = (d
0)

Combining Subclaim 2 and 3, we conclude that conditioned on Bind not oc-
curring (that is, A never sending a com commitment that can be decommitted
to different values), the expected running time of machine B is bounded by a
polynomial t0(n). This concludes Claim 6.
Proof of Claim 7—Correctness of the Output distribution of B. We proceed
to show that the output distribution of B is correct. Claim 7 follows from the
following two subclaims:
116Subclaim 4. For every b 2 f0;1g, n 2 N and z 2 f0;1g, it holds that the view of A
in simulation by B in experiment STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z) is identical to that in experi-
ment INDb(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z), conditioned on that A never sends a commitment of com
that can be decommitted to two different values and that B does not output fail in
STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z).
Subclaim 5. For every b 2 f0;1g, n 2 N and z 2 f0;1g, the probability that A sends a
commitment of com that can be decommitted to two different values or that B outputs
fail in STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z) is negligible.
Proof of Subclaim 4. First note that, in STAb(h ˆ C; ˆ Ri; B;n;z), B returns the output
of A contained in the simulated view VA returned by EXT (at the top recursion
level d = 0). As in INDb(hC;Ri;O;A;n;z), theoutputis replaced with? if A copies
the identity of the left interaction in any right interaction. Hence it sufﬁces to
show that in the case where A does not copy the identity of the left interaction,
EXT simulates the messages in the left and right interactions for A perfectly. By
construction of EXT, all the messages belonging to the commitments of hC;Ri
(both on the left and right) are simulated perfectly. Furthermore, conditioned on
that B does not output fail, whenever A expects a decommitment of a right in-
teraction, B must have previously extracted a valid decommitment of that right
interaction (otherwise, B would abort and output fail). Finally, conditioned on
that every commitment of com sent by A has a unique decommitment, the de-
commitment extracted by B must be the same as that provided by the oracle O
in experiment IND. Therefore the simulated view of A in B is identical to that in
IND. 
Proof of Subclaim 5. Consider a ﬁxed b 2 f0;1g. Since B runs for at most 2n steps,
it follows directly from the statistically binding property of com that the proba-
117bility that A sends a commitment of com that can be decommitted to two differ-
ent values is negligible. (The argument is exactly the same as that in the proof
of Claim 6.) Therefore, it sufﬁces to bound the probability that B outputs fail.
By construction, B outputs fail if it runs for more than 2n steps, or “gets stuck”
on a right interaction j that is accepting and has a different identity from the left
interaction. By Claim 6, the probability that B runs for more than 2n steps is
negligible. Thus the former case happens with only negligible probability. On
the other hand, the latter happens only if one of the following three cases occurs.
Case 1: None of the WISSP proofs in the right interaction is rewound.
Case 2: Some proof is rewound but the recursive calls invoked for this proof
generates the same proof transcript as in the original execution of the in-
teraction.
Case 3: A witness is extracted from one of the proofs in the interaction, but it is
not a valid decommitment of the right interaction.
Below we analyze the probabilities that each of the above cases occurs. We show
that all these events occur with only negligible probability. Therefore, overall
the probability that B outputs fail is negligible.
Analysis of Case 1: We show that Case 1 never happens. More precisely, for
every accepting right interaction j with a different identity from the left
interaction, one of its proofs must be rewound. By Lemma 5, there exist
a number of 
((n)) non-overlapping proofs in the right interaction j that
has a safe-point. Recall that in B (more precisely, in EXT), a right interac-
tion may be carried out at multiple different recursion levels (through re-
cursive calls); and at level d, B rewinds every proof in this interaction that
118has a d + 1-good safe-point. By Subclaim 2, the recursion depth is only a
constant; hence there must be a level d, on which a number of 
((n)) non-
overlapping proofs with a safe-point start in interaction j. Since the total
number of right-proofs that start on level d is bounded by kd = M=0(n)d
(otherwise, the simulation is cancelled) and 0(n) = o((n)), there must ex-
ist one right-proof that has a safe-point , such that there are less than
M=0(n)d+1 right-proofs starting in between  and the last message of the
proof. Therefore  is a d + 1-good safe-point for this right-proof, and will
be rewound.
Analysis of Case 2: We bound the probability that any challenge message is
picked twice in whole execution of B to be negligible. Since B runs for at
most 2n steps, it picks at most 2n challenges during the whole execution.
Furthermore, the length of each challenge is 3n. By applying the union
bound, we obtain that, the probability that a challenge  is picked again
is at most 2n
23n, and hence, using the union bound again, the probability
that any challenge in the execution is picked twice is at most 2n 2n
23n. Hence,
overall, the probability that this case occurs is negligible.
Analysis of Case 3: Suppose for contradiction that, there exists a polynomial g,
such that for inﬁnitely many n 2 N and z, case 3 occurs with probability
at least 1=g(n) during the execution of B. By Claim 6, the probability that
B runs for more than g0(n) = 2t(n)g(n) steps is at most 1=2g(n). Therefore,
the probability that B extracts out a witness w in some right interaction j
that is not a valid decommitment of that interaction in the ﬁrst g0(n) steps
is at least 1=2g(n). It follows from the special-soundness property that the
witness w extracted must be a value r such that f(r) = s, where s is the ﬁrst
message in the right interaction j. Then we show that we can invert the
119one-way function f. More precisely, given A, n and z, we construct A that
inverts f. A on input y = f(r0), emulates an execution of A(z) internally ex-
actly as B does, except that (1) it “cuts” the execution off after g0(n) steps,
and (2) it picks a random right interaction started in the ﬁrst g0(n) steps,
and feeds y as the Stage 1 message in that interaction; ﬁnally, A outputs
all the witnesses extracted from this interaction. Since A proceeds identi-
cally as B in the ﬁrst g0(n) steps, the probability that it inverts f in some
right interaction is exactly the same as the probability that B does in the
ﬁrst g0(n) steps, which is at least 1=2g(n). Furthermore, with probability at
least 1=g0(n), A guesses correctly the right interaction in which this hap-
pens, and thus it inverts y with probability at least 1=2g(n)g0(n).

4.3.3 Proof of Robustness
In this section, we extend the proof in the last section to show that hC;Ri is
also robust CCA-secure w.r.t. O. Towards this, we need to show (in addition
to that hC;Ri is CCA-secure w.r.t. O) that for every constant k, and every PPT
adversary A, there exists a simulator S, such that, for every PPT k-round ITM
B, the interaction between B and A with access to O is indistinguishable from
that between B and S.
Given an adversary A, and a constant k, the construction of the simulator
S is very similar to that of B in the last section. On a high-level, S externally
interacts with an arbitrary k-round ITM B, and internally simulates an execu-
tion between B and AO, by forwarding messages from B internally to A, while
120concurrently extracting the decommitments of the right interactions from A to
simulate O. The extraction strategy of S is essentially the same as that used by
B: it recursively rewinds A over the WISSP proofs in Stage 3 of the protocol
to extract the decommitments, except that, here the goal is to make sure that
the left interaction with B is never rewound, (instead of the goal of ensuring
that the left interaction remains hiding (in B)). This is achieved by rewinding
only those WISSP proofs that do not interleave with any messages in the left
interaction, and cancelling every rewinding in which the WISSP proof inter-
leaves with a left-message. More precisely, consider the notion of R-safe-point
(which is in analogous to the notion of safe-point)—a preﬁx  of a transcript  is
a R-safe-point for a right-proof (;;) if it includes all the messages in  up to
 (inclusive), and that no left-message is exchanged in between  and . Then
S simply runs the procedure EXTdeﬁned in the last section internally, except
that it replaces the notion of safe-point with R-safe-point, and that it simulates
the left interaction with A by forwarding the messages between A and B; ev-
erything else remains the same. Then it follows from the fact that S always
rewinds A from a R-safe-point , and cancels every rewindings in which  is
not a R-safe-point, the left interaction is never rewound. Furthermore, since the
left interaction with B consists of only k rounds, there exist 
(n") R-safe-point
in every successful right interaction. Then, it follows from the same proof as in
Claim 6 and Claim 7 that, except from negligible probability, S runs in expected
polynomial time, and that the joint output of S and B is indistinguishable from
that of AO and B.
Remark 2. The protocol hC;Ri described in Section 4.2 uses a one-way function with
efﬁciently recognizable range in its ﬁrst stage. It can be modiﬁed to work with any
arbitrary one-way function f as follows: in Stage 1, the receiver sends the images of
121two secrets, i.e., s1 = f(r1) and s2 = f(r2), followed by a proof that either s1 or s2
is in the range of f, using a resettable WI proof system [CGGM00] (the committer
veriﬁes the proof and aborts if it is not convincing); and in Stage 3 the committer proves
that either it has committed to v honestly, or that one of s1 and s2 is in the range of f.
It follows using almost the same proofs as above that the modiﬁed protocol is a robust
CCA-secure commitment scheme, except that it relies on the one-wayness of f and,
additionally, the resettable WI property of the proof in Stage 1 that, the value extracted
from A is the desired decommitment, despite that A is rewound during the extraction.
(See Case 3 in the proof of Claim 5.)
Remark 3. We further modify the protocol to work with 4-round special-sound proofs
instead of 3-round special-sound proofs: in Stage 1, the receiver sends, in addition to
the images of two secrets, the ﬁrst message r of a 4-round special-sound proof; then in
Stage 3, the committer and the receiver simply use the last three messages of a 4-round
special-sound proof with the ﬁrst message ﬁxed to r, as a 3-round special-sound proof. It
follows from the same proof as described above that the modiﬁed protocol is robust CCA
secure, as both the WI and the special-soundness properties hold even if the special-
sound proofs share the same ﬁrst message.
4.4 UC and Global UC security
We brieﬂy review UC and externalized UC (EUC) security. For full details see
[Can00, CDPW07]. The original motivation to deﬁne EUC security was to cap-
ture settings where all ITMs in the system have access to some global, poten-
tially trusted information (such as a globally available public key infrastructure
or a bulletin board) [CDPW07]. Here however we use the EUC formalism to
capture the notion of global helper functionalities that are available only to the
122corrupted parties.
We ﬁrst review the model of computation, ideal protocols, and the general
deﬁnition of securely realizing an ideal functionality. Next we present hybrid
protocols and the composition theorem.
The basic model of execution. Following [GMR89, Gol01], a protocol is rep-
resented as an interactive Turing machine (ITM), which represents the program
to be run within each participant. Speciﬁcally, an ITM has three tapes that can
be written to by other ITMs: the input and subroutine output tapes model the in-
puts from and the outputs to other programs running within the same “entity”
(say, the same physical computer), and the incoming communication tapes and
outgoing communication tapes model messages received from and to be sent to
the network. It also has an identity tape that cannot be written to by the ITM
itself. The identity tape contains the program of the ITM (in some standard
encoding) plus additional identifying information speciﬁed below. Adversarial
entities are also modeled as ITMs.
We distinguish between ITMs (which represent static objects, or programs)
and instances of ITMs, or ITIs, that represent interacting processes in a running
system. Speciﬁcally, an ITI is an ITM along with an identiﬁer that distinguishes
it from other ITIs in the same system. The identiﬁer consists of two parts: A
session-identiﬁer (SID) which identiﬁes which protocol instance the ITI belongs
to, and a party identiﬁer (PID) that distinguishes among the parties in a proto-
col instance. Typically the PID is also used to associate ITIs with “parties”, or
clusters, that represent some administrative domains or physical computers.
The model of computation consists of a number of ITIs that can write on
123each others tapes in certain ways (speciﬁed in the model). The pair (SID,PID)
is a unique identiﬁer of the ITI in the system. With one exception (discussed
within) we assume that all ITMs are probabilistic polynomial time.6
Security of protocols. Protocols that securely carry out a given task (or, pro-
tocol problem) are deﬁned in three steps, as follows. First, the process of exe-
cuting a protocol in an adversarial environment is formalized. Next, an “ideal
process” for carrying out the task at hand is formalized. In the ideal process
the parties do not communicate with each other. Instead they have access to an
“ideal functionality,” which is essentially an incorruptible “trusted party” that
is programmed to capture the desired functionality of the task at hand. A proto-
col is said to securely realize an ideal functionality if the process of running the
protocol amounts to “emulating” the ideal process for that ideal functionality.
Below we overview the model of protocol execution (called the real-life model),
the ideal process, and the notion of protocol emulation.
The model for protocol execution. The model of computation consists of the
partiesrunning aninstance ofaprotocol , an adversary A thatcontrols thecom-
munication among the parties, and an environment Z that controls the inputs to
the parties and sees their outputs. We assume that all parties have a security
parameter k 2 N. (We remark that this is done merely for convenience and is
not essential for the model to make sense). The execution consists of a sequence
of activations, where in each activation a single participant (either Z, A, or some
6An ITM is PPT if there exists a constant c > 0 such that, at any point during its run, the
overall number of steps taken by M is at most nc, where n is the overall number of bits written on
the input tape of M in this run. In fact, in order to guarantee that the overall protocol execution
process is bounded by a polynomial, we deﬁne n as the total number of bits written to the input
tape of M, minus the overall number of bits written by M to input tapes of other ITMs; see [Can01].
124other ITM) is activated, and may write on a tape of at most one other participant,
subject to the rules below. Once the activation of a participant is complete (i.e.,
once it enters a special waiting state), the participant whose tape was written
on is activated next. (If no such party exists then the environment is activated
next.)
The environment is given an external input z and is the ﬁrst to be activated.
In its ﬁrst activation, the environment invokes the adversary A, providing it
with some arbitrary input. In the context of UC security, the environment can
fromnowoninvoke(namely, provideinputto)onlyITMsthatconsistofasingle
instance of protocol . That is, all the ITMs invoked by the environment must
have the same SID and the code of . In the context of EUC security the envi-
ronment can in addition invoke an additional ITI that interacts with all parties.
We call this ITI the helper functionality, denoted H.
Once the adversary is activated, it may read its own tapes and the outgo-
ing communication tapes of all parties. It may either deliver a message to some
party by writing this message on the party’s incoming communication tape or
report information to Z by writing this information on the subroutine output
tape of Z. For simplicity of exposition, in the rest of this paper we assume
authenticated communication; that is, the adversary may deliver only mes-
sages that were actually sent. (This is however not essential since authentica-
tion can be realized via a protocol, given standard authentication infrastructure
[Can04].)
Once a protocol party (i.e., an ITI running ) is activated, either due to an
input given by the environment or due to a message delivered by the adversary,
it follows its code and possibly writes a local output on the subroutine output
125tape of the environment, or an outgoing message on the adversary’s incoming
communication tape.
The protocol execution ends when the environment halts. The output of the
protocol execution is the output of the environment. Without loss of generality
we assume that this output consists of only a single bit.
Let EXEC;A;Z(k;z;r) denote the output of the environment Z when interacting
with parties running protocol  on security parameter k, input z and random
input r = rZ;rA;r1;r2;::: as described above (z and rZ for Z; rA for A, ri for party Pi).
Let EXEC;A;Z(k;z) denote the random variable describing EXEC;A;Z(k;z;r) when r
is uniformly chosen. Let EXEC;A;Z denote the ensemble fEXEC;A;Z(k;z)gk2N;z2f0;1g.
Ideal functionalities and ideal protocols. Security of protocols is deﬁned via
comparing the protocol execution to an ideal protocol for carrying out the task at
hand. Akeyingredientintheidealprotocolistheidealfunctionalitythatcaptures
the desired functionality, or the speciﬁcation, of that task. The ideal function-
ality is modeled as another ITM (representing a “trusted party”) that interacts
with the parties and the adversary. More speciﬁcally, in the ideal protocol for
functionality F all parties simply hand their inputs to an ITI running F. (We
will simply call this ITI F. The SID of F is the same as the SID of the ITIs run-
ning the ideal protocol. (the PID of F is null.)) In addition, F can interact with
the adversary according to its code. Whenever F outputs a value to a party,
the party immediately copies this value to its own output tape. We call the par-
ties in the ideal protocol dummy parties. Let (F) denote the ideal protocol for
functionality F.
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protocol  if for any adversary A there exists an adversary S such that no envi-
ronment Z, on any input, can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is
interacting with A and parties running , or it is interacting with S and parties
running . This means that, from the point of view of the environment, run-
ning protocol  is ‘just as good’ as interacting with . We say that  securely
realizes an ideal functionality F if it emulates the ideal protocol (F). More pre-
cise deﬁnitions follow. A distribution ensemble is called binary if it consists of
distributions over f0;1g.
Deﬁnition 26. Let  and  be protocols. We say that  UC-emulates (resp., EUC-
emulates)  if for any adversary A there exists an adversary S such that for any en-
vironment Z that obeys the rules of interaction for UC (resp., EUC) security we have
EXEC;S;Z  EXEC;A;Z:
Deﬁnition 27. Let F be an ideal functionality and let  be a protocol. We say that 
UC-realizes (resp., EUC-realizes) F if  UC-emulates (resp., EUC-emulates) the
ideal protocol (F).
Security with dummy adversaries. Consider the adversary D that simply fol-
lows the instructions of the environment. That is, any message coming from
one of the ITIs running the protocol is forwarded to the environment, and any
input coming from the environment is interpreted as a message to be delivered
to the ITI speciﬁed in the input. We call this adversary the dummy adversary. A
convenient lemma is that UC security with respect to the dummy adversary is
equivalent to standard UC security. That is:
Deﬁnition 28. Let  and  be protocols. We say that  UC-emulates (resp., EUC-
emulates)  w.r.t the dummy adversary D if there exists an adversary S such that
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we have EXEC;S;Z  EXEC;D;Z:
Theorem 8. Let  and  be protocols. Then  UC-emulates (resp., EUC-emulates) 
if and only if  UC-emulates (resp., EUC-emulates)  with respect to the dummy
adversary.
Hybrid protocols. Hybrid protocols are protocols where, in addition to com-
municating as usual as in the standard model of execution, the parties also have
access to (multiple copies of) an ideal functionality. Hybrid protocols repre-
sent protocols that use idealizations of underlying primitives, or alternatively
make trust assumptions on the underlying network. They are also instrumental
in stating the universal composition theorem. Speciﬁcally, in an F-hybrid proto-
col (i.e., in a hybrid protocol with access to an ideal functionality F), the parties
may give inputs to and receive outputs from an unbounded number of copies
of F.
The communication between the parties and each one of the copies of F
mimics the ideal process. That is, giving input to a copy of F is done by writing
the input value on the input tape of that copy. Similarly, each copy of F writes
the output values to the subroutine output tape of the corresponding party. It is
stressed that the adversary does not see the interaction between the copies of F
and the honest parties.
The copies of F are differentiated using their SIDs. All inputs to each copy
and all outputs from each copy carry the corresponding SID. The model does
not specify how the SIDs are generated, nor does it specify how parties “agree”
on the SID of a certain protocol copy that is to be run by them. These tasks are
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tionalities, and designing protocols that securely realize them, by freeing the
functionality from the need to choose the SIDs and guarantee their uniqueness.
In addition, it seems to reﬂect common practice of protocol design in existing
networks.
The deﬁnition of a protocol securely realizing an ideal functionality is ex-
tended to hybrid protocols in the natural way.
The universal composition operation. We deﬁne the universal composition
operation and state the universal composition theorem. Let  be an F-hybrid
protocol, and let  be a protocol that securely realizes F. The composed protocol
 isconstructedbymodifyingthecodeofeachITMinsothattheﬁrstmessage
sent to each copy of F is replaced with an invocation of a new copy of  with
fresh random input, with the same SID, and with the contents of that message as
input. Each subsequent message to that copy of F is replaced with an activation
of the corresponding copy of , with the contents of that message given to  as
new input. Each output value generated by a copy of  is treated as a message
received from the corresponding copy of F. The copy of  will start sending
and receiving messages as speciﬁed in its code. Notice that if  is a G-hybrid
protocol (i.e.,  uses ideal evaluation calls to some functionality G) then so is .
The universal composition theorem. Let F be an ideal functionality. In its
general form, the composition theorem basically says that if  is a protocol that
UC-realizes F (resp., EUC-realizes F) then, for any F-hybrid protocol , we
have that an execution of the composed protocol  “emulates” an execution
of protocol . That is, for any adversary A there exists a simulator S such that
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is interacting with A and protocol  or with S and protocol , in a UC (resp.,
EUC) interaction. As a corollary, we get that if protocol  UC-realizes F (resp.,
EUC-realizes F), then so does protocol .7
Theorem 9 (Universal Composition [Can01, CDPW07]). Let F be an ideal func-
tionality. Let  be a F-hybrid protocol, and let  be a protocol that UC-realizes F (resp.,
EUC-realizes F). Then protocol  UC-emulates  (resp., EUC-emulates ).
An immediate corollary of this theorem is that if the protocol  UC-realizes
(resp., EUC-realizes) some functionality G, then so does .
4.5 UC Security with Super-Polynomial Helpers
We modify the deﬁnitions of UC security by giving the corrupted parties access
to an external “helper” entity, in a conceptually similar way to [PS04]. This
entity, denoted H, is computationally unbounded, and can be thought of as
providing the corrupted parties with some judicious help. (As we’ll see, this
help will be used to assist the simulator to “reverse engineering” the adversary
in order to extract relevant information hidden in its communication.)
The deﬁnition uses the formalism of EUC security [CDPW07]. Speciﬁcally,
we model the helper entity as an ITM that is invoked directly by the environ-
ment, and that interacts with the environment and the corrupted parties. More
formally, let H be an ITM. An environment Z is called aided by H if: (a) Z invokes
7The universal composition theorem in [Can01] applies only to “subroutine respecting pro-
tocols”, namely protocols that do not share subroutines with any other protocol in the system.
In [CDPW07] the theorem is extended to protocols that share subroutines with arbitrary other
protocols, as long as the composed protocol, , realizes F with EUC security.
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party (i.e., an ITI) P is corrupted (i.e., P receives a corrupted message), Z lets
H know of this fact; (c) H interacts only with the corrupted parties. Then:
Deﬁnition 29. Let  and  be protocols, and let H be a helper functionality (i.e., an
ITM).WesaythatH-EUC-emulatesifforanyadversary Athereexistsanadversary
S such that for any environment Z that’s aided by H we have EXEC;S;Z  EXEC;A;Z.
The meaningfulness of relativized UC security of course depends on the
particular helper ITM in use. Still, it is easy to see that if protocol  H-EUC-
emulates protocol  where H obeys the above rules and runs in time T(n), then
 UC-emulates  according to a relaxed notion where the adversary S can run
in time poly(T(n)). As noted in the past, for many protocols and ideal func-
tionalities, this relaxed notion of security sufﬁces even when T(n) = exp(n)
[Pas03b, PS04, BS05, MMY06].
Universal Composition with super-polynomial helpers. The universal com-
position theorem generalizes naturally to the case of EUC, even with super-
polynomial helper functionalities:
Theorem (universal composition for relativized UC). Let F be an ideal functional-
ity, let H be a helper functionality, let  be an F-hybrid protocol, and let  be a protocol
that H-EUC-realizes F. Then protocol  H-EUC-emulates .
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4.5 follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem
9 (see e.g. the proof in [Can00]). The only difference is in the construction of the
distinguishing environment Z (see there). Recall that Z takes an environment
Z that distinguishes between an execution of  and an execution of , and uses
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this purpose, Z emulates for Z an execution of .
Now, in the presence of the helper H, Z must emulate for Z also the interac-
tion with H. Note that Z cannot run H on its own, since H may well be super-
polynomial in complexity. Instead, Z will forward to the external instance of H
each message sent to H by Z. Similarly, whenever any of the corrupted parties
that Z locally runs sends a message to H, Z externally invokes a party with the
same ID and code, corrupts it, and instructs it to send the query to the external
instance of H. The responses of H are handled analogously.
Note that the proof uses the fact that the helper functionality H does not
take messages directly from the adversary. Indeed, Z cannot emulate for the
external instance of H messages coming from the adversary. 
4.6 UC with Super-Polynomial Helpers from CCA-Security
We here show how to realize any functionality by relying on our construction
of CCA-secure commitments. Let hC;Ri be a commitment scheme that is robust
CCA-secure w.r.t. a decommitment oracle O. Furthermore, assume that O can
be computed in sub-exponential time; note that this property can be ensured
by using our construction of CCA secure commitments with a “scaled-down”
security parameter. Consider a helper functionality H that “breaks” commit-
ments of hC;Ri in the same way as O does, subject to the condition that player Pi
in a protocol instance sid can only query the functionality on commitments that
uses identity (Pi; sid). More precisely, every party Pi in a secure computation
can simultaneously engage with H in multiple sessions of the commit phase of
132hC;Ri as a committer using identity Pi, where the functionality simply forwards
all the messages internally to the decommitment oracle O, and forwards Pi the
decommitment pair returned from O at the end of each session. See Figure 4.5
for a formal description of the functionality. Clearly this functionality can also
be implemented in sub-exponential time.
Functionality H
Corrupted Parties: Upon receiving an input (Corrupt, Pi; sid) from the
environment, record (Corrupt, Pi; sid).
Initialization: Upon receiving an input (Init,Pi; sid;k) from party Pi in
the protocol instance sid, if there is no previously recorded tuple (Corrupt,
Pi; sid) or there is a previously recorded session (Pi; sid;k), ignore this message;
otherwise, initialize a session of hC;Ri with O using identity (Pi; sid), and
record session (Pi; sid;k).
Accessing O: Upon receiving an input (Mesg,Pi; sid;k;m) from party Pi
in the protocol instance sid, if there is no previously recorded session
(Pi; sid;k), ignore the message; otherwise, forward m to O in the kth session that
uses identity (Pi; sid), obtain a reply m0, and return (Mesg,Pi; sid;k;m0) to Pi.
Figure 4.5: The ideal functionality H
We have now the following theorem:
Theorem 10. Let " be any positive constant. Assume the existence of enhanced trap-
door permutations. Then for every well-formed functionality8 F, there exists a O(n")-
round protocol  that H-EUC-emulates F.
Towards proving the theorem, we ﬁrst show how to implement the ideal com-
mitment functionality Fcom in the H-EUC-model, and then show how to realize
any functionality using Fcom.
8See [CLOS02] for a deﬁnition of well-formed functionalities.
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ure 4.6, acts as a physical “lock-box” for the players in a secure computation: it
enables a player (Pi) to commit to a receiver (Pj) a string m in a perfectly hiding
way, by simply having Pi send m to the functionality in a commit phase; and
later, in a reveal phase, it ensures that the commitment is opened in a perfectly
binding way, by sending the unique previously recorded string m to Pj.
Functionality Fcom
Commit Phase: Upon receiving an input (Commit; sid; x) from C, verify that
sid = (C;R; sid0) for some R, else ignore the input. Next, record x and generate
a public delayed output (Receipt; sid) to R. Once x is recorded, ignore any
subsequent Commit inputs.
Reveal Phase: Upon receiving an input (Open; sid) from C, proceed as
follows: If there is a recorded value x then generate a public delayed output
(Open; sid; x) to R. Otherwise, do nothing.
Figure 4.6: The ideal commitment functionality Fcom
Lemma 6. Let " be any positive constant. There exists a O(n")-round protocol com
that H-EUC-emulates Fcom.
Proof. The committer Pi and the receiver Pj, on input (Commit, (Pi;Pj; sid);v)
to Pi and (Receipt, (Pi;Pj; sid)) to Pj, proceed as follows:
Stage 1: the receiver Pj picks a random secret r 2 f0;1gn, and commits to r us-
ing the CCA-secure commitment scheme hC;Ri, and using (Pj; sid) as the
identity of the interaction.
Stage 2: the committer Pi commits to the value v using hC;Ri, and using (Pi; sid)
as the identity of the interaction.
Stage 3: the committer Pi commits to 0n using hC;Ri, and using (Pi; sid) as the
identity of the interaction.
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mits to the value v in a reveal phase, by sending v to Pj and then providing a
strongly WI proof of the statement that either it has committed to v in Stage
2, or that it has committed to a valid decommitment pair (r;d) of the Stage 1
commitment, in Stage 3. The receiver Pj accepts if the proof is convincing, and
rejects otherwise.
Next we proceed to show that  is indeed a secure realization of Fcom. Be-
low we describe the technique for simulating the protocol execution of  in the
ideal-world, where parties have access to the ideal commitment functionality
Fcom, and give a proof that the simulation in the ideal-world setting is indistin-
guishable from a real-world execution of . Recall that we only need to prove
that  H-EUC-emulates Fcom; hence in both the ideal and real worlds, the envi-
ronment and the adversary have access to the H functionality.
Let A be any PPT adversary. The simulator S for A in the ideal world inter-
nally simulates a real-world execution with A: it simulates A’s interaction with
theenvironmentZ andthefunctionalityH, bysimplyforwardingthecommuni-
cations between A and Z or H; furthermore, it simulates the commit and reveal
phases of the commitment hC;Ri for A as follows:
Strategy 1: If the Committer (Pi) is honest and the Receiver (Pj) is corrupted,
the simulator need to be able to complete the commit phase of the protocol
on behalf of the committer without actually knowing the committed value
v (which Fcom will not disclose until the reveal phase is initiated). Thus,
the simulator needs to be able equivocate the commitment so that it can
be opened to the proper value v in the subsequent reveal phase.
Towards this, in the commit phase, the simulator ﬁrst forwards the hC;Ri
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Since the receiver Pj is corrupted, H accepts commitments with identity Pj
from S, and returns S a valid decommitment pair (r;d) if the commitment
isaccepting. (Notethatitfollowsfromtheefﬁcientveriﬁabilitypropertyof
hC;Ri that if a commitment of hC;Ri is accepting, then except from negligi-
ble probability, it is valid, and further by the statistically binding property,
has a unique committed value, in which case, H would return a valid de-
commitment pair to this value.) Next the simulator completes the commit
stage by committing to 0n in Stage 2, and committing to the decommit-
ment pair (r;d) in Stage 3. Then, later, in the reveal phase, S can open to
any value v, by sending v to A and proving in the strongly WI proof that
it has committed to a decommitment of the Stage 1 commitment in Stage
3.
Strategy 2: If the Committer (Pi) is corrupted and the Receiver (Pj) is honest,
the simulator will need to learn the committed value v from the commit-
ter in order to correctly provide the corresponding commit phase input to
Fcom.
The simulator S emulates the messages from the receiver Pj for A (control-
ling Pi), by following the honest receiver strategy; additionally, it forwards
the Stage 2 commitment of hC;Ri from A to the decommitment function-
ality H, and uses the committed value returned from the functionality as
the commit phase input. More precisely, let (v;d) be the decommitment
pair returned from H; S then sends the message (Commit;(Pi;Pj; sid);v)
to Fcom, if the Stage 2 commitment from A is accepting; otherwise, it does
nothing.
Strategy 3: If both the Committer (Pi) and the Receiver (Pj) are honest, sincethe
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able to simulate the commit phase between two honest parties for A, with-
out knowing the value committed to by Pi, and later equivocate the simu-
lated commitment to open to any value that Pi reveals. This task is almost
the same as that in the ﬁrst case, except that the receiver now is honest.
Then S simulates the messages from the receiver Pj by following the hon-
est receiver strategy; and simulates the messages from the committer Pi by
applies Strategy 1 against the honest receiver strategy.
Below we analyze each of the simulation strategies above, and show that the
environment Z’s interactions with S in the ideal-world is indistinguishable from
that with A in the real-world in each of the cases.
Analysis of the ﬁrst case: Consider the following three hybrids:
Hybrid H1 proceeds identically to the ideal-execution, except that in H1 the
ideal commitment functionality Fcom discloses the committed value v to
S, once it receives it from Pi; S then commits to v honestly, instead of 0n,
in Stage 2 of the commit phase simulated for A, using hC;Ri and iden-
tity (Pi; sid). Then the only difference between the ideal-execution and H1
lies in the value committed to in Stage 2 of the simulation of . Since H
“breaks” commitments of hC;Ri in the same way as O does, it follows from
theCCA-securityw.r.t. OofhC;Rithat, theexecutionin H1 isindistinguish-
able from that in the ideal-world, provided that H does not “break” any
commitments of hC;Ri using identity (Pi; sid). (Recall that CCA-security
holds only if the adversary does not query the decommitment oracle on
any commitment using the same identity as the left interaction.) The last
requirement holds, since H only accepts queries on commitments from
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any commitment with identity (Pi; sid) (which belongs to an honest party).
Hence we conclude that the ideal-execution is indistinguishable from H1.
Hybrid H2 proceeds the same as H1 does, except that S further emulates the
reveal phase honestly for A, i.e., it proves in the strongly WI proof in the
reveal phase that it has committed to v honestly in Stage 2 of the commit
phase. Since the only difference between H1 and H2 lies in the witness
used in the proof in the reveal phase, it follows from the robustness w.r.t.
O property of hC;Ri and the strongly WI property of the proof that, exe-
cutions in H1 and H2 are indistinguishable.
Hybrid H3 proceeds the same as H2 does, except that S commits to 0n, instead
of the secret r, in Stage 3 of the commit phase. Since the only difference
between H2 and H3 lies in the value committed to (using hC;Ri) in Stage 3
of the commit phase simulated for A, it follows from the same argument
as in H1 that the executions in H2 and H3 are indistinguishable.
Finally, as the view of A in H3 is emulated perfectly as in the real-execution,
we have that the output of Z in H3 is identical to that in the real-execution. It
then follows using a hybrid argument that the ideal and the real executions are
indistinguishable in the ﬁrst case.
Analysis of the second case: In this case, since the simulator S emulates the
honest receiver Pj perfectly for A (controlling the committer Pi), the views of A
in the ideal and real worlds are identically distributed. Furthermore, we show
that the committed value that S extracts from A is almost always the same as
the value that A opens to in the reveal phase. Hence the outputs of the honest
receiver Pj in the ideal and real woulds are (almost always) identical, and thus
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Recall that in this case, S sends the value v that A commits to in Stage 2 (ob-
tained from H) as the commit phase input to Fcom. Assume for contradiction
that v is not the value A opens to later in the reveal stage, with non-negligible
probability. Then by the soundness of the proof in the reveal stage, A must have
committed to the secret r (i.e., the committed value of Stage 1) in Stage 3, with
non-negligible probability. Then we can construct an adversary A0 that violates
the CCA-security w.r.t. O of hC;Ri. In the experiment INDb, The adversary A0O,
internally emulates an ideal-execution with A and Z, by emulating the func-
tionality H using O; it emulates the commit and reveal phases for A as S does,
except that it forwards the commitment of hC;Ri it receives from the external
committer to A as Stage 1—in INDb, the external commitment is a commitment
to value rb, from fr0;r1g chosen by A0, and uses identity id again chosen by A0;
here A0 selects r0 and r1 at random and sets id to be (Pj; sid)—furthermore, A0
also forwards the Stage 3 commitment from A to O to obtain a decommitment
pair (u;d), and outputs u at the end of the execution. Since A0 emulates the
ideal-execution perfectly for A and Z, the probability that A, in emulation by A0,
commits to the secret in Stage 3 of the commit phase is identical to that in the
ideal-execution. Therefore, by our hypothesis, in IND0, where the secret is set to
r0, the probability that A commits to r0 in Stage 3 is non-negligible. However, in
IND1, the probability that A commits to r0 in Stage 3 is at most 1=2n, as the ideal-
execution is simulated completely without using r0. Therefore the outputs of
A0 in IND0 and IND1 are distinguishable. Furthermore, since A0 only forwards O
the commitments from A and Z, which use identities of the corrupted parties, A0
never queries O on any commitment that uses the identity of the left interaction
(Pj; sid). Hence A0 violates the CCA-security w.r.t. O of hC;Ri.
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honest parties for A. Since the simulation strategy is the same as that in the
ﬁrst case, it follows from the same proof that the real and ideal executions are
indistinguishable in this case. 
Realizing Any Functionality: First note that to realize any well-formed func-
tionality, it sufﬁces to realize the ideal oblivious transfer functionality FOT [Rab05,
EGL85], which allows a receiver to obtain one out of two bits held by a sender,
without revealing to the sender the identity of its selection, as presented in Fig-
ure 4.7. By previous works [Kil92, BOGW88, GMW87, IPS08], this sufﬁces for
unconditionally implementing any functionality.
Functionality FOT
1. Upon receiving input (Sender; sid;b0;b1) from party S, verify that
sid = (S;R; sid0) for some identity R and b0;b1 2 f0;1g; else ignore the input.
Next, record b0;b1 and generate a public delayed output (Sender; sid) to R.
Ignore further (Sender;:::) inputs.
2. Upon receiving input (Receiver; sid;i) from R, where i 2 f0;1g, wait
until a value b0;b1 is recorded, and then send a private delayed output
(Output; sid;bi) to R and halt.
3. Upon receiving a message (Corrupt; sid;P) from the adversary, where
P 2 fS;Rg, send b0;b1 to the adversary. Furthermore, if S is corrupted, the
adversary now provides values b0
0;b0
1 with each b0
j 2 f0;1g, and no output was
yet written to R, then output (Output; sid;b0
i) to R and halt.
Figure 4.7: The oblivious transfer functionality, FOT
Towards securely realizing FOT, we would like to rely on the the CLOS-BMR
protocol [CLOS02, BMR90]—a constant-round protocol that UC-realize FOT in
the Fcom-hybrid model—and simply realize Fcom using our H-EUC secure im-
plementation (described above). If the CLOS-BMR protocol had been a H-EUC
140realization of FOT, then the resulting composed protocol would also be H-EUC
secure (and we would be done). But recall that UC-security does not necessarily
imply H-EUC security (since now the environment is endowed by the super-
polynomial oracle H). One way around this problem would be to rely on sub-
exponentially-hard trapdoor permutations in the CLOS-BMR protocol. We take
a different route (which dispenses of the extra assumptions): Since the CLOS-
BMR protocol is constant-round, we can rely on the robust CCA-security prop-
erty of O to prove that CLOS-BMR (relying on standard, polynomially-hard,
trapdoor permutations) in fact is secure also w.r.t H. More precisely,
Lemma 7. Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then, there exists
a constant-round Fcom-hybrid protocol OT that H-EUC-emulates FOT.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we rely on the previous results from [CLOS02,
BMR90]9.
Theorem 11 ([CLOS02, BMR90]). Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permu-
tations. Then, there exists a constant-round Fcom-hybrid protocol OT that UC-realizes
FOT, with a black-box security proof.
We show that the protocol OT that UC-emulates FOT also H-EUC-emulates
FOT. By Theorem 8, it sufﬁces to show that, for the dummy adversary D, (which
simply forwards messages between the honest parties, using OT, and the envi-
ronment,) there exists a simulator S, such that no environment Z, with access
to the helper functionality H, can distinguish its interactions with D or S. Note
that since the dummy adversary D never accesses H, it is also a valid real-world
9Previous results in [CLOS02, BMR90] showed that, assuming the existence of enhanced
trapdoor permutations, for every (non-reactive) function g, there exists a constant-round Fcom-
hybrid protocol that UC-securely evaluates this function. Here we only relies on this result
applied to a speciﬁc function, that is, the oblivious transfer function.
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a simulator S 0, such that no environment Z0 that obeys the rules of interaction
for UC, can distinguish its interaction with D (and the honest parties using the
Fcom-hybrid protocol OT in the real-world), from its interaction with S 0 (and
the honest parties using FOT in the ideal-world). Then let B1 be the compound
machine that contains D, the honest parties, and Fcom in the real-world, and
B2 the compound machine that contains S 0, the honest parties, and FOT in the
ideal-world. We have that:
 No UC-environment Z0 can tell apart its interaction with B1 or B2, and
 both B1 and B2 are constant-round ITMs—since the dummy adversary D
simply forwards messages between the honest parties and the environ-
ment, the interaction with B1 consists of only messages in the protocol OT,
and hence has some constant number of rounds k; furthermore, by the in-
distinguishability of the interaction with B1 and B2, the interaction with B2
also contains only k rounds.
Given the two properties above, we show that S 0 is also a valid simulator for D
in the H-EUC-model, that is, no environment Z, in the H-EUC-model, can tell
apart its interactions with D (and the honest parties using OT), from that with
S 0 (and honest parties using FOT). In other words, no environment Z, having
access to H, can tell apart its interaction with B1 or B2. Suppose not, and that
there is an environment Z that distinguishes interactions with B1 and B2. Then
by the robustness w.r.t. O of hC;Ri, and the fact that both B1 and B2 are constant-
round ITMs, there exists a simulator Z00, such that, the interacion between Bi
and ZH, is indistinguishable from that between Bi and Z00. Therefore the envi-
ronment Z00, without access to H, also distinguishes the interactions with B1 and
142B2. However, this contradicts with the ﬁrst property above. Hence, we conclude
the lemma. 
Finally, given FOT, we can securely realize any well-formed functionalities.
Lemma 8. For every well-formed functionality F, there exists a constant-round FOT-
hybrid protocol  that H-EUC-emulates F.
Proof. Thislemmafollowsessentiallyfromthepreviousworks[Kil92,BOGW88,
GMW87, IPS08], which showed that for any well-formed functionality F, there
exists a constant-round protocol  that UC-securely realizes F in the FOT-hybrid
model, with a black-box security proof. In fact, it follows syntactically from the
same proof as in [Kil92, BOGW88, GMW87, IPS08] that this result holds even for
environmentsthatruninsub-exponentialtime. Inparticular, forthedummyad-
versary D in the H-EUC model, (who, as argued in the proof of Lemma 7, does
not accesses the helper functionality and thus is also a valid UC-adversary),
there exists a simulator S in the ideal world, such that no sub-exponential time
environment can tell part its interactions with D or S. Since the helper function-
alityH canbeimplementedinsub-exponentialtime, wecanviewenvironments
in the H-EUC model as sub-exponential time machines. Thus, combining The-
orem 8, we have that  also H-EUC-emulates F. 
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FROM NON-MALLEABILITY TO CCA-SECURITY
We show that there is a tight connection between the two notions of input in-
dependence: Already we know that CCA-security is a natural strengthening of
non-malleability; in this chapter, we show that there is a generic compilation
technique that transforms any robust non-malleable commitment scheme into
a t-robust CCA secure commitment scheme for any constant t, by additionally
relying on a concurrent extraction strategy of a special type. This leads to new,
round optimal, constructions of CCA-secure commitments. By plugging these
new constructions in the construction of H-EUC secure protocols in the last
chapter, we immediately improve the round-complexity of H-EUC security.
5.1 GenericConstructionofRobustCCA-SecureCommitments
In this section we provide a construction of t-robust CCA-secure commitments
using a robust non-malleable commitment scheme and a concurrent extrac-
tion strategy. As shown in Chapter 3, the former can be based on one-way
functions. The latter lies in the heart of constructions of concurrent ZK pro-
tocols. Almost all constructions of concurrent ZK protocols implicitly deﬁne
a sub-protocol, which as shown in their security proofs, has a corresponding
concurrent extraction strategy—that is, a rewinding extractor—that can extract
out secrets deﬁned in the sub-protocols when executed in a concurrent setting.
For example, the preamble stage of the concurrent ZK protocol of [PRS02] is
such a concurrently-extractable sub-protocol, which consists of !(logn) rounds;
so is the preamble stage of the concurrent ZK protocol of [PV08], which con-
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egy. We note that Micciancio, Ong, Sahai and Vadhan introduced the notion of
concurrently-extractable commitment schemes in [MOSV06], which is an abstrac-
tion of the preamble stage of the protocol in [PRS02]. We here, however, are
unable to employ their abstraction. Instead, we will directly deﬁne a restricted
type of concurrent extraction strategies that are “conforming” for our CCA-
secure commitments, and then provide a modular security analysis, based on
properties of the conforming concurrent extraction strategy and the robust non-
malleable commitment scheme. It turns out that many previous concurrent ex-
traction strategies [RK99, KP01, PRS02, PTV08] are in fact conforming. Further-
more, the round-complexity of our CCA-secure commitments is dominated by
the round-complexity required by the conforming concurrent extraction strat-
egy. Therefore, by employing the strategy in [PTV08] (which in turn is based
on [KP01, PRS02], we obtain a !(logn) robust CCA-secure commitment scheme
based on one-way functions. That is,
Theorem 12. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then, there exists a !(logn)-
round robust CCA-secure commitment scheme.
Furthermore, by employing the concurrent extraction strategy in [PV08] for
quasi-polynomial time adversaries (or PQT), we obtain a constant-round t-
robust CCA-secure commitment scheme w.r.t. PQT based on one-way func-
tions hard for quasi-polynomial time.
Theorem 13. Assume the existence of one-way functions hard for quasi-polynomial
time. Then, for every constant t, there exists a constant-round t-robust CCA-secure
commitment scheme w.r.t. quasi-polynomial time adversaries.
Below we ﬁrst describe our constructions in a uniﬁed way and specify the
145concrete instantiations in Section 5.2. For simplicity of exposition, our descrip-
tion below relies on the following primitives:
1. One-way functions f with efﬁciently recognizable range.
But, the protocol can be easily modiﬁed to work with any arbitrary one-
way function using the same technique used in Chapter 4 of providing a
witness hiding proof that an element is in the range of the one-way func-
tion; see Remark 2 for more details.
2. A 2-round statistically-binding commitment scheme com that has unique de-
commitment (i.e., for every machine A, it holds that in an interaction with the
honest receiver, the probability that A produces a commitment c, such that, there
exist two decommitments (v1;d1) , (v2;d2) that make the honest receiver accept
in the reveal stage is negligible.
The requirement of unique decommiment is not necessary and can be
avoided by using the same technique introduced in our ﬁrst construction
of robust CCA-secure commitments in chapter 4 (see Remark 4 for more
details.)
Furthermore, ourconstructionmakesuseofan-roundZK proofsystemhPz;Vzi
for NP, and an O()-round -robust non-malleable commitment scheme h ˜ C; ˜ Ri;
such a non-malleable commitment scheme exits by By Theorem 3.
Given the above primitives, for any positive integer t, we construct a t-robust
CCA-secure commitment scheme hCt;Rti as follows. To commit to a value v, the
Committer and the Receiver, on common input 1n and the identity id 2 f0;1gn,
where n is the security parameter, proceed in six stages:
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s = f(r), through the one-way function f with an efﬁciently recognizable
range, to the Committer. The Committer checks that s is in the range of f
and aborts otherwise. Furthermore, the receiver also sends in parallel the
ﬁrst message c1 of a commitment of com.
Stage 2 the Committer sends the second message c2 of a commitment of com to
v, followed by a proof of the statement that (c1;c2) is a valid commitment
of com using the -round ZK proof system hPz;Vzi.
Stage 3 the Committer commits to v (again) using the O()-round -robust non-
malleable commitment scheme h ˜ C; ˜ Ri and identity id.
Stage 4 the Committer commits to 0n using h ˜ C; ˜ Ri and identity id.
Stage 5 the Committer performs a 4-round WISSP proof hPw;Vwi of the state-
ment that it has committed to 0n in Stage 4, or it knows a pre-image of
s.
Stage 6 the Committer proves that it has committed to value v in both Stage 2
and 3, or a pre-image of s in Stage 4. This is proved in  iterations, where
iteration i 2 [] consists of l invocations of the 4-round WISSP protocol
hPw;Vwi arranged as follows: The ﬁrst two messages of the l invocations
are exchanged in parallel in the ﬁrst two rounds, followed by l message
exchanges. In the jth round, the prover sends j   f0;1g
, a random sec-
ond last message for the jth WISSP invocation, and the veriﬁer replies
with the last message j of the proof. Each message exchange is called a
(rewinding) slot and the l WISSP proofs in an iteration is called a block.
A slot is convincing if the veriﬁer produces an accepting proof; a block is
convincing if every slot in the block is convincing. If there is ever an uncon-
vincing slot, the prover aborts the whole session.
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ber of messages exchanged in each of Stage 2 to 5, and l will be deﬁned
later. (Jumping ahead, l(n) is the number of “rewinding slots” required by
the concurrent extraction strategy. For instance, l is any super-logarithmic
polynomial if we employ the concurrent extraction strategy of [PTV08]).
Let ` = l be the total number of WISSP proofs in Stage 6.
Let  be a transcript of the protocol h ˜ C; ˜ Ri. We deﬁne the value committed to
in the transcript to be the value committed to in Stage 2 (using com) of . That
is, in the reveal stage, the committer needs to reveal the committed value and
a corresponding decommitment string of Stage 2 of the protocol as the decom-
mitment.
On the round complexity of hCt;Rti: It is easy to see that the round complexity
of the ﬁrst 5 stages of hCt;Rti is bounded by 4k+1 and that of Stage 6 is bounded
by 4`(n) = 4l. Since t is a constant, the overall round complexity of hCt;Rti
is O(kl). Furthermore, as k is the maximum number of messages exchanged in
Stage 2 to 5, and hence O(), the round complexity of hCt;Rti is O(l). Therefore,
the round complexity is decided by our instantiations of the ZK proof system
hPz;Vzi (that decides ), and the concurrent extraction strategy (that decides l).
We defer the concrete instantiations to Section 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
Proposition 7. hCt;Rti is binding with efﬁcient veriﬁability.
Proof. Binding: Thebindingpropertyfollowsdirectlyfromthestatisticallybind-
ing property of com used in Stage 2.
Efﬁcient Veriﬁability: ItfollowsfromthesoundnessoftheStage2zero-knowledge
148proof of hPz;Vzi that, except with negligible probability, whenever a com-
mitment of hCt;Rti is accepting, the Stage 2 commitment of com must be
valid. Then since the decommiment of a commitment of hCt;Rti is sim-
ply the decommitment of its Stage 2 commitment, we have that the whole
hCt;Rti commitment is also valid.

Next we proceed to show that hCt;Rti is a t-robust CCA-secure commitment.
Before providing the formal proof, we ﬁrst sketch the high-level idea of the
proof of CCA-security; the proof of t-robustness uses very similar ideas. To-
wards this, recall that we need to exhibit a decommitment oracle O for hCt;Rti
such that hCt;Rti is CCA-secure and t-robust w.r.t. O. Since the decommitment
of a hCt;Rti commitment is the unique decommitment of its Stage 2 commitment
of com. Consider the following oracle O: O acts as an honest receiver during the
commit stages; at the end of every accepting interaction of commit stage, if the
Stage 2 com commitment is valid, O returns the unique decommitment of Stage
2; otherwise, it returns ?.
5.1.1 Proof Overview of CCA-security
To show that hCt;Rti is CCA-secure w.r.t. O, we follow the same high-level idea
used in our ﬁrst construction of robust CCA-secure commitment scheme in
Chapter 4. Recall that proving CCA-security w.r.t. O amounts to showing that
the views of A in experiments IND0 and IND1 are indistinguishable (when A has
oracle access to O). The main hurdle in showing this is that the oracle O is
not efﬁciently computable; if it were, indistinguishability would directly follow
149from the hiding property of the left interaction. However, since hCt;Rti consists
of a sequence of special-sound proofs of the committed value in the last stage,
the oracle O can be implemented by extracting the decommitments from the
adversary, via “rewinding” the special-sound proofs in the right interactions.
However, two problems arise when trying to simulate the oracle O:
 First, once we start rewinding the right interactions, A might send new
messages also in the left interaction. So, if done naively, this would re-
quire us to also rewind the left interaction, which could violate its hiding
property.
 Second, in the experiment INDb, the adversary A expects to receive the de-
commitment information at the very moment it completes a commitment
to its oracle. If the adversary “nests” its oracle calls, these rewindings be-
come recursive and the running-time of the extraction quickly becomes
exponential.
Previous solution: To overcome the two problems, our ﬁrst construction re-
lies crucially on two techniques: A special message scheduling technique based
on the message scheduling technique for constructing non-malleable commit-
ments in [DDN00, LPV08], and a concurrent extraction strategy based on that
of Richardson and Kilian (RK) [RK99]. The special message scheduling ensures
that for every accepting right interaction with an identity that is different from
the left interaction, there exists 
(n") safe-points in the interaction, from which
one can rewind the right interaction (and extract out the value committed to)
without requesting any new message in the left interaction. Using these safe-
points, the oracle O can then be simulated without violating the hiding property
150of the left interaction. Furthermore, since there are 
(n") safe-points in every
right interaction, there is always at least one safe-point where the number of
nested executions inside is “small”, and if rewinding only from such safe-points
according to a RK-type extraction strategy, the overall running-time of extrac-
tion is bounded by a polynomial in expectation.
Our solution: The drawback of relying on message scheduling technique and
RK-type concurrent extraction strategy is that both of them require the protocol
to have at least 
(n") “rewinding” slots. To improve the round complexity, we
seek different solutions to the two above-mentioned problems.
To overcome the ﬁrst problem, instead of considering a single extraction
strategy that “preserves” the hiding property of the “whole” left interaction as
in our ﬁrst construction, we consider different extraction strategies that “pre-
serve” the hiding property of different “parts” of the left interaction. Therefore,
the view of A is indistinguishable if each time we only change a small “part” of
the left interaction. Then by gradually changing different parts of the left inter-
action, it follow from a hybrid argument that the view of A is indistinguishable
in IND0 and IND1. More precisely, consider the following sequence of hybrids H0
to H`+4, ` = `(n), where H0 is simply the honest execution of experiment IND0,
and every two subsequent hybrids differ at a small “part” of the left interaction.
Hybrid H0: Hybrid H0 consists of an honest emulation of the experiment IND0.
Hybrid H1: Hybrid H1 proceeds identically to H0 except that the left execution
is emulated by ﬁnding a fake witness r, using a brute-force search, and
next using this r as a witness to succeed in the WISSP proof in Stage 5;
everything else remains the same.
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is emulated by committing to the fake witness r using h ˜ C; ˜ Ri in Stage 4.
Hybrids H3 to H`+2: In hybrids H3 to H`(n)+2, we change the witness used in the
` WISSP proofs in Stage 6 of the left interaction. More speciﬁcally, the
experiment Hi+2 proceeds identically to H2, except that in the ﬁrst i proofs
in Stage 6 of the left interaction, we use the fact that we have committed
to a fake witness r in Stage 4.
Hybrid H`+3: Hybrid H`+3 proceeds identically to H`+2 except that Stage 3 of the
left execution is emulated by committing to 0 using h ˜ C; ˜ Ri.
Hybrid H`+4: Hybrid H`+4 proceeds identically to H`+3 except that the Stage 2
commitment of the left execution is emulated by committing to 0 followed
by an honest ZK proof of the validity of the commitment.
By construction, every two subsequent hybrids Hi and Hi+1 differ only at a small
“part” of the left interaction: Either one of Stage 2 to 5, or one of the WISSP
proofs in Stage 6. Furthermore, the difference in the “part” changed in Hi and
Hi+1 is computationally indistinguishable. More precisely, from hybrid H0 to H1
and from Hj to Hj+1 for 2  j  ` + 1, the difference lies in how a WISSP
proof (in Stage 5 or Stage 6 respectively) in the left interaction is simulated,
it thus follows from the witness indistinguishability of the WISSP protocol
hPw;Vwi that the difference is indistinguishable. Additionally, from hybrid H1
to H2 and from H`+2 to H`+3, the indistinguishability follows from the hiding
property of the commitments h ˜ C; ˜ Ri, and from H`+3 to H`+4, it follows from the
hiding property of com together with the ZK property of the protocol hPz;Vzi.
To show CCA-security, it essentially amounts to show that every two subse-
quent hybrids Hi and Hi+1 are even indistinguishable to adversaries with access
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secure commitments, we prove this by showing that the decommitment oracle
O can be simulated via rewindings (so as to extract out the committed values)
without violating the indistinguishability of the “part” (in the left interaction) that is
being changed from Hi to Hi+1. This is the main technical content of the proof.
Compared with the task in our ﬁrst construction of designing a concurrent ex-
traction strategy that retains the hiding property of the whole left interaction,
here, since every two subsequent hybrids differ at only at a small part of the left
interaction consisting of a few—bounded by k—messages, it becomes much eas-
ier to devise an extraction strategy that retains the indistinguishability of these k
messages. More precisely, we employ an idea similar to that used in the context
of concurrent non-malleable ZK with adaptive input selection of [LP11a]. They
presented a concurrent extraction strategy that avoids rewinding a small num-
ber  of “critical messages”, by using the PRS extraction strategy in a modular
way. Intuitively, the basic idea is to provide more, say  +1, “blocks” of special-
sound proofs in the protocol than the number of critical messages, where each
block contains many special-sound proofs adequate for performing the concur-
rent extraction strategy (for example, !(logn) proofs when using the PRS con-
current extraction strategy). Therefore in every right interaction, there must
exist one complete “block” of special-sound proofs such that during its execu-
tion, no critical message is being exchanged; then a witness can be extracted via
rewinding the special-sound proofs in that block without rewinding any critical
message. In the protocol hCt;Rti, the last stage contains at least (2k + 1) blocks
of special-sound proofs, each consisting of l proofs. By setting l appropriately
according to the concurrent extraction strategy we choose, we can extract out a
witness for every right interaction without rewinding the critical messages—at
153most k of them—being changed from Hi to Hi+1. In other words, the oracle O can
be emulated efﬁciently without rewinding the “part” being changed from Hi to
Hi+1.
There is one more problem to be solved before the above argument goes
through: We need to show that the witnesses extracted from the right interac-
tions are indeed the valid decommitments. This essentially boils down to show
that the adversary A never commits to a “trapdoor”—a pre-image of the Stage
1 message—in Stage 4 of any right interaction, even though the left interac-
tion it participates in is simulated using a “trapdoor”. It seems that this should
follow from the robust non-malleability of the Stage 4 commitments of h ˜ C; ˜ Ri.
However, when showing this, we run into the same problem as we encounter
when showing the indistinguishability of the view of A: Namely, the robust
non-malleability property needs to hold even to an adversary with access to the
decommitment oracle O; or essentially, it needs to hold under rewindings (for
simulating O). We use the same idea as above: as long as there are sufﬁciently
many blocks of special-sound proofs, we can describe a concurrent extraction
strategy that avoids rewinding the “part” being changed in Hi and Hi+1 together
with the commitment of hCt;Rti that we want to violate robust non-malleability
of
5.2 Proof of t-Robust CCA-Security
In this section, we provide the formal proof of the t-robust CCA-security of
hCt;Rti. As discussed above, the proof crucially relies on different concurrent
extraction strategies for the protocol hCt;Rti; let us start by introducing them.
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Our basic deﬁnition of a concurrent extraction strategy for hCt;Rti is very sim-
ilar to that of concurrently extractable commitments introduced in [MOSV06].
Consider a (potentially unbounded) probabilistic adversary A that, on receiving
a security parameter 1n and an auxiliary input z, sends m = m(n) commitments
of hCt;Rti to values v1;:::;vm of its choice, using identities id1;:::;idm of its choice
again. Let V beapreﬁx oftheviewof A insuchan experiment, whichconsistsof
a list messages that A receives and the random coins it tosses. Let viewA(n;z;V)
denote the view of A continuing from V in the experiment. Loosely speaking, a
basicconcurrentextractionstrategyofhCt;Rtiisaprobabilisticmachine E (called
the extractor) that, on input the security parameter 1n, m(n) and a partial view V,
with black-box access to A(1n;z;Vk), emulates the view of A continuing from V
perfectly; furthermore, for every block of special-sound proofs that A completes
successfully, E outputs a valid witness of the statement proved in that block.
Deﬁnition 30 (Basic Concurrent Extraction Strategy for hCt;Rti). A concurrent
extraction strategy for hCt;Rti is a probabilistic machine E, such that, for every polyno-
mial m, and every probabilistic machine A that on common input 1n and auxiliary input
z opens up at most m(n) commitments of hCt;Rti, the following two properties holds.
Statistical Simulation: For every partial view V, the following ensembles are statis-
tically close.
 fviewA(n;z;V)gn2N;z2f0;1g

n
EA(1n;z;Vk)(1n;m(n);V)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
Concurrent Extraction from Blocks: In the execution of EA(1n;z;Vk)(1n;m(n);V), it
holds that except with negligible probability, whenever E makes a query Q to A,
155for every convincing block of special sound proofs contained completely in Q, E
outputs on a special output tape a witness w of the statement proved in that block.
Conforming Strategies
In this work, we focus on concurrent extraction strategies that follow certain
restrictions: Intuitively, an extractor E uses rewindings to extract the witnesses,
and during rewindings, it can feed the adversary any messages and random
inputs of its choice. We say that a concurrent extractor is “conforming” if in
rewindings, it always emulates messages from the receiver for A honestly and
independently (in different rewindings) and supply A with independent truly
random inputs. More precisely, for every query Q = (T;r) made by E to A
that consists of a list of input messages T = (a1;:::;ak) and random input r, let
(b1;:::;bk) be the list of messages returned by Ar on input messages in T, and
mesg(T) = (a1;b1;a2;b2;:::;ak;bk) the complete transcript of messages; further-
more, denote by (T;R)k(a;r) the query (Tka;Rkr).
Deﬁnition 31 (Conforming Concurrent Extraction Strategy for hCt;Rti). A con-
current extraction strategy E is conforming if it satisﬁes the following properties:
Random Queries: It holds that before E makes a query ((Tka);(Rkr)) to A, it has
already made query (T;R) to A. Furthermore, r is a truly random string and the
distribution of a is identical to the distribution of the next message from the honest
receiver ˆ R conditioned on that mesg(T) has occurred in an interaction with ˆ R.
Independent Queries: Every pair of queries (T0;R0) and (T1;R1) that E makes to A
may share a preﬁx, but are otherwise uncorrelated. That is, there exists a query
(T;R), such that, it holds that for every b 2 f0;1g, Tb = TkT0
b and Rb = RkR0
b, and
156the distributions of (T0
0;R0
0) and (T0
1;R0
1) are independent.
Furthermore, it is without loss of generality to assume that the emulated view
˜ T of A that E outputs in the end is queried to A at some point.
Intuitively, a conforming concurrent extractor E only leverage the power of
rewinding to extract witnesses: It internally emulates executions between A (on
truly random input) and the honest receiver ˆ R; it may rewind these executions,
and in rewindings, messages to A are emulated again honestly and indepen-
dently and A is supplied with truly random inputs. Finally, it outputs one com-
plete execution with A that it emulates. In fact, almost all previous works on
concurrent ZK implicitly deﬁnes a concurrent extraction strategy, and many of
them are conforming and can be adapted to work on protocol hCt;Rti. Following
terminologies used in previous works, we call a continuous execution between
A and ˆ R emulated by E internally a thread, and the execution that E outputs in
the end the main thread.
In this work, we consider two conforming concurrent extraction strategies
adaptedrespectivelyfromthestrategiesdeﬁnedimplicitlyin[PTV08]and[PV08].
In [PTV08], Pass, Tseng, and Venkitasubramaniam present a concurrent ZK
protocolwithapreamblephaseconsistingof!(logn)specialsoundproofssched-
uled in the same as in a block in protocol hCt;Rti. The ZK property of their pro-
tocol is based on a more general analysis of the oblivious simulation technique
of Kilian and Petrank [KP01]. The core of their analysis is a concurrent extrac-
tion strategy over the !(logn) special sound proofs; furthermore, their strategy
is “conforming”. Recall that each block of the protocol hCt;Rti consists of l spe-
cial sound proofs. Then, using the analysis of [PTV08], we obtain that:
Proposition 8 ([PTV08]). Set the polynomial l to !(logn). Then, there exists a con-
157forming concurrent extraction strategy for hCt;Rti that runs in polynomial time.
Inanotherwork[PV08], PassandVenkitasubramaniampresentedaconstant-
round concurrent ZK protocol for quasi-polynomial time adversaries based on
the simulation technique of Richardson and Kilian [RK99]. Their analysis ex-
hibits a concurrent extraction strategy over 3 special-sound proofs (scheduled
as in a block of hCt;Rti) that takes quasi-polynomial time, which is, again, con-
forming. Therefore,
Proposition 9 ([PV08]). Set the polynomial l to 3. Then there exists a conforming
concurrent extraction strategy for hCt;Rti that runs in quasi-polynomial time.
Robust Concurrent Extraction Strategy for hCt;Rti
In this section, we deﬁne robust concurrent extraction strategy. Roughly speak-
ing, it is a concurrent extraction strategy that can avoid rewinding a small num-
ber of “critical” messages. Formally, consider a (potentially unbounded) deter-
ministic adversary A that, on receiving a security parameter 1n and auxiliary in-
put z, participates in one left and many right interactions. On the left, it interacts
with a machine B, and on the right it sends m = m(n) commitments of hCt;Rti as
deﬁned above. Loosely speaking, a concurrent extraction strategy E of hCt;Rti
is robust w.r.t. a machine B, if E on input 1n and m(n), with black-box access
to A(1n;z), emulates the execution between A and B (almost) perfectly without
rewinding B; furthermore, for every accepting commitment from A, E outputs a
valid witness of the statement proved in Stage 6 of that commitment. (Note
that different from the basic concurrent extraction strategy, the robust extractor
only needs to simulate the execution between A and B from the very beginning,
158instead of from some partial execution, and only need to output a witness for
every accepting commitment, instead of every convincing block.)
Deﬁnition 32 (Robust Concurrent Extraction Strategy for hCt;Rti). Let B be a in-
teractiveTuringmachine. Aconcurrentextractionstrategy E forhCt;Rtiisrobust w.r.t.
B if for every polynomial m, and every deterministic machine A that on common input
1n and auxiliary input z, interacts with B and opens up at most m(n) commitments of
hCt;Rti, the following holds.
Statistical Simulation: The following ensembles are statistically close.


outB;A[hB;A(z)i(1n)]
	
n2N;z2f0;1g

n
outB;EA[hB;EA(1n;z)(m(n))i(1n)]
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
Robust Concurrent Extraction: IntheexperimenthB;EA(1n;z)(m(n))i(1n), itholdsthat
except with negligible probability, whenever E makes a query Q to A, for every ac-
cepting commitment in Q, E outputs on a special output tape a witness w of the
statement proved in Stage 6 of that commitment.
We say that a concurrent extraction strategy E for hCt;Rti is -robust if it is robust
w.r.t. every machine B that sends at most  messages.
In [LP11a], Lin and Pass presented a transformation that turns speciﬁcally
the [PTV08] concurrent extraction strategy into another strategy that avoids
rewinding a small number  of critical messages. We show that their transfor-
mation can actually be applied as a generic transformation turning any concur-
rent extraction strategy for hCt;Rti into a -robust concurrent extraction strategy,
provided that the number of blocks of special sound proofs in hCt;Rti is greater
than . Recall that in Stage 6 of hCt;Rti there are  blocks. Then,
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concurrent extraction strategy for hCt;Rti. Then there exists a (conforming) concurrent
extraction strategy E for hCt;Rti that is -robust. Furthermore, the running time of E
is polynomial in the running time of E.
Proof. Given a concurrent extraction strategy ˜ E for hCt;Rti, our goal is to con-
struct another strategy E, such that, for every deterministic machine A and
machine B that sends at most  messages, E emulates the interaction between
A and B without rewinding B and extracts out a witness for every accepting
commitment from A.
We assume without loss of generality that the interaction between A and B
consists of  rounds of message exchanges where A sends the ﬁrst message. Let
(m1;:::;m) denote the messages that A sends to B and ai for i 2 [] the message
that B sends to A in reply to mi. Then the execution with A can be emulated
by the sequential execution of the following  + 1 machines A1;:::;A+1, where
machine Ai produces a partial view Vi of A up until the message mi is sent.
Machine Ai: Ai on input the partial view Vi 1 produced by its predecessor Ai 1
and the reply ai 1 (V0 = ", a0 = ") from B, continue the execution of A from
Vi 1kai 1, by feeding Vi 1 and ai 1 to A, and forwarding every message
from Aexternally; ﬁnally, itabortswhen Aterminatesorsendsthemessage
mi, and output the newly generated view Vi of A.
Note that each machine Ai with message ai 1 and partial view Vi 1 hard-coded
is a machine that interacts only with ˆ R. Therefore, when applying the the con-
current extraction strategy ˜ E over Ai, E emulates the view of Ai continuing from
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proofs that starts completely outside Vi 1.
The concurrent extraction strategy E emulates the view of A in interaction
with B in a “progressive” way by emulating the views of A1;:::;A+1 using ˜ E in
sequence in  + 1 iterations. More precisely, let Vj for j 2 [ + 1] (and V0 = ")
denote the partial view of A that E generates after j steps.
In iteration j: E sends the last message mj 1 in Vj 1 to B and obtains a reply
aj 1.
It then simulates the view of Aj continuing from Vj 1kaj 1 using ˜ E. When-
ever ˜ E makes a query Q to Aj(1n;z;Vj 1kaj 1k), E emulates the answer by
making a query Q0 = (Vj 1kaj 1kQ) to its own oracle A(1n;z;). Further-
more, E copies whatever ˜ E outputs on the special output tape to its own
special output tape.
Finally, it sets Vj to the output of ˜ E, that is,
Vj = E
Aj(1n;z;Vj 1kaj 1k)(1
n;Vj 1kaj 1)
After  + 1 steps, E returns the output of A after receiving messages in Vt+1.
By construction, E never rewinds machine B. Next we show that E satisﬁes
the statistical simulation and concurrent extraction properties. For the former,
since E emulates the oracle Aj(1n;z;Vj 1kaj 1k) perfectly for ˜ E, it follows from
the statistical simulation property of ˜ E that every partial view Vj is emulated
(almost) perfectly, thus the joint output of E and B distributes statistically close
to the joint output of A and B. For the latter, we need to show that whenever
E makes a query (Vj 1kaj 1kQ) (in some iteration j  [ + 1]) to A that contains
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matching witness. Consider the following two scenarios: the view Q contains
a complete block of special sound proofs in that commitment, or not. In this
former case, it follows directly from the concurrent extraction property of ˜ E that
when ˜ E makes the query Q to Aj, it also outputs on its special output tape a
matching witness; thus E copies that witness to its special output tape. In the
latter case, the preﬁx Vj 1 must contain at least    1 blocks of special sound
proofs in that commitment. Consider all the partial views V1 :::Vj 1 generated
in previous steps. Since for every i, Vi 1 is a preﬁx of Vi, we have that one of
V1, (V2   V1), :::, (Vj 1   Vj 2) (where V2   V1 = V if V2 = V1kV) must contain a
complete block of special sound proofs, say it is Vi Vi 1. Then in step i, ˜ E must
have queried Ai on transcript Vi   Vi 1 (recall that we assume without loss of
generality that the concurrent extraction strategy always queries the adversary
on the view it ﬁnally outputs). Therefore, by the concurrent extraction property
of ˜ E again that ˜ E must have output a matching witness in step i, and thus so has
E. In conclusion, E is a -robust concurrent extraction strategy.
Finally, it is easy to see that above transformation also preserves the “con-
forming” property, and the running time of E is polynomial in the running
time of E. 
5.2.2 !(logn)-Round Robust CCA-Secure Protocol
We prove in this section the following proposition:
Proposition 11. Set the polynomial l to !(logn). Then hCt;Rti is t-robust CCA secure
w.r.t. O.
162Then by instantiating hCt;Rti with a !(1) round ZK proof system (in Stage 2),
we obtain a !(logn)-round t-robust CCA-secure commitment scheme based on
one-way functions. Furthermore, since when l is set to !(logn), for all constant t,
the protocol hCt;Rti is the same, call it hC;Ri. We obtain that, hC;Ri is CCA-secure
and robust to any constant-round protocols, and conclude Theorem 12
Proof of CCA-Security
Considerthesequenceofhybrid H1;:::;H`+4 deﬁnedinSection5.1.1. Lethybi(A;n;z)
denote the view of the adversary A(z) (with access to the decommitment oracle
O) in the hybrid Hi. Furthermore, in a commitment of hCt;Rti, we call the pre-
image of the Stage 1 message a “trapdoor” of that commitment; we say that A
“cheats” in a hybrid Hi, if in an accepting right commitment A commits to the
trapdoor of that commitment in Stage 4. To show that hCt;Rti is CCA-secure
w.r.t. O, it essentially amounts to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 9. For every PPT adversary A, it holds that
n
hyb0(A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g 
n
hyb`(n)+4(A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
Furthermore, for every function i : N ! N, the probability that A cheats in Hi(n) is
negligible.
Proof. We show that the lemma follows from the following two claims:
Claim 8. For every PPT adversary A, the probability that A cheats in H0 is negligible.
Claim 9. For every PPT adversary A, and every function i : N ! N, it holds that, if
the probability that A cheats in Hi(n) is negligible, then it holds that:
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n
hybi(n)(A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g 
n
hybi(n)+1(A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
 The probability that A cheats in Hi(n)+1 is negligible.
Assume for contradiction that the lemma is false, that is, there exists an ad-
versary A such that
a) Either there exists a distinguisher D and a polynomial p1, such that, for in-
ﬁnitely many n 2 N and z 2 f0;1g, it holds that D distinguishes hyb0(A;n;z)
and hyb`+4(A;n;z) with probability 1=p1(n),
b) Or there exists a function i and a polynomial p2, such that, A cheats in Hi(n)
with probability greater than 1=p2(n).
Then consider the following two possible scenarios:
Condition b) holds. In this case, by Claim 8, there must exist a j such that the
probability of A cheating jumps from being negligible to non-negligible.
Formally, there exists a function j, a negligible function 0 and a polyno-
mial q, such that for inﬁnitely many n and z, A cheats in Hj(n) with negli-
gible probability 0(n), but cheats in Hj(n)+1 with much higher probability
0(n) + 1=q(n).
Assume for contradiction that for every function j, it holds that either the
probability of cheating in Hj(n) is non-negligible, or it is, but the probability
of cheating in Hj(n)+1 is non-negligible. By Claim 8, the probability of cheat-
ing in H0 is negligible. Thus by our hypothesis, it follows from a hybrid
argument that the probability that A cheats in all hybrids are negligible,
which contradicts with condition b).
164Otherwise, condition b) does not hold, but condition a) holds. Inthiscase, for
every function i, the probability that A cheats in Hi(n) is negligible, and for
inﬁnitely many n and z, D distinguishes hyb0(A;n;z) and hyb`+4(A;n;z) with
probability 1=p1(n). This implies there exists a function j, such that, the
probabilitythat Acheatsin Hj(n) isnegligibleand Ddistinguisheshybj(n)(A;n;z)
and hybj(n)+1(A;n;z) with probability at least 1=p1(n)(`(n) + 4).
Both of the above cases contradicts with Claim 9; we thus conclude the lemma.

Since hybrid H0 is identical to the real experiment IND0, Lemma 9 shows that
the view of the adversary in IND0 is indistinguishable to that in H`+4. Similarly,
we can consider another sequence of hybrids H0
0 to H0
`+4 starting from IND1; it
follows from the same proof for showing the indistinguishability of IND0 and
H`+4 that the view of A in IND1 is indistinguishable to that in H0
`+4. Since in both
H`+4 and H0
`+4, the left interaction is simulated completely independently of the
two challenge messages chosen by the adversary, the two hybrids H`+4 and H0
`+4
are identical. Therefore, we obtain that the views of A in IND0 and IND1 are
indistinguishable, and thus hCt;Rti is CCA-secure w.r.t. O. Next we complete
the proof by providing a formal proof of Claim 8 and 9.
Proof of Claim 8 At a high-level, Claim 8 essentially follows from the one-
wayness of the one-way function f (and the special-soundness of the Stage 5
WISSPproof): Ifacomputationallyboundedadversarycancommittoa“trap-
door” in Stage 4 of the commitment, then by the special-soundness of Stage 5,
we can extract out a “trapdoor”, which is a pre-image of the Stage 1 message,
and thus violates the one-wayness of function f. However, this argument does
165not go through directly, since the adversary A in hybrid H0 has access to the or-
acle O, which is computationally unbounded. To resolve this, we show that the
oracle O can be simulated efﬁciently via rewindings. By Proposition 8, when l
is set to !(logn), there exists a conforming concurrent extraction strategy E for
hCt;Rti. Fix any adversary A. Consider the following two experiments.
Experiment EXP0: This experiment emulates an execution of H0, by viewing A
together with the left committer ˆ C as a concurrent committer ˜ A of hCt;Rti
(that receives some exponential time help to obtain the decommitment of
each commitment), and applying E on the concurrent committer.
More formally, let ˜ O be a decommitment oracle of com that on input the
transcript of a com commitment, return the unique decommitment if there
is any, and ? otherwise. Consider a machine ˜ A that with access to ˜ O, exter-
nally acts as a committer of hCt;Rti in many concurrent interactions, and
internally emulates an execution of H0 with A as follows: It emulates mes-
sages in the left interaction for A by running the honest committer strat-
egy; it emulates the right interactions by ﬁrst forwarding commitments of
hCt;Rti externally, and whenever A completes a right commitment success-
fully and expects a decommitment from O, ˜ A queries the oracle ˜ O on the
transcript of the com commitment in Stage 2 of that commitment, and re-
turns to A the answer from ˜ O; ﬁnally, ˜ A outputs the view of A. By construc-
tion, ˜ A
˜ O acts externally as a concurrent committer of hCt;Rti and emulates
internallytheviewof Aperfectly. Experiment EXP0 invokestheconcurrent
extraction strategy E over machine ˜ A
˜ O, that is, executing E
˜ A
˜ O(1n;z;)(1n;m)
(where m = m(n) is the maximum number of right interactions that A opens
up), and outputs what E outputs (i.e., an emulated view of ˜ A
˜ O).
Experiment EXP1: This experiment proceeds identically to EXP0, except that it
166emulates the decommitment oracle ˜ O for ˜ A using the witnesses that E ex-
tracts during its execution.
Recallthatduringtheexecution E
˜ A
˜ O(1n;z;)(1n;m), whenever E makesaquery
Q to ˜ A
˜ O, for every accepting commitment of hCt;Rti in Q, E outputs on its
special output tape a witness of the statement proved in Stage 6 of that
commitment1. On the other hand, when ˜ A
˜ O is invoked with a query Q,
for every accepting commitment of hCt;Rti in Q, it queries ˜ O in order to
obtain a decommitment; here, experiment EXP1 emulates ˜ O by returning
the appropriate witness that E outputs on its special output tape.
Intuitively, both experiments EXP0 and EXP1 uses the concurrent extraction
strategy E to emulate the view of A in hybrid H0. Since E is conforming, it
runs internally many threads of executions with A (incorporated in ˜ A) and may
rewind A in order to extract witnesses; in each rewinding, messages from the
right receiver are emulated honestly and independently (by E), as well as that
from the left committer (by ˜ A). The only difference between EXP0 and EXP1 is
that in the former, the decommitments of the right commitments are obtained
using brute force search (with help from ˜ O), whereas in the latter, they are em-
ulated using the witnesses extracted by E. Let EXPb(A;n;z) describe emulated
view of A in EXPb (formally, it is the view of A embedded in the view of ˜ A
˜ O
output by E). By construction and the statistical simulation property of E, the
output of E
˜ A
˜ O
is statistically close the view of ˜ A
˜ O. Then since ˜ A
˜ O emulates the
real view of A in H0 perfectly, we have fEXP0(A;n;z)g and

hyb0(A;n;z)
	
are sta-
tistically close. Furthermore, we show below in Subclaim 6 that the probability
of A cheating in the view emulated by EXP1 is negligible; in fact Subclaim 6
1More accurately, E outputs a witness for every block in Stage 6 of the commitment; since all
blocks have the same statement, it sufﬁces to consider one of the witnesses as the witness of the
statement proved in Stage 6.
167proves something even stronger that the probability of A cheating in any thread
emulated by E in EXP1 is negligible. In Subclaim 7, we show that the emulated
view of A in EXP0 and EXP1 are statistically close. Therefore, we obtain that the
probability that A cheats in the view emulated by EXP0 is negligible. Thus the
probability of cheating in H0 is also negligible.
Subclaim 6. The probability that A cheats in any thread in the emulation by E in EXP1
is negligible.
Subclaim 7. Ensembles fEXP0(A;n;z)gn2N;z2f0;1g and fEXP1(A;n;z)gn2N;z2f0;1g are sta-
tistically close.
Proof of Subclaim 6. Assume for contradiction that there is a polynomial p, such
that, for inﬁnitely many n 2 N and z 2 f0;1g, A cheats in some thread in EXP1
with probability 1=p(n). Then we construct another PPT machine B that can
invert the one-way function f.
Towards this, we ﬁrst construct a PPT machine B0 that on input a value y
(together with n, z) gives a WISSP proof of a statement x, such that, with high
probability, the only valid witnesses of x are pre-images of y through f. Then
machine B can be constructed by incorporating B0 and extracting a witness from
the WISSP proof; by the special-soundness property, the extracted witness
must be a pre-image of y, and thus B violates the one-wayness of f.
Machine B0 proceeds identically to EXP1, except the following: It picks at
random a thread and a commitment in that thread; in that commitment, it
feeds A the value y in Stage 1, and forwards the statement and messages of
the WISSP proof in Stage 5 externally. Since B0 emulates EXP1 perfectly, it fol-
lows from our hypothesis that the probability that A cheats in some thread in B0
168is 1=p(n). Then, since there are at most a polynomial number of threads and a
polynomial number of commitments in each thread, with non-negligible prob-
ability, B0 guesses correctly the commitment in which A cheats. In that commit-
ment, A commits to a “trapdoor” in Stage 4; as a result, the only valid witnesses
of the Stage 5 WISSP proof are pre-images of y. Therefore, with non-negligible
probability, B0 gives a WISSP proof whose witnesses are pre-images of y. 
Proof of Subclaim 7. The only difference between EXP0 and EXP1 lies in how the
decommitments of the right commitments are emulated. Therefore, to show
that fEXP1(A;n;z)g is statistically close to fEXP0(A;n;z)g, it sufﬁces to show that
EXP1 emulates the decommitments in a way statistically close to that in EXP0.
That is, it sufﬁces to show that in every thread (in emulation by E) in EXP1,
whenever a right commitment completes successfully, E already extracts a wit-
ness and the witness is a valid decommitment. By Subclaim 6, A (almost) never
cheats in any thread in EXP1. Therefore, if E succeeds in extracting a witness for
a right commitment, the witness must be a valid decommitment. Thus it boils
down to show that E always extracts successfully in EXP
1
0.
By the concurrent extraction property, the extractor E (almost) always ex-
tracts successfully in EXP0. Assume for contradiction that this is not the case in
EXP1, that is, in some thread, when a right commitment completes successfully,
E fails to output a valid witness for it. Consider the ﬁrst commitment for which
this happens, it follows from the argument above that, before this commitment
completes, EXP1 emulates all the decommitments (almost) perfectly, and thus
the view of E in EXP1 is (almost) identical to that in EXP0. Then the probability
that E extracts a witness for that commitment in EXP1 is (almost) the same as
that in EXP0 which is overwhelming. This gives a contradiction. Therefore, we
169conclude the subclaim. 
Proof of Claim 9 Fix any adversary A and any i = i(n). We want to show that
if the probability that A cheats in Hi is negligible, then (1) the views of A in Hi
and Hi+1 are indistinguishable and (2) the probability that A cheats in Hi+1 is also
negligible. Below we ﬁrst prove the second condition, and then show that fol-
lowing almost the same proof the ﬁrst condition also holds.
PROVING (2)—The probability that A cheats in Hi+1 is negligible.
Recall that hybrid Hi+1 proceeds almost identically to Hi, except that it simulates
a small “part” of the left interaction in a different but still indistinguishable way.
By construction, the “part” where Hi and Hi+1 differ consists of either a com-
mitment of h ˜ C; ˜ Ri (when i = 1 or i = ` + 2) or a “short” sub-protocol with at
most  rounds (otherwise). Then, provided that the decommitment oracle O in
Hi and Hi+1 can be emulated efﬁciently, it essentially follows from respectively
the non-malleability and -robustness of Stage 4 that the probability A cheats in
Hi and Hi+1 differ by at most a negligible amount, and hence the second condi-
tion holds. More precisely, let part(i) denote the set of left-interaction messages
where Hi and Hi+1 differ. Assume for contradiction that there exists a polyno-
mial p such that for inﬁnitely many n 2 N and z 2 f0;1g, A cheats in Hi+1 with
probability 1=p(n). We show how to derive a contradiction by relying on the
-robust non-malleability of h ˜ C; ˜ Ri and a robust concurrent extraction strategy
of hCt;Rti.
By our hypothesis, there must exists a j = j(n) (in [m(n)]) such that in Hi+1,
A cheats in the ﬁrst j right interactions with a negligible probability (n), but
170cheats in the ﬁrst j + 1 right interactions with a polynomial probability 1=p0(n),
(where the right interactions are ordered by the completion of their Stage 4 com-
mitment.) Let ˜ Hi and ˜ Hi+1 denote respectively the executions of Hi and Hi+1 that
are cut-off immediately after A completes Stage 4 of the jth right interaction.
Consider the following two experiments that emulates the executions of ˜ Hi and
˜ Hi+1 using a robust concurrent extraction strategy. Recall that protocol hCt;Rti
contains  blocks of special-sound proofs, where  = max(2k + 1;t) is greater
than 2k. Therefore by Proposition 8 and 10, there exists a conforming 2k-robust
concurrent extraction strategy E for hCt;Rti.
Experiment EXP
i
0[u]: This experiment emulates an execution of ˜ Hi or ˜ Hi+1, by
viewing A together with the left committer ˆ C as a concurrent committer ˜ A
of hCt;Rti (as in EXP0), that additionally interacts with a 2k-round machine
B, and then applying E to emulate the interaction between ˜ A and B.
Formally, ˜ A (as ˜ A in EXP0,) internally emulates an execution of ˜ Hi with
A, by forwarding the right commitments from A externally to an honest
receiver ˆ R, obtaining decommitment information through the decommit-
ment oracle ˜ O of com, and emulating messages in the left interaction for A
as the left committer in ˜ Hi does; in the end, ˜ A outputs the emulated view
of A. Furthermore, ˜ A (different from ˜ A in EXP0,) cuts off the execution im-
mediately after the completion of Stage 4 of the jth right interaction, and it
additionally forwards messages in part(i) of the left interaction and that in
Stage 4 of the jth right interaction externally to machine B. Machine B, on
input u 2 f0;1g, responds to messages in part(i) of the left interaction as the
left committer in Hi+u does, and to that in Stage 4 of the right interaction as
the honest receiver ˜ R of h ˜ C; ˜ Ri does; ﬁnally, it outputs the transcript of mes-
sages it sends/receives. By construction, ˜ A
˜ O acts externally as a concurrent
171committer of hCt;Rti and interacts with B in at most 2k rounds; internally,
it emulates internally the view of A in ˜ Hi or ˜ Hi+1 perfectly, depending on
the input u of B.
Experiment EXP
i
0[u] emulates an interaction between B(u) and ˜ A
˜ O by run-
ning B(u) with E
˜ A
˜ O
. Since ˜ A outputsan emulatedview V of A andforwards
Stage 4 of the jth right interaction in V to B, so does E
˜ A
˜ O
.
Experiment EXP
i
1[u]: This experiment proceeds identically to EXP
i
0[u], except
that it emulates the decommitment oracle ˜ O for ˜ A using the witnesses that
E extracts during its execution as in EXP1.
Let EXP
i
b[u](A;n;z) describe the joint distribution of the output of E together
with the value it commits to B(u) using h ˜ C; ˜ Ri in EXP
i
b[u]. By the statistical simu-
lation property of E, the joint output of E and Bin EXP
i
0[u] is statistically close to
that of ˜ A
˜ O and B. Since the output of ˜ A
˜ O is an emulated view of A that distributes
identically to the real view of A in ˜ Hi+u, and the outputs of B is the transcript of
messages it sends/receives, which decides the value that ˜ A commits to using
h ˜ C; ˜ Ri, we have that EXP
i
0[u](A;n;z) is statistically close to the emulated view of
A by ˜ A
˜ O and the value it commits to B. Since the commitment that ˜ A sends to B is
forwarded from Stage 4 of the jth interaction in the emulated view of A, we de-
rive that EXP
i
0[u](A;n;z) is statistically close to ˜ hybi+u(A;n;z), where ˜ hybi+u(A;n;z)
denotes the view of A in ˜ Hi+u and the value it commits to in Stage 4 of right
interaction j. Formally
Subclaim 8. For every u 2 f0;1g, it holds that the ensembles
n
˜ hybi+u(A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
and
n
EXP
i
0[u](A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g are statistically close.
Furthermore, below we show that the emulated view of A together with
172the value E commits to in experiment EXP
i
0[u] are statistically close to that in
EXP
i
1[u].
Subclaim 9. For every u, it holds that the two ensembles
n
EXP
i
0[u](A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
and
n
EXP
i
1[u](A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g are statistically close.
Finally, since in EXP
i
1[u] the decommitment oracle ˜ O is emulated efﬁciently
using the witnesses extracted by E, machine E with black-box access to ˜ A runs
in polynomial time. Therefore, it follows from the -robust non-malleability
of h ˜ C; ˜ Ri that the view of E
˜ A and the value it commits to using h ˜ C; ˜ Ri (to B),
after receiving messages in part(i) of the left interaction in EXP
i
1[0] and EXP
i
1[1]
(simulated indistinguishably by B(0) and B(1)) are indistinguishable. That is,
Subclaim 10. Ensembles
n
EXP
i
1[0](A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g and
n
EXP
i
1[1](A;n;z)
o
n2N;z2f0;1g
are computationally indistinguishable.
Therefore, itfollowsfromahybridargumentthat ˜ hybi(A;n;z)and ˜ hybi+1(A;n;z)
are computationally indistinguishable, implying that the value A commits to in
the jth right interaction is indistinguishable in ˜ Hi and ˜ Hi+1. This contradicts with
our hypothesis and we conclude that the probability that A cheats in Hi+1 is neg-
ligible. Below for completeness, we provide the formal proof of Subclaim 9.
Proof of Subclaim 9. Fix any u. This subclaim essentially follows from the fact
that A (almost) never cheats in ˜ Hi and ˜ Hi+1. (Note that, though A may commit
to a trapdoor in the jth right interaction in ˜ Hi+1, this right interaction is never
completed successfully, since the execution is cut off immediately after Stage
4 of the jth right interaction.) Then we claim that in experiment EXP
i
0[u], the
probability that A cheats in any accepting commitment in any thread emulated
173by E is negligible. This follows from the fact that E is conforming, meaning
that in every thread, it emulates messages to A perfectly as in ˜ Hi+u; then if in
EXP
i
0[u], E, with probability p, can generate a thread in which A cheats in an
acceptingcommitment, thenwithatleastprobability p=w, suchathreadappears
in ˜ Hi+u, where w is an upper bound on the number of threads that E generates.
Therefore the probability that A cheats in any accepting commitment in EXP
i
0[u]
is negligible.
Furthermore, it follows from the concurrent extraction property of E that, E
always succeeds in extracting a valid witness for every accepting right interac-
tionin EXP
i
0[u]. Thenitfollowsfromthefactthat Anevercheatsinanyaccepting
commitments in EXP
i
0[u], we have that the witnesses extracted by E are indeed
the unique decommitments of these accepting commitments. Therefore, it is
equivalent to replace the decommitment from the oracle ˜ O used in EXP
i
0[u] with
the witnesses extracted by E used in EXP
i
1[u]. Therefore
n
EXP
i
0[u](A;n;z)
o
and
n
EXP
i
1[u](A;n;z)
o
are statistically close. 
PROVING (1)—The view of A is indistinguishable in Hi and Hi+1.
Recall that Hi and Hi+1 only differ at part(i) of the left interaction. Provided that
the decommitment oracle O can be emulated efﬁciently without violating the
indistinguishability of part(i) in Hi and Hi+1, then the indistinguishability of the
view of A in Hi and Hi+1 would simply follow from the indistinguishability of
part(i). Towards this, we follow the same proof idea as above, since part(i) of the
left interaction consists of at most k messages, we can use the same conforming
2k-robust concurrent extraction strategy E as above to simulate the decommit-
ment oracle O, and show the correctness of the emulation by considering the
following experiments.
174Experiment ˆ EXP
i
0[u]: This experiment proceeds identically to EXP
i
0[u] except
the following: Consider machines ˆ A and ˆ B that proceed identically to ˜ A
and B, except that ˆ A only forwards part(i) of the left interaction (without
Stage 4 of the jth right interaction) in the emulated view of A to ˆ B. Then
ˆ EXP
i
0[u] emulates the execution between ˆ B and ˆ A by running ˆ B with E
ˆ A
˜ O
as EXP
i
0[u] does.
Experiment ˆ EXP
i
1[u]: Similar to EXP
i
1[u], this experiment emulates the execu-
tion of ˆ EXP
i
0[u], by replacing answers from the decommitment oracle ˜ O
with the appropriate witnesses that E extracts during its execution.
Let ˆ EXP
i
b[u](A;n;z) describe the emulated view of A in ˆ EXP
i
b[u]. It follows from
the statistical simulation property of E that ˆ EXP
i
b[u](A;n;z) (i.e., the output of E)
is statistically close the emulated view of A in ˆ A (i.e., the output of ˆ A), which in
turn, by construction, is identical to the real view of A in Hi+u. That is,
Subclaim 11. For every u 2 f0;1g, it holds that the ensembles

hybi+u(A;n;z)
	
n2N;z2f0;1g
and

ˆ EXP
i
0[u](A;n;z)

n2N;z2f0;1g are statistically close.
Then, towards establishing the indistinguishability of the view of A in Hi
and Hi+1, it sufﬁces to show the same claims as Subclaim 9 and 10 with respect
to ˆ EXP
i
b[u](A;n;z).
Subclaim 12. For every u, it holds that the two ensembles

ˆ EXP
i
0[u](A;n;z)

n2N;z2f0;1g
and

ˆ EXP
i
1[u](A;n;z)

n2N;z2f0;1g are statistically close.
Subclaim 13. Ensembles

ˆ EXP
i
1[0](A;n;z)

n2N;z2f0;1g and

ˆ EXP
i
1[1](A;n;z)

n2N;z2f0;1g
are computationally indistinguishable.
Subclaim 12 essentially follows from the same proof as in Subclaim 9, except
that now we rely on the fact that A never cheats in Hi+1 (proved in the previous
175step) to establish that the witnesses extracted by E must be valid decommit-
ments in ˆ EXP
i
0[1] (whereas in the proof of Subclaim 9, we rely on the hypothesis
that A never cheats in the ﬁrst j right interactions). Subclaim 13 follows from a
similar argument as in Subclaim 10: Since the decommitment oracle is emulated
efﬁciently in ˆ EXP
i
1[u], the views of E after receiving part(i) of the left interaction
in ˆ EXP
i
1[u]and ˆ EXP
i
1[u](simulatedindistinguishablyby ˆ B(0)and ˆ B(1)), areindis-
tinguishable; therefore so are the outputs

ˆ EXP
i
1[0](A;n;z)

and

ˆ EXP
i
1[0](A;n;z)

of E. Finally, by a hybrid argument, we conclude that the view of A in Hi and
Hi+1 is indistinguishable.
Proof of t-Robustness
In this section, we extend the proof in the last section to show that hCt;Rti is
also robust CCA-secure w.r.t. O. Towards this, we need to show that there exists
a simulator S, such that, for every PPT adversary A and every PPT t-round
ITM B, the joint output in the interaction between B and A with access to O is
indistinguishable from that between B and S A.
The construction of the simulator S is very similar to the construction of
experiment ˆ EXP
i
1[u] in the last section. Recall that protocol hCt;Rti contains 
blocks of special-sound proofs, where  = max(2k + 1;t) is greater than t. There-
fore by Proposition 8 and 10, there exists a conforming t-robust concurrent ex-
traction strategy E for hCt;Rti. In analogy to the proof in the last section, we ﬁrst
construct a simulator S 0 that is similar to experiment ˆ EXP
i
0[u] and may take ex-
ponential time. On a high-level, S 0, with black-box oracle access to an adversary
A, externally interacts with an arbitrary t-round ITM B, and internally simulates
an execution between B and AO as follows: Consider machine ¯ A (similar to ˆ A
176and ˜ A) that when interacting with B on the left and the honest receiver ˆ R on the
right, internally emulates an execution with A by forwarding messages from
B to A, messages from A belonging to right commitments of hCt;Rti to ˆ R, and
emulating the decommitment messages from O using a decommitment oracle
˜ O of com; ﬁnally ¯ A returns the output of A; then S 0 simply invokes the t-robust
conforming extraction strategy E over ¯ A
˜ O and outputs whatever E outputs (dur-
ing the execution of E, S 0 emulates the oracle ¯ A for E using its own oracle A).
It follows from the statistical simulation property of E that the joint output in
the interaction between AO and B is statistically close to that in the interaction
between S 0 and B.
The only problem is that S 0 runs in exponential time since the decommit-
ment oracle ˜ O does. Then using the same idea as in ˆ EXP
i
1[u], the actual simu-
lator S proceeds identically to S 0 except that it emulates ˜ O using the witnesses
extracted by E. To show that the joint output in the interaction between S and
B distributes correctly, it sufﬁces to show that it is statistically close to the joint
output in the interaction between S 0 and B. As in the proof of Subclaim 9 and 12,
since the only difference between S and S 0 lies in how the decommitment mes-
sages are emulated, this boils down to show that the witnesses that E extracts in
S 0 are always valid decommitment. It follows from the same proof as in Claim 8
that the probability that A with access to O cheats in an interaction with B is
negligible. Therefore, since E is conforming, the probability that A cheats in
any thread emulated by E in S 0 is also negligible. Hence, the witnesses that E
extracts in S 0 must be valid decommitment, and S is a valid simulator.
Remark 4. The protocol hCt;Rti described in Section 5.1 uses a statistically binding
commitment scheme with unique decommitment. It can be modiﬁed to work with any
arbitrary statistically binding commitment com as follows: In Stage 2, the committer
177commits to the value v using com once—referred to as the ﬁrst commitment—and ad-
ditionally commits to a decommitment of the ﬁrst commitment using com—referred to
as the second commitment. In the rest of the protocol, use the decommitment of the ﬁrst
commitment decided uniquely by the statistical binding property of the second commit-
ment as the unique decommitment of Stage 2. It follows using almost the same proofs
as above that the modiﬁed protocol is a t-robust CCA-secure commitment scheme.
5.2.3 Constant-Round Robust CCA-Secure Protocol w.r.t. PQT
Atag-basedefﬁcientlyveriﬁablecommitmentist-robust CCA-secure w.r.t. quasi-
polynomial time Turing machines, or PQT if it satisﬁes the Deﬁnitions 23 and 24
inchapter4withthenotionoffeasiblecomputationchangedfromPPT toPQT.
Similarly, for other cryptographic primitives, we can also consider a version of
the primitive w.r.t. PQT.
Let h ¯ Ct; ¯ Rti be a protocol that proceeds identically to hCt;Rti except that all
the primitives used in hCt;Rti (including one-way functions, statistically bind-
ingcommitments, ZK proof, non-malleablecommitmentsandWISSPproofs)
are replaced with corresponding primitives secure w.r.t. quasi-polynomial time
adversaries. It follows from Proposition 9 and syntactically the same proof as
Proposition 11 that the following holds.
Proposition 12. Set the polynomial l to 3. Then h ¯ Ct; ¯ Rti is t-robust CCA secure w.r.t.
O for quasi-polynomial time adversaries.
Assumingtheexistenceofone-wayfunctionshardforquasi-polynomialtime
adversaries, there exist constant-round statistically binding commitments, ZK
178proof, non-malleablecommitmentsandWISSPproofshardforquasi-polynomial
time adversaries. (A ZK proof secure against quasi-polynomial time adver-
saries can be obtained by instantiating the 3-round GMW protocol [GMW91]
with a statistically binding commitment that is hiding for quasi-polynomial
time adversaries and repeating it in parallel for !(logn) times). Instantiating
h ¯ Ct; ¯ Rti with these constant-round primitives, we obtain a O(t)-round t-robust
CCA secure commitment scheme based on one-way functions hard for quasi-
polynomial time. Therefore, for every constant t, we obtain a constant-round
t-robust CCA-secure commitment scheme w.r.t. PQT based on one-way func-
tions hard for PQT. This concludes Theorem 12
5.3 4-Robust Commitment Has ˜ 
(logn) Rounds
In this section, we show the following theorem.
Theorem14. Anyefﬁcientlyveriﬁablecommitmentschemethatis4-robusthas ˜ 
(logn)
rounds.
Therefore our !(logn)-round CCA secure commitment scheme that is t-robust
for any constant t has optimal round complexity (up to a logarithmic factor).
Proof. Towards the theorem, we show that the existence of a k-round 4-robust
commitment scheme implies the existence of a (k + 4)-round black-box concur-
rent ZK argument. Then the theorem simply follows from the lower bound
that black-box concurrent ZK protocols require ˜ 
(logn) rounds [CKPR01].
Given a k-round commitment scheme hC;Ri that is 4-robust w.r.t. a decom-
mitment oracle O, we construct the black-box concurrent ZK argument hP;Vi as
179follows. To prove a statement x 2 f0;1gn, the Prover on private input a witness w
and common input 1n, interacts with the Veriﬁer in the following two stages:
Preamble: the Veriﬁer commits to a random value r using hC;Ri. The Prover
aborts if the commitment is not accepting. Let T be the transcript of the
commitment.
Proof Phase: theProverprovesusinga4-roundWISSPproofsystemthestate-
ment that either x is true or T is a valid commitment of hC;Ri.
By construction, the protocol hP;Vi consists of k + 4 messages. It follows from
standard technique that this protocol is complete and sound. To show that the
protocol is also black-box concurrent ZK, we need to establish that there exists
a simulator S, such that for every malicious veriﬁer V, inputs n, x and z, the
simulator on input 1n and x, with black-box access to V(z), outputs a view that
is indistinguishable from the real view of V. Towards this we ﬁrst construct a
simulator S 0 that has access to the decommitment oracle O, and then remove the
use of the oracle by relying on the 4-robustness property of hC;Ri.
Simulator S 0 with black box access to a veriﬁer V and O, internally simu-
lates an execution with V, by forwarding all the commitments of hC;Ri in the
Preamble Phase from V to O, which returns a decommitment for every accept-
ing commitment, and then simulating the WISSP proofs in the Proof Stage
using the decommitment as a “trapdoor”. Finally S 0 outputs the view of V in
thesimulation. Toshowthat theoutputviewof S 0 distributescorrectly, consider
the following sequence of hybrids H0 to Hm(n), where m(n) is an upper bound on
the total number of sessions that V opens up:
Hybrid Hi: H0 proceedsidenticallytoS 0, exceptthatitonlysimulatestheWISSP
180proofs in the ﬁrst i interactions, using the decommitments returned by O;
the rest of interactions are emulated using an honest witness.
Since the output of H0 distributes identically to the real view of V and that of
Hm(n) distributes identically to the output of S 0. To show the correctness of S 0, it
sufﬁces to show that the outputs of Hi and Hi+1 are indistinguishable. Towards
this, consider the following machines A and B: Machine A with oracle access to
O, internally proceeds identically to Hi, except that, it forwards the statement
x and messages of the WISSP proof in the i + 1th interaction externally to B,
together with the valid witness w and the trapdoor  obtained from O; in the
end, A outputs what Hi outputs; machine B on input b, acts as an honest prover
of the WISSP proof using witness w if b = 0 and  if b = 1. By construction,
when the input of Bis 0, AO internally emulates an execution of Hi, and when the
inputis1, itemulatesanexecutionof Hi+1. Sincemachine Bonlyinteractsinfour
rounds, it follows from the 4-robustness of hC;Ri that there exists a simulator C
such that C with black box access to A, when interacting with B(b), emulates
the interaction between AO and B(b). That is, the joint output of CA and B(b)
is indistinguishable to that of AO and B(b). Then since the outputs of CA when
interacting with B on input 0 or 1 are indistinguishable (by the WI property of
the proof), the outputs of AO when interacting with B on input 0 or 1 are also
indistinguishable, which respectively distributes identically to the output of Hi
and Hi+1. Thusweconcludethattheoutputsof Hi and Hi+1 areindistinguishable,
and the output of S 0 is correctly distributed.
Using S 0, we construct the actual simulator S that does not have access to
the decommitment oracle O, again by replying on the 4-robustness of hC;Ri.
Consider an protocol hA; Bi where A and B does not interact with each other and
181simplyoutputanemptystring. SincetheprotocolhA; Biisempty, itfollowsfrom
the 4-robustness of hC;Ri that, there exists a simulator C, such that C with black
box access to S 0V
(when interacting with A) emulates the execution of S 0V;O
(when interacting with A). That is, the output of C, with black box access to S 0V
is indistinguishable to the output of S 0V
with access to O. Then the simulator
S simply internally incorporates C and S 0, and emulates the execution of CS 0V
,
using its oracle access to V, and outputs what C outputs. Then since the output
of S 0 distributes correctly, we have that the output of S also distributes correctly.
Thus S is a valid simulator for hP;Vi 
5.4 ImprovingEfﬁciencyofUCwithSuper-PolynomialHelpers
Given our new constructions of robust CCA-secure commitment schemes, we
immediately obtain more round-efﬁcient protocols satisfying UC-security with
super-polynomial time helpers.
By Theorem 12, there exists a !(logn)-round commitment scheme hC;Ri that
is robust CCA-secure w.r.t. a decommitment oracle O, based on one-way func-
tions. Then, let H0 be a helper functionality that acts as the decommitment
oracle O, as H in Figure 4.5 in Section 4.6. Then it follows from the same proof
as in Section 4.6 that
Theorem 15. Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations. Then for every
well-formed functionality F, there exists a !(logn)-round protocol  that H0-EUC-
emulates F.
Furthermore, since the construction in Section 4.6 actually only requires a
182CCA-secure commitment scheme that is t-robust for a ﬁxed constant t. By Theo-
rem 13, there exists a constant-round t-robust CCA-secure commitment scheme
h ¯ Ct; ¯ Rti, based on owe-way functions hard for PQT. Then, let H00 be a helper
functionality acting as the decommiment oracle corresponding to the robust
CCA-security property of h ¯ Ct; ¯ Rti. Again, it follows syntactically the same proof
as in Section 4.6 that
Theorem 16. Assume the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations secure w.r.t.
quasi-polynomial time adversaries. Then for every well-formed functionality F, there
exists a constant-round protocol  that H00-EUC-emulates F.
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